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A B S T R A C T
Networks of embedded devices are becoming increasingly popular. Examples of such
networks range from small ecosystems, such as home and building automation, to very
large infrastructure, e.g., industrial control systems. Devices in these networks usually
collect private information and perform safety- and security-critical operations. There-
fore, attacks targeting them are critical as they threaten both privacy and safety of hu-
mans, and are capable of causing extreme physical damage. A prominent example of
such attacks is characterized by the Stuxnet worm which targets industrial control sys-
tems and is suspected to have caused substantial damage to Iran’s nuclear program. In
fact, three classes of attacks are relevant in the context of large embedded networks.
These are malware infestation, physical, and runtime attacks.
In this dissertation, we investigate the security of large embedded networks in differ-
ent deployment scenarios and provide security solutions that allow to scalably secure
and manage these networks. In particular, we identify the adversarial assumptions and
security requirements for every scenario and provide security protocols, based on re-
mote attestation, that allow the detection of attacks belonging to the three aforemen-
tioned classes.
In order to secure large embedded networks, this dissertation presents the design and
implementation of several scalable attestation protocols for centralized and autonomous
networks. First, we present three scalable attestation protocols for centralized embedded
networks that allows the detection of malware infestation attacks. These are accompa-
nied with a systematic treatment of the problem that allows identifying and fulfilling all
security requirements. Second, we investigate the problem of physical attacks on large
embedded networks defining the capabilities of a physical attacker, and design two scal-
able attestation protocols that efficiently detect physical attacks in both centralized and
autonomous settings. Third, we design a scalable attestation protocol that is capable
of efficiently detecting runtime attacks on autonomous systems without disrupting the
functionality or safety requirements of these systems. Finally, since management and
software updates represent a critical requirement for securing a device as well as an
important entry point for attackers, we also present a scalable management protocol for
large networks that allows to securely and efficiently broadcast management commands
and collect statistics regarding all devices in an embedded network.
III
Z U S A M M E N FA S S U N G
Netzwerke eingebetteter Geräte werden immer beliebter. Beispiele solcher Netzwerke
reichen von relativ kleinen Umgebungen wie der Haus- und Gebäudeautomation bis
hin zu sehr großen Infrastrukturen, z. B. industriellen Steuerungssystemen. Geräte in
diesen Netzwerken sammeln oft private Informationen und führen sicherheitskritische
Vorgänge aus. Daher sind Angriffe, die auf sie abzielen, von entscheidender Bedeu-
tung, da sie sowohl die Privatsphäre als auch die Sicherheit von Personen bedrohen
und zu großen Schäden führen können. Ein prominentes Beispiel für solche Angriffe
ist der Stuxnet-Wurm, der auf industrielle Kontrollsysteme abzielt und vermutlich das
iranische Nuklearprogramm erheblich beschädigt hat. Tatsächlich sind insbesondere
drei Angriffskategorien im Zusammenhang mit großen eingebetteten Netzwerken rel-
evant. Diese sind Malware-Befall, physische Angriffe sowie Laufzeitangriffe.
In dieser Dissertation untersuchen wir die Sicherheit großer eingebetteter Netzw-
erke in verschiedenen Implementierungsszenarien und stellen Sicherheitslösungen vor,
mit denen diese Netzwerke auf eine skalierbare Weise gesichert und verwaltet werden
können. Insbesondere identifizieren wir relevante Annahmen über den Angreifer und
jeweilige Sicherheitsanforderungen für jedes dieser Szenarien und stellen auf Remote-
Attestierung beruhende Sicherheitsprotokolle vor, mit denen Angriffe der drei zuvor
genannten Klassen erkannt werden können.
Um große eingebettete Netzwerke abzusichern, werden in dieser Dissertation mehrere
skalierbare Attestierungsprotokolle für zentralisierte und autonome Netzwerke entwor-
fen und implementiert. Zunächst stellen wir drei skalierbare Attestierungsprotokolle für
zentralisierte eingebettete Netzwerke vor, die die Erkennung von Malware-Angriffen er-
möglichen. Diese werden begleitet von einer systematischen Behandlung des Problems,
durch die alle Sicherheitsanforderungen erkannt und erfüllt werden können. Zweitens
untersuchen wir das Problem physischer Angriffe auf große eingebettete Netzwerke,
definieren die Fähigkeiten eines physischen Angreifers und entwerfen zwei skalierbare
Attestierungsprotokolle, mit denen physische Angriffe sowohl in zentralen als auch in
autonomen Umgebungen effizient erkannt werden können. Drittens entwerfen wir ein
skalierbares Attestierungsprotokoll, welches Laufzeitangriffe auf autonome Systeme ef-
fizient erkennen kann, ohne die Funktionalität oder Sicherheitsanforderungen dieser
Systeme zu beeinträchtigen. Da Management- und Softwareupdates eine wichtige Vo-
raussetzung fÃŒr die Sicherung eines Gerätes sowie einen wichtigen Einstiegspunkt
fÃŒr Angreifer darstellen, stellen wir außerdem ein skalierbares Verwaltungsprotokoll
für große Netzwerke vor, mit dem Verwaltungsbefehle sicher und effizient gesendet und
Statistiken über allen Geräten in einem eingebetteten Netzwerk erfasst werden können.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Embedded systems are increasingly pervading every aspect of our daily lives. The num-
ber of deployed systems has been rapidly growing in the past decade. According to
Cisco, 50 billion of such systems are expected to be deployed by 2020. The ever in-
creasing development and deployment of embedded systems, in addition to their inter-
connection through the legacy internet has enabled a wide range of applications. This
phenomenon is referred to as the Internet of Things (IoT). Examples of IoT deployment
include personal devices such as smart gadgets, small ecosystems such as home/office
automation, and very large scale deployments such as industrial control systems and
autonomous systems.
Embedded system are usually special-purpose devices designed to perform restricted
tasks. They have constrained resources in terms of memory, computational power, and
energy. They are also constrained in terms of size. As a consequence, such systems lack
the security features of legacy computing device such as memory virtualization, and
secure cryptographic co-processor, e.g., Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Moreover, due
to their prevasiveness, increasing sensing and actuating capabilities, and their processing
of sensitive information, embedded systems represent an attractive target for attacks.
They have been the target of several successful attacks that actually caused real physical
damage. Popular examples include the Stuxnet episde [148], and the recent HVAC [149]
and Jeeb attacks [5].
Attacks on embedded systems range from remote software attacks, where the attacker
manipulates a device’s software state from afar by either installing malicious code also
known as malware infestation or by mounting runtime attacks that alter the execution
of the code without changing its binaries, to physical or hardware attacks where the
attacker exploits physical proximity to a victim device to modify its hardware and/or
extract its secrets. Unlike physical attacks, remote software attacks are scalable as they
require no physical proximity to the victim device, whereas the attacker is limited to
physically attacking a small number of devices.
The most prominent example of malware infestation is the stuxnet worm [148] that
targeted nuclear centrifugers leading to catastrophic consequences. Similarly, the power
of runtime attacks has been demonstrated by the turing complete Return-Oriented Pro-
gramming (ROP) attack [127], where the attacker exploits a memory corruption vulner-
ability such as a buffer overflow to maliciously modify control-flow data and execute an
arbitrary malicious functionality. Finally, physical attacks can be either invasive requir-
ing the adversary to disassemble the device and extract its components, or non-invasive
such as side channel attacks that exploit physical properties of the device, e.g., electro-
magnetic radiations, to extract device’s secrets during normal operation. Physical attacks
on stand-alone devices such as personal gadgets are insignificant, as such devices are
almost always attended. However, devices in very large installation are spread over a
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very large area and can be within the attacker’s grasp, e.g., equipment outside a smart
factory or drones in an autonomous system.
Remote attestation is a security service that allows a trusted entity denoted by verifier
to assess the trustworthiness of a remote (possibly malicious) device – the prover. It is
established as an interactive protocol through which the prover sends the verifier a mea-
surement of its software state. The measurement is typically a cryptographic hash of the
prover’s binary. It serves as a proof that the prover’s software has not been maliciously
modified, i.e., has not been infested by malware. This is referred to as static attestation.
Several static attestation schemes have been proposed in the literature. These can be
clustered into three main classes: Software-based attestation [81, 126, 125, 122, 62, 89],
hardware-based attestation [111, 144, 86, 118, 97, 95], and hybrid attestation [52, 84, 57,
28].
Software-based attestation is applicable to legacy and low-end devices as it requires
neither secure hardware nor cryptographic secrets. Its security is rather based on the
limited computational power of the prover and a strict estimation of the time required
to generate a measurement of its software state. The security of software-based attes-
tation is based on strong assumptions that are hard to achieve in practice [15], such
as the adversarial silence during the execution of the attestation protocol, and the opti-
mality of measurement function and its implementation. For this reason software-based
attestation is considered impractical and its applicability is limited to narrow range
of scenarios, e.g., attestation of peripherals. Hardware-based attestation exploits cryp-
tographic co-processors, such as TPM, to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the
measurement. However, its hardware requirements is often too complex and too expen-
sive for embedded systems. Hybrid attestation schemes aim at reducing the hardware
requirements for securing remote attestation. Its is based on devising lightweight secu-
rity architectures that provide similar securiy gaurantees to those of hardware-based
attestation while minimizing the required hardware security features. Examples of such
architecture include SMART [52] and TrustLite [84] that only require a Read-Only Mem-
ory (ROM) and a simple Memory Protection Unit (MPU).
Several recent efforts has lead to the development of Control-Flow Attestation (CFA)
schemes. In these schemes the software state measured by the prover is not a hash of
the software binaries. It is rather a compact representation of the precise control-flow
path followed by the software during execution. Based on the reported measurement
and a database of benign execution paths, the verifier can detect any deviation from the
expected execution of the software, thus detecting control-flow attacks such as ROP [127].
CFA [9, 49, 155] induces a very large overhead on the prover, who is required interrupt
and record every control-flow event, e.g., indirect branches, during software execution;
and on the verifier, who is expected to store and search a very large database of benign
execution paths in order to verify one reported measurement. The prover’s overhead
problem has been addressed by recent CFA schemes [49, 155] that leverage hardware
assistance in order to record the control-flow of a software in parallel to its execution.
These schemes allow CFA with zero runtime overhead on the prover. However, the
verifier’s overhead continues to limit applicability of CFA to very small programs and
hinders its scalability to large networks such as autonomous systems.
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While current industrial trends envision networks of embedded systems that consist
of a very large number of heterogeneous mobile devices, all existing attestation schemes
are geared to the single-device setting and are neither scalable nor directly applicable
to such envisioned networks. For example in industrial control systems a very large
number of devices collaborate to monitor safety-critical processes, and in autonomous
networks intelligent devices collaborate to collectively achieve a common task. On the
other hand, static attestation schemes are not scalable, i.e., they cannot efficiently detect
malware infestation for a large number of devices, and CFA schemes have high veri-
fication overhead and are only applicable to small-size programs. Moreover, all these
schemes vulnerable to physical attacks that are considered out of scope of single-device
attestation schemes while are in fact extremely relevant in emerging scenarios.
1.1 goal and scope of this dissertation
We aim at securing emerging networks of embedded systems by providing security so-
lutions that allow scalable integrity verification as well as secure management and mon-
itoring of such networks. We extend traditional remote attestation to provide efficiency,
scalability, and detection of stronger attackers that either have physical proximity to the
devices or are capable of performing runtime attacks. In particular, the main goal of this
dissertation is introducing the design and implementation of security solutions that are
capable of efficiently detecting a wide range of attacks on embedded systems that are
relevant in large deployments – collective attestation, as well as enabling secure manage-
ment and monitoring of embedded systems in such deployments. In general, we focus
on designing collective attestation schemes that are capable of detecting malware infesta-
tion, runtime attacks, and physical attacks. Our solutions targeting malware infestation
also take into account the possibility of physical attacks in the targeted settings as well
as the severity of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Our runtime attack detection exploits
software modularity and devises a novel execution path representation to allow efficient
CFA of complex embedded software. And, our physical attack detection assumes that
in order to physically attack a device, the attacker has to turn it off for a non-negligible
amount of time. Thus it is capable of detecting invasive physical attacks that require the
attacker to disassemble the device and extract its components. However, non-invasive
attacks such as side channel attacks are considered out of scope. Finally, we provide a
secure management scheme that leverage cache-capable networks and aggregation trees
of untrusted nodes to allow secure management and assessment of embedded devices
using a single low-power management device, e.g., a smart phone.
It is important to note that networks of embedded devices can be either (1) central-
ized involving a central entity that is responsible running and monitoring the network,
e.g., IoT devices in smart environments or industrial control systems in a smart factory;
or (2) decentralized where a multitude of devices perform a collaborative task in dis-
tributed manner forming collectively intelligent systems, e.g., autonomous networks of
drones or robots. In this dissertation we aim at securing both centralized and decentral-
ized autonomous systems. In particular, we devise collective attestation schemes that are
capable of detecting malware infestation and physical attacks in centralized networks
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and autonomous networks. Furthermore, we devise a Control-Flow Attestation (CFA)
scheme that is capable of securing collaboration between devices in autonomous net-
works. Finally, our secure management and assessment scheme requires a central man-
agement entity for distribution of management commands and collection of statistical
information regarding managed devices.
1.2 summary of contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation are listed below:
Systematization of Knowledge on Attestation. We survey the state of the art on attes-
tation and systematically study and classify them. In particular, we present different
possible attacks that are relevant to attestation, i.e., those attacks that either target or
are detected by existing attestation schemes. We also describe different security and per-
formance requirements imposed by different attestation schemes. Existing attestation
schemes are then clustered based on their requirements and the attacks they mitigate
and/or are vulnerable to.
Efficient Collective Attestation Solution. We solution and implement the first attes-
tation solution for detecting malware infestation in large-scale systems. This scheme
presents the first step in a new line of research on multi-device attestation. We further
develop the first security model for collective attestation and show the security of our
scheme in this model. Our approach demonstrates the feasibility of collective attesta-
tion as it enables attesting a million-device network in order of seconds. Efficiency is
achieved by distributing the attestation burden across the network and using symmetric
key cryptography for in-network interactions.
Secure Aggregation and Resiliency to Physical and DoS Attacks. We develop a novel
aggregate signature – Optimistic Aggregate Signature (OAS), which is a combination of
aggregate and multisignatures providing constant verification overhead while allowing
aggregation of signatures on different messages. Based on OAS we present a collective
attestation solution that is resilient against physical attacks on devices involved in the
attestation. The developed solution also provides resiliency against Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks on attestation by requiring the verifier to possess a secure token in order
to perform attestation.
Systematic Treatment of Remote Attestation. We establish collective attestation in cen-
tralized networks on solid ground, by performing a careful analysis of its requirements,
and systematically identifying its software, hardware, as well as protocol components.
To this end, we extract the security properties that should be satisfied by collective attes-
tation, and derive a minimal set of features that enables satisfying these properties. We
further present practical implementations that provide these features.
Secure Detection of Physical Attacks. We devise a security solution that is capable
of detecting both malware infestation and physical attacks on centralized networks of
embedded devices. The solution is based on extending collective attestation with ab-
sence detection that allows devices to detect physical attacks on their peers and report
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it to the verifier. The scheme is based on network-wide heartbeats (i.e., authenticated
timestamps) that are periodically broadcasted by each device in the network proving its
presence at the time indicated by the timestamp.
Collective Attestation for Autonomous Systems. We present a secure collective attesta-
tion solution for autonomous systems that is capable of detecting both malware infes-
tation and physical attacks. Our solution combines continuous peer-to-peer attestation
and periodic local heartbeats with key exchange in order to detect malicious devices in
the system. It also allows devices to be mobile based on a dedicated roaming protocol,
where mobile devices collect proofs of trustworthiness from their old neighbors and
exploit them for establishing new neighbors.
Healing and Attestation for Autonomous Systems. We present the first attestation solu-
tion that allows disinfecting malicious devices by re-installing genuine benign software.
The solution is based on using Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) for measurement of software
state, which allows identifying the exact memory address(es) that were modified by the
adversary. Based on this novel measurement scheme, we devise a healing protocol that
allows efficient disinfection of malicious devices.
Secure Collaboration Based on Control-Flow Attestation (CFA). We develop a security
solution that is capable of securing interaction between devices in autonomous networks
based on efficient CFA. In particular, we present a novel execution path representation
based on Multiset Hash (MSH) functions that enables efficient verification of execution
paths. Moreover, we decompose the software running on autonomous devices into small
interacting software modules. Based on data-flow monitoring, each software module
that is relevant for the generation of every piece of data is identified. In order to secure
devices’ interaction, we enable MSH-based CFA for each module that is relevant to data
exchanged between devices. The software decomposition reduces the amount of code
that should be attested drastically. Along with MSH representation it allows CFA of
autonomous systems where the software is too complex and embedded devices need to
act as both verifiers and provers.
Secure Management and Assessment of Large IoT Deployments. We devise a secure
and scalable management framework that allows efficient management and assessment
of large IoT deployments with a single low-power management device. Our framework
has low storage, communication, and computation overhead on both the managed and
managing devices. It leverages trees of untrusted nodes to distribute domain indepen-
dent management specifications represented by finite state machines, and to efficiently
collect statistics about the status of devices based on a novel secure aggregation protocol.
1.3 outline
This dissertation is organized as follows: We introduce our notation in Chapter 2 and
provide a systematic study of state of the art on attestation in Chapter 3. Then we intro-
duce our collective attestation solutions that are capable of efficiently detecting malware
infestation in centralized networks in Chapter 4, where we also provide a systematic
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treatment of such solutions. Next, in Chapter 5 we describe security solutions that are
capable of detecting both malware infestation and physical attacks in centralized and
autonomous settings. In Chapter 6 we present our security solution that allows secur-
ing interaction between collaborating devices in autonomous networks based on CFA.
Our management and assessment protocol for large IoT deployments is described in
Chapter 7. Finally, we conclude this dissertation in Chapter 8.
1.4 previous publications
This dissertation is based on several previous publications of the author. These publica-
tion are listed below. Note that, the author of this work is the main author of all these
publications. He contributed to the sheer amount of ideas, design, implementation, and
evaluation. For a full list of publications of the author, please refer to Chapter 9.
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2015.
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2
P R E L I M I N A R I E S
2.1 notation
Let M be a finite set, then |M| denotes the number of elements in M. For an integer (or
a bit-string) n, |n| denotes the bit-length of n. We denote by m ∈R M the assignment of
a uniformly sampled element of set M to a variable m. Furthermore, {0, 1}` denotes the
set of all bit-strings having length `. For an event E, we denote by Pr[E] the probability
that E occurs. E can be the result of a security experiment for example. A probability
(`) is negligible if, for every polynomial f, (`) 6 1/f(`) for all sufficiently large ` ∈N.
If Q is a probabilistic algorithm, then b ← Q(a) means that Q assigns its output to
variable b on input a. QR denotes an algorithm Q that arbitrarily interacts with algo-
rithm R while it is executing. We denote by the term prot
[
Q : aQ; R : aR; ∗ : apub
] →
[Q : bQ; R : bR] an interactive protocol prot between two probabilistic algorithms Q and
R, through which, Q (resp. R) gets private input aQ (resp. aR) and public input apub.
During the operation of Q (resp. R), it interacts with R (resp. Q). As a result, Q (resp. R)
outputs bQ (resp. bR).
A network N is a set of interconnected device. The number of devices in the network
is denoted by n. Devices in the network may be either homogeneous or heterogeneous
in terms of software and hardware configurations. A device is denoted by Di. Further,
the network could be either static or dynamic in terms of topology or membership.
Neighboring devices refer to device that have a direct communication link to each other.
We denote that entity the is responsible for maintenance of the network by operator O.
An entity that is interested in verifying the software integrity of the network is called
verifier V. And the device through which the verifier communicate to the network is
called the initiator D1.
2.2 mathematic and cryptographic background
Definition 2.1 (Admissible Pairing). Consider the three multiplicative groups G1, G2 and
GT of prime order p ≈ 2`, where ` ∈ N is some defined security parameter. G1, G2, and GT
are written multiplicatively with the identity element being 1. A mapping e : G1×G2 → GT is
called a pairing if it has the following three properties:
• Bilinear. It should hold that ∀O,O ′ ∈ G1 and ∀P,P ′ ∈ G2:
e(O ·O ′,P · P ′) = e(O,P) · e(O,P ′) · e(O ′,P) · e(O ′,P ′).
• Non-degenerate. It should hold that ∀O ∈ G∗1, ∃P ∈ G∗2 (respectively ∀P ∈ G∗2, ∃O ∈ G∗1)
such that e(O,P) 6= 1.
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• Computable. There exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that computes e(O,P)
∀(O,P) ∈ G1 ×G2.
Let g1 and g2 be generators for G1 and G2 respectively, we call the pairing e admissi-
ble if e(g1,g2) = gT , where gT is a generator for GT .
2.2.1 Computational Intractability Assumptions
Definition 2.2 (Computational co-Diffie-Helman (co-CDH) Assumption). Let G1, G2,
and GT be three groups with large prime order p, let g2 and ga2 be two members of G2 where
a ∈R Z, let h be a member of G1, and let e : G1 ×G2 → GT be an admissible pairing. The
co-CDH assumption states that every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has negligible
advantage (in security parameter ` ∈ Z):
Advco−CDHA = Pr
[
A(g2,ga2 ,h) = h
a].
Definition 2.3 (Decisional co-Diffie-Helman (co-DDH) Assumption). Let G1, G2, and GT
be three groups with large prime order p, let g2 and ga2 be two members of G2 where a ∈R Z,
let h and ha be two members of G1 where b ∈R Z, and let e : G1 ×G2 → GT be an admissible
pairing. Finally, Let Pke denote the tuple (p,G1,G2,GT ,h,g2, e). The co-DDH assumption
in G1 states that every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has negligible advantage (in
security parameter ` ∈ Z):
Advco−DDHA =
∣∣Pr [1← A(Pke,ga2 ,ha)]− Pr [1← A(Pke,ga2 ,hb)]∣∣.
Definition 2.4 (Gap co-Diffie-Helman (co-GDH) Group ). A group G1 of prime order p is a
co-GDH group if in this group: co-CDH assumption holds while co-DDH assumption does not.
2.3 cryptographic primitives
2.3.1 Hash Functions
Definition 2.5 (Hash Functions). Let α,β ∈ N. A hash function hash maps bit strings of
arbitrarily finite length α to bit strings of fixed length β, i.e., hash : {0, 1}α → {0, 1}β
Definition 2.6 (Hash Family). A family of hash functions constitutes the set
{
hashk : {0, 1}α →
{0, 1}β|k ∈ {0, 1}κ} of hash functions indexed by k, where α,β, κ ∈N.
Definition 2.7 (Collision Resistance). A hash function hash is called collision resistant if it
is computationally infeasible to find two distinct inputs values a0 6= a1 such that hash(a0) =
hash(a1), i.e., it should hold that for every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A:
Pr
[
hash(a0) = hash(a1)|(a0,a1)← Ahash
]
6 (α,β).
where  is negligible in α and β.
2.3 cryptographic primitives 11
Definition 2.8 (Multiset Hash (MSH) Functions). A multiset denotes a finite unordered
group of elements where an element may appear more than once. Let M1 and M2 be multisets
of elements from a countable set S of cardinality 2m,m ∈ Z, and let α,β ∈ N. A Multiset
Hash Function is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (H, +H , =H ). On input
a multiset M with a finite number n ∈ {0, 1}α of elements, H outputs a string h with a fixed
length β, i.e., h← H(M). On input of two hashes h1 and h2 of two multisets M1 and M2 (i.e.,
h1 = H(M1) and h2 = H(M2)), =H indicates whether the two multisets M1 and M2 are equal,
i.e., H(M1) =H H(M2) is true iff M1 = M2. h1 and h2 are then called equivalent. On input of
two hashes h1 and h2 of two multisets M1 and M2, +H outputs the hash ha of the addition of
the two multisets M1 and M2, i.e., H(M1 unionmultiM2) =H H(M1) +H H(M2).
Definition 2.9 (Multiset Collision Resistance). Consider a MSH function as defined in Defi-
nition 2.8 (H, +H , =H ) that has security parameters α,β ∈N and let S be a set of cardinality
2m,m ∈ Z. This MSH function is called multiset-collision resistant is computationally infea-
sible to find two distinct multisets M1 6= M2 of elements from S whose cardinalities are of
polynomial size in m such that H(M1) = H(M2), i.e., it should hold that for every probabilistic
polynomial time adversary A:
Pr
[
H(M1) = H(M2)|(M1, M2)← AMSH
]
6 (α,β,m).
where  is negligible in α, β, and m.
2.3.2 Encryption Schemes
Definition 2.10 (Symmetric Encryption Scheme). An encryption scheme is a tuple of prob-
abilistic polynomial time algorithms (genkeyenc, encrypt, decrypt). Let M denote the message
space of the encryption scheme, and C denote its ciphertext space. On input of security parame-
ter `encrypt ∈ N, genkeyenc outputs a secret encryption key k, i.e., k ← genkeyenc(1`encrypt). On
input of a messagem ∈M and key k, encrypt outputs a ciphertext c in C, i.e., c← encrypt(k;m).
Finally, on input of ciphertext c in C and key k, decrypt outputs a message m such that
c = encrypt(k;m), i.e., m← decrypt(k; c). It should hold ∀` ∈N that:
Pr
[
decrypt(k; encrypt(k;m)) = m|k← genkeyenc(1`encrypt)] = 1.
Definition 2.11 (Chosen Plaintext (CPA) Security). Consider an encryption scheme as defined
in Definition 2.10 (genkeyenc, encrypt, decrypt) that has a security parameter `encrypt ∈ N. We
define ExpCPA−bA as a security experiment between a CPA-challenger denoted by C
CPA and
adversary A. CCPA first generates an encryption key k← genkeyenc(1`encrypt). A then generates
two messages m0,m1 ∈ M and sends them to CCPA. As a next step, CCPA generates the
ciphertext cb ← encrypt(k;mb), where b ∈ {0, 1}, and sends cb back to A. Finally, A has to
return the bit b ′ which states whether CCPA has encryptedm0 orm1. The output of this security
experiment is the bit b ′, i.e., ExpCPA−bA = b
′. An encryption scheme is called CPA-secure if
every probabilistic polynomial time adversary A has negligible advantage in `encrypt:
AdvCPAA =
∣∣Pr [ExpCPA−0A = 1]− Pr [ExpCPA−1A = 1]∣∣.
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2.3.3 Authentication Schemes
Definition 2.12 (Message Authentication Code). A Message Authentication Code (MAC)
constitutes a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (genkeymac,mac, vermac). Al-
gorithm genkeymac takes as input security parameter `mac ∈ N, and outputs a secret key k,
i.e., k ← genkeymac(1`mac). The security parameter `mac determines the message space M of
the MAC scheme. Algorithm mac takes as input message m ∈ M and key k, and outputs a
MAC digest µ on m, i.e., µ ← mac(k;m). Finally, algorithm vermac takes as input MAC µ,
message m, and key k, and outputs 1 if µ is a valid MAC digest on m and 0 otherwise, i.e.,
vermac(k;m,µ) ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 2.13 (Signature Scheme). A signature scheme constitutes a tuple of probabilistic
polynomial time algorithms (genkeysign, sign, versig). Algorithm genkeysign takes security pa-
rameter `sign ∈ N as input, and outputs a secret signing key sk and a public verification key pk,
i.e., (sk, pk) ← genkeysign(1`sign). The security parameter `sign determines the message space M
of the signature scheme. Algorithm sign takes a message m ∈M, and secret key sk as input, and
outputs a signature σ on the message m, i.e., σ ← sign(sk;m). Finally, algorithm versig takes
signature σ, message m, and public key pk as input, and outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature on m
and 0 otherwise, i.e., versig(pk;m,σ) ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 2.14 (Aggregate Signature / Multisignature). An Aggregate (resp. Multi) sig-
nature scheme is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (genkeysign, sign, versig,
aggsign, veraggsign). On input of security parameter `sign ∈ N, genkeysign outputs a secret
signing key ski and a public verification key pki, i.e., (ski, pki) ← genkeysign(1`sign). On in-
put of message ma ∈ M and ski, sign outputs a signature σ on ma, i.e., σ ← sign(ski;ma).
On input σ, ma, and pki, versig outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature on ma and 0 otherwise,
i.e., versig(pki;ma;σ) ∈ {0, 1}. On input of signatures σ1 · · ·σn on distinct (resp. same) mes-
sage(s), aggsign outputs an aggregate signature σ, i.e., σ ← aggsign(σ1, · · · ,σn). On input
of σ, m1, · · · ,mn (resp. ma), and pk1, · · · , pkn, veraggsign outputs 1 if σ is an aggregate of
valid signatures σ1, · · · ,σn on m1, · · · ,mn (resp. ma) and 0 otherwise, i.e., the output of
veraggsign(pk1, · · · ,pkn;m1, · · · ,mn,σ) ∈ {0, 1} (resp. veraggsign(pk1, · · · ,pkn;ma;σ) ∈
{0, 1}).
Definition 2.15 (Selective Forgery under Chosen Message Attack (CMA)). Consider a
signature scheme as defined in Definition 2.12 (genkeysign, sign, versig) that has a security pa-
rameter `sign ∈ N. We define ExpCMAA as a security experiment between a CMA-challenger
denoted by CCMA and adversary A. CCMA first generates a signing key pair (sk, pk) ←
genkeysign(1`sign), sends pk to A, and selects a message m∗ that it wants A to sign. A then
creates a message m and sends it to CCMA. As a response, CCMA generates the signature
σ ← sign(sk;m) and sends it back to A. A repeats this step requesting signatures on messages
of its choice. Then CCMA sends the selected message m∗ to A which outputs a signature σ∗. Fi-
nally, CCMA returns its decision b = 1 that indicates whether σ∗ is a valid signature over m∗.
The output of this security experiment is the decision b of CCMA, i.e., ExpCMAA = b. A signa-
ture scheme is secure against selective forgery under CMA if it holds that for every probabilistic
polynomial time adversary A:
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AdvCMAA = Pr
[
ExpCMAA = b
]
6 (`sign).
where  is negligible in `sign.
Remote Attestation. Remote attestation refers to an interactive protocol executed be-
tween two parties: (1) the verifier V, and (2) the prover P. The goal of RA is to allow V
to remotely check and verify the software integrity of P, and hereby detect compromise
(i.e., malicious code modification) on P. RA is initiated by V sending an attestation re-
quest req including a random challenge N to P. N is required to thwart replay attacks on
RA. In response to an attestation request, a trusted component on P, denoted by attestor
measures P’s software state by generating a cryptographic hash of its binaries. Attestor
is typically established using hardware security architectures [52, 57]. The measurement
is authenticated by attestor and reported back to the V as an attestation response resp.
Based on the set of benign software states, V can then determine whether P is trustwor-
thy.

3
R E L AT E D W O R K
The pervasiveness of embedded devices and their increasing sensing and actuation ca-
pabilities has made them attractive targets for attacks. Malware infestation represents
one sevre class of attacks that threatens both privacy and safety of the users of such
devices, e.g., stuxnet [148]. As a consequence, security solutions which defend against
malware infestation attacks have been increasingly demanded. One prominent solution
for detecting such attacks is secure software attestation. Attestation allows a trusted
verifier to check the integrity of the software on a remote prover. It has been a popular
research topic in established security conferences over the course of the last two decades.
Attestation is usually established as an interactive protocol, where a remote entity (the
verifier) sends a challenge to an untrusted device (the prover). As a response, the prover
generates a measurement of its software state and sends it back to the verifier.
In this chapter, we provide background information and a systematic study of existing
work on attestation. In particular, we first introduce different attacks that are relevant
for attestation, and describe requirements imposed by existing attestation solutions as
well as the security properties they provide. We then classify these solutions based on
their requirements, security properties, and the attacks they detect or are vulnerable to.
In general these solutions can be clustered into three main classes: (1) software-based
attestation that requires no secure hardware whatsoever, (2) hardware-based attestation
that requires complex and expensive security hardware, and (3) hybrid attestation that
requires a small set of security features in hardware. Additionally, a fourth class of attes-
tation schemes has recently emerged which aims at detecting runtime attacks through
attesting the control flow of an executing software rather than its binaries. This class is
denoted by (iv) Control-Flow Attestation (CFA). Security of CFA is based on the hard-
ware features required by hybrid attestation.
3.1 attestation landscape
The goal, scope, and security properties of remote attestation has evolved throughout
the years allowing better security gaurantees (e.g., TPM [144]), requiring less complex
hardware (g., SMART [52]), or detecting more sophisticated attacks (e.g., Control-Flow
Attestation – CFA [9]). Similarly, various attacks that target existing attestation schemes
have been devised. In this section we introduce the four identified attestation classes
and present all attacks that are relevant to attestation, i.e, attacks that either target or are
detected by existing attestation schemes.
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3.1.1 Taxonomy of Attestation
We classify existing attestation schemes based of multiple factors. In particular, based
on security guarantees provided by these schemes and on their requirements in terms of
hardware and cryptographic secrets, these schemes can be classified into software-based
attestation, hardware-based attestation, and hybrid attestation. Furthermore, these schemes
can be classified based on the nature of the attacks that they detect into static and run-
time attestation. While static attestation measures the software binaries at load time,
runtime attestation measures the software execution at runtime. It is important to note
that except for software-based attestation, attestation solutions can typically be executed
remotely and are hence referred to as remote attestation schemes. Figure 3.1 shows the
taxonomy of attestation: The figure shows the four main classes that existing attesta-
tion solutions are clustered into as well as the relation between different classes. For
example, runtime attestation schemes require basic security features in hardware and
are considered as a subclass of hybrid attestation. Similarly, software-based attestation,
hardware-based attestation, and hybrid attestation are considered static attestation solu-
tions. In the following we briefly introduce each of these classes:
Software-based Attestation. Software-based attestation [81, 126, 125, 124, 122, 62, 89]
refers to attestation solutions that require no hardware security or cryptographic se-
crets. The security of these solutions is rather based on the limited computational power
of the prover and on strict estimation of the time required to execute the attestation
protocol. Not relying on the existence of security hardware has made software-based
attestation an interesting approach for verifying the integrity of low-end embedded and
legacy computing devices. Unfortunately, the security of software-based attestation is
based on strong assumption that are hard to achieve in most realisitc settings [15], such
as adversarial silence during attestation and optimality of attestation protocol and its
implementation. As a consequence, existing software-based solutions were targeted by
many successful attacks [130, 32, 151] and their applicability was limited to attesting
peripherals [89].
Hardware-based Attestation. Hardware-based attestation [108, 52, 86, 119, 85] refers
to attestation solutions that require complex hardware such as a secure co-processor
(e.g.Trusted Platform Modules – TPM [144]) or extensive hardware modifications. These
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hardware requirements provide a secure trust anchor that ensures the integrity of code
used for attestation and the secrecy of the cryptographic keys used for authentication.
They hereby provide strong guarantees on the security of attestation. However, such
hardware requirements are too complex and expensive for low-end embedded devices.
Hybrid Attestation. Hybrid attestation [52, 57, 84, 28] refers to attestation solutions that
provide strong security guarantees (comparable to those of hardware-based attestation)
while minimizing the hardware requirements. This is achieved by leveraging a soft-
ware/hardware co-design, which allows required hardware features to be as simple as
a Read Only Memory (ROM) and a simple Memory Protection Unit (MPU). Although
minimal, the hardware features required by hybrid attestation solutions render them
inapplicable to legacy computing devices.
Runtime Attestation. Runtime attestation [46, 20, 83, 65, 155, 9, 49] refers to the class
of attestation solutions that capture the behavior of an executing program at runtime
rather than measuring its binaries at load time. In particular, existing runtime attestation
solutions focus on measuring certain aspects of a program’s execution, e.g., the base
pointer integrity of called functions, the launch order of program’s modules, and various
other properties that may present an indication of runtime attacks. Recent effort on
runtime attestation devised schemes that are capable of reporting the exact control-flow
path of an executing program to a remote verifier. These schemes are also referred to as
Control-Flow Attestation (CFA) schemes.
3.1.2 Taxonomy of Attacks
As the goal and the security guarantees of attestation evolved: several attacks have been
successfully performed on existing attestation schemes, several new attacks became de-
tectable by attestation, and various attacks were added to the threat model of attestation.
Figure 3.2 shows all these attacks and their relation to the four aforementioned attesta-
tion classes. In the following we describe each of the individual attacks. We denote an
adversary by A.
Communication Attacks. In a communication attack, A possess full control over all
communication channels, i.e., A is capable of eavesdropping on, dropping, modifying,
and delaying all exchanged packets as well as injecting its own packets on the commu-
nication channel. Communication attacks cannot be detected by attestation. However,
they are within the threat model of most existing attestation schemes. These attacks are
usually thwarted by means of authentication.
Malware Attacks. In a malware attack, A compromises a device by maliciously modify-
ing its software state. A then injects its own code (i.e., malware) on that device. Malware
injection allows A to execute an arbitrarily malicious functionality on the infected de-
vice, for example, A could read sensitive data that is not protected by hardware, report
wrong information, or perform malicious actions. The initial goal of attestation has been
the detection of such malware infestation attacks.
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Physical Attacks. In a physical attack, A exploits its physical presence next to a device
in order to extract its secrets or modify its software or hardware components, e.g., over-
clocking the processor or replacing a memory module. We distinguish between three
classes of physical attacks: (1) invasive attacks [133] that require A to access a device’s
internal components using sophisticated lab equipment, (2) semi-invasive attacks [134]
that require A to at least perform decapsulation of the device using less complicated
tools, (3) non-invasive attacks [160] that allow A to extract device’s secrets during nor-
mal operation using low-cost engineering tools. Physical attacks are considered out of
scope of most existing attestation schemes that typically assume a software-only ad-
versary. Consequently, an adversary that is capable of performing physical attacks can
undermine the security of all these schemes.
Runtime Attacks. In a runtime attack, A exploits a software vulnerability, e.g., a buffer
overflow, to perform a malicious behaviour during program execution [140]. For exam-
ple, a buffer overflow vulnerability in a program can be exploited by A to overwrite
memory cells adjacent to the buffer, which contain control-flow information, e.g., a func-
tions return address. This allows A to hijack the control- low of the program and jump
to an arbitrary address of choice. The most prominent example is Return-Oriented Pro-
gramming (ROP) attack [127], through which A stitches together small snippets of ma-
chine code, already residing on device’s memory, to execute an arbitrarily malicious
functionality. We identify two classes of runtime attacks that are relevant to existing
work on attestation: (1) non-control-data attacks that modify non-control data indirectly
affecting a program’s control flow, e.g., branch variables, and (2) control-data attacks
that overwrite functions pointers and return addresses.
Proxy and Collusion Attacks. In a proxy/collusion attack,A evades detection by software-
based attestation by delegating or speeding up the execution of the attestation protocol.
In particular, in order to hide compromise of a device, the attestation is either delegated
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to an identical benign device, simulated by a more powerful device, or executed in par-
allel by multiple devices. All existing software-based attestation schemes are vulnerable
to proxy attacks, since the verifier in such schemes is incapable of authenticating the
prover.
Code Hiding Attacks. In a code hiding attack, A moves malicious code between pro-
gram and data memory in order to evade detection by software-based attestation [32].
Consequently, attestation is performed on benign code residing in program memory,
while the malicious code resides on the device’s data memory. After execution of at-
testation, A moves malicious code back to program memory for execution. Note that,
performing code hiding attack could be based on ROP that allows stitching together
code snippets required for hiding and restoring the malicious code.
Address Translation Attacks. In an address translation attack, A evades detection by
software-based attestation through exploiting the address translation mechanism of
modern CPUs [151]. In particular, since modern processors enforce the distinction be-
tween code and data, A is capable of allowing a device to attest to a different code than
the one it executes. In order to execute this attack, A is required to modify the device’s
operating system which is responsible for virtual address translation. This allows A to
maliciously modify and execute a target program, while redirecting data accesses to an
unmodified copy of this program.
Page Substitution Attacks. In a page substitution attack,A evades detection by software-
based attestation through adding malicious attestation code at the same memory page
containing the measurement code [130]. This malicious attestation code allows A to con-
vince the verifier of the trustworthiness of a prover despite its existence in the memory.
This leads to a successful attestation of the prover, while at the same time allowing for
arbitrary subsequent modification to the its memory. In the case where the page holding
the measurement code is full, A may exploit code compression (see below) in order to
perform a page substitution attack.
Code Compression Attacks. In a code compression attackA evades detection by software-
based attestation by compressing the code on the prover [32]. In particular, A compresses
the benign code in the memory to generate enough space in the program memory for
storing malicious code. At attestation time benign code is decompressed and measured
on-the-fly. Code compression attacks target software-based attestation schemes that are
based on filling the memory of a device with randomness in order to leave no space for
malicious code (see Section 3.4.2).
Memory Shadowing Attacks. In a memory shadowing attack A evades detection by
software-based attestation by exploiting empty memory on the prover. In particular, A
compromises a device by injecting malicious code in an empty memory position. At
attestation time, A simply evades detection by redirecting memory reads that target
malicious code to another empty shadow memory, i.e., a memory that has the same
address with only one single bit flipped. Flipping only one single bit leads to a negligible
increase in the execution time of the attestation protocol. This negligible increase is not
detected by existing software-based attestation solutions that are based on measuring
the attestation time (see Section 3.4.1).
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TOCTOU Attacks. In a Time of Check Time of Use (TOCTOU) attack,A exploits the time
difference between that attestation of a program and its execution in order to perform a
malicious functionality on a device without being detected by the attestation protocol. In
other words, A introduces and executes malicious code before or after attestation, while
restoring the code to its benign state during attestation. TOCTOU attacks are very hard
to protect against and are not considered by most existing attestation protocol. Such
attacks can also be based on physical [155] or runtime attacks [32].
3.2 requirements for attestation
Existing attestation schemes have different requirements that separate them from each
other and determine their applicability to different scenarios. We distinguish between
three types of requirements of an attestation solution: software, hardware, and crypto-
graphic requirements.
3.2.1 Hardware Requirements
Hardware requirements range from requiring no hardware, which applies to software-
based attestation solutions, to requiring a cryptographic co-processor, which is the case
in most hardware-based attestation solutions. Hardware requirements of existing attes-
tation solutions are presented in the following:
No Hardware Requirements. This entails not requiring any specific hardware for en-
abling attestation, i.e., no new hardware modules are required, and no modification to
existing hardware is needed. A direct consequence of having no hardware requirements
is applicability to low-end and legacy computing devices.
Complex Hardware Requirements. This entails requiring additional hardware compo-
nents or applying complex and expensive modifications to existing hardware. Examples
of complex hardware requirements include cryptographic co-processors such as Trusted
Platform Modules (TPM), and hardware extensive modifications that induce a very large
fingerprint, i.e., area overhead, or changes to the core of the CPU, e.g., extending the in-
struction set. A direct consequence of having complex and expensive hardware require-
ments is inapplicability to low-end and legacy computing devices.
Simple Hardware Requirements. This entails requiring simple hardware extensions
that are neither complex nor expensive. Examples of simple hardware extensions include
adding simple hardware modules, or performing small hardware modifications that
have a small fingerprint. Such modification usually aim at providing simple security
features, e.g., a Read Only Memory (ROM) that ensures integrity of the code and data
its stores, or a simple Memory Protection Unit (MPU) that restricts access to a certain
memory area, thus, providing integrity and/or confidentiality of data. Requiring only
simple hardware allows attestation schemes to be applied to low-end but not legacy
computing devices.
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Other Hardware Requirements. This refers to other hardware-related requirements that
are imposed on the prover or the verifier of an attestation schemes. Examples of such re-
quirements include prior knowledge of prover’s hardware configurations by the verifier,
e.g., knowledge of memory size or clock rate of the prover’s CPU.
3.2.2 Software Requirements
Software requirements refer to requirements that are either imposed on the attestation
code, i.e., software used for executing the attestation protocol; or the attested software,
i.e., the software whose integrity is to be verified. The former is mainly relevant for
software-based attestation, while the latter is relevant for runtime attestation. Software
requirements of existing attestation solutions are presented in the following:
Access to Source Code of Attested Software. This entails knowing the source of the
software on the prover that needs to be attested. Access to source code is usually relevant
for runtime attestation, where the source code is required to extract properties regarding
the its execution behavior, e.g., Control-Flow Graph (CFG). Requiring access to source
code hinder applicability to legacy or closed-source code which is usually only available
in binary format.
Instrumentation of Attested Software. This entails applying modifications to the soft-
ware on the prover that needs to be attested. Examples of instrumentation include
adding specific instructions to the code which are crucial for the execution of the at-
testation protocol. Instrumentation can be either performed at compile time provided
access to source code, or can be based on binary instrumentation otherwise. This re-
quirement is usually relevant for runtime attestation which expects the attestation code
to be triggered continuously throughout the executions of the attested software.
Optimality of Attestation Code. This entails requiring ensuring that the code respon-
sible for executing the attestation protocol on the prover is optimal in terms of time.
Optimality requirement should apply to both the attestation algorithm and its imple-
mentation. In other words, finding a different algorithm or implementation that exe-
cutes the attestation protocol in less time than the original attestation code should not
be possible. This requirements is relevant for software-based attestation, whose secu-
rity is based on the exact estimation of the time required by the prover to execute the
attestation protocol.
3.2.3 Cryptographic Requirements
Cryptographic requirements of attestation range from having no cryptographic require-
ments, which applies to software-based attestation solutions; to requiring a key manage-
ment scheme and cryptographic secrets; which is the case for hardware-based attestation
solutions. Cryptographic requirements of existing attestation solutions are presented in
the following:
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No Cryptographic Requirements. This entails not requiring any cryptographic secrets
or key managements protocols. Schemes that have no cryptographic requirements usu-
ally rely on an out of band channel in order to allow authentication the prover.
Cryptographic Secrets. This entails requiring the prover to store one or more crypto-
graphic keys that are used for authentication. Cryptographic secrets can be either a
public key pair, or a symmetric key that is shared with a trusted verifier.
Key Management Protocols. This entails requiring means for sharing symmetric keys or
prove possession and security of private keys. Key management can be handled using
public key certificates based on existing public key infrastructure (PKI), which is the
case for TPMs.
3.3 properties of attestation
Existing attestation schemes have different performance- and security-related properties.
These properties distinguish the schemes from one another. They play an important role
in determining the applicability of each scheme in different scenarios.
3.3.1 Performance Properties
Performance properties of attestation are mainly concerned with the overhead imposed
on each of the prover and the verifier of an attestation scheme. This also concerns the
scalability of the scheme and its applicability to large networks. Performance properties
of existing attestation solutions are presented in the following:
Efficiency on the Prover’s Side. This entails requiring the attestation solution to impose
low overhead on the prover in terms of energy consumption and runtime. Importance
of runtime efficiency on prover is significant since existing attestation schemes usually
require uninterrupted execution of the attestation protocol. This results in taking the
prover away from performing its original task. In software-based attestation the high
runtime overhead on the prover is basically due to the very large number of memory
access operations. These operation are required to ensure that every memory cell is
accessed (with a very high probability) during random traversal. On the other hand,
runtime attestation induce a high runtime overhead on the prover due to continuous
generation of hash values at runtime. Finally, energy consumption on the prover is also
of particular importance due to the limited sources of energy on low-end embedded
devices. These devices are usually battery-powered.
Efficiency on the Verifier’s Side. This entails requiring the attestation solution to im-
pose low overhead on the verifier in terms of energy consumption and runtime. The
verifier in an attestation protocol can either be a powerful device, e.g., a server, or a less
powerful entity, e.g., a low-end embedded device with limited resource. In the latter
case, overhead on the verifier is particularly important. In software-based attestation the
high runtime overhead on the verifier is mainly due to the recalculation of the attesta-
tion response. This requires the verifier to simulate the execution of the attestation code
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on the prover. On the other hand, runtime attestation induce a high runtime overhead
on the verifier, which is required to search a very large database of benign attestation
responses.
Scalability. This entails applicability to a very large number of provers. In particular, we
consider an attestation solution to be scalable if the increase in its runtime is (at most)
logarithmic in the number of devices that are attested. Existing attestation solutions have
a runtime overhead that increases linearly with the number of provers when naively
applied in a multi-device setting.
3.3.2 Security Properties
Security properties of attestation are mainly concerned with the inclusion of certain
attack vectors in the threat model and providing resiliency against these attacks. Security
properties of existing attestation solutions are presented in the following:
Time Consistency. Time consistency refers to ensuring that the generated measurement
over a certain software (or piece of memory) indeed reflects the state of all parts of
the software (or content at different memory addresses) at the exact same time period.
Such property prevents an adversary from evading detection by moving malicious code
within the prover’s memory during the execution of the attestation code. The most natu-
ral technique for imposing such a property is locking the prover’s memory throughout
the attestation process.
Hardware Independence. Hardware independence entails that the security of the attes-
tation solution is independent of prover’s hardware properties. Such hardware proper-
ties may include the size of the memory to be attested, or the clock speed of the prover’s
processor. Attestation solutions that are not hardware independent, e.g., software-based
attestation are vulnerable to physical attacks that aim at extending the prover’s memory
or overclocking its processor.
End-to-End Security. End-to-end security entails resistance against man-in-the-middle
attacks and hereby applicability in remote settings. Such property is established through
the authentication of the software measurements taken at the prover. Authentication is
usually based on cryptographic secrets that protected by the prover’s hardware.
Resiliency Against TOCTOU. Resiliency against TOCTOU entails requiring that the
software executed on the prover is identical to the attested one. Such property prevents
an adversary from compromising a device’s software state in the time gap between
attestation and execution. Most existing attestation solutions are not resilient against
TOCTOU attacks. These attacks can be either launched remotely, i.e., by software means,
or via hardware means.
Detection of Runtime Attacks. This property entails the detection of attacks that do
not change the binaries of the software on the prover, but rather its runtime behavior
during exection, e.g., Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) attacks [127]. While runtime
attestation aim at detection of such runtime attacks, static attestation solutions are in fact
vulnerable to these attacks, that they usually consider to be out of scope.
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3.4 software-based attestation
The goal of software-based attestation is to allow software integrity verification without
requiring hardware security features. This is mainly driven by the need to reduce the
deployment and upgrade costs as well as allowing applicability to legacy and low-end
computing devices. The core of most existing software-based attestation schemes is a
so-called checksumming or verification function, which generates the measurement of
prover’s software state. The checksumming function is carefully designed to utilize all
memory resources and computational power of the prover in such a way that a measure-
ment can only be generated in time if it reflects the correct software state of the prover.
As a result, the verifier only accepts a correct measurement if received within a cer-
tain time limit. Software-based attestation of this kind is also referred to as time-based
attestation.
Security of time-based attestation relies on strong assumptions that are hard to achieve
in most realistic scenarios. In particular, it requires adversarial silence during the exe-
cution of the attestation protocol, it assumes optimality of the checksumming function
and its implementation, it requires a strict estimation of the round trip time between the
verifier and the prover, and it requires that the verifier has prior knowledge of prover’s
hardware configurations and memory contents. The checksumming function usually op-
erates in a loop, where one random memory address is accessed at each iteration and
incorporated into the measurement. This random memory traversal can be based on the
random challenge sent by the verifier.
Some of the existing software-based attestation schemes are not based on the execu-
tion time of the attestation code, but rather on exploiting memory constraints of the
prover. In particular, such schemes protects the prover against malware infestation by
filling its unused memory with randomness. This leaves no free space for the adversary
to inject malicious code.
3.4.1 Time-Based Attestation
In the following we present existing time-based attestation schemes for both low-end
and advanced computing devices.
Genuinity. Genuinity [81] is a time-based attestation solution that allows verifying the
integrity of the operating system and the hardware of a legacy computing device. The
core of Genuinity is a checksumming function that incorporates the side effects of its ex-
ecution in calculating the measurement of a device’s software state. As a result, a device
that has different operating system and/or hardware would consume more time in or-
der to generate a correct measurement. Examples of the side effects incorporated in the
measurement in Genuinity include: performance counters, cache tags, and cache miss
counts of the Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB). Genuinity assumes that the verifier
has prior knowledge of the prover’s hardware configuration. It also assumes a platform
with a single processor that is not modified by the adversary.
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Pioneer. Pioneer [125] aims at providing verifiable code execution for legacy computing
devices, i.e., it ensures that a piece of untampered software was successfully executed. Pi-
oneer is based on a checksumming function that is capable of verifying its own integrity
as well as the integrity of other executables. In particular, this function first generates a
measurement over its own code and sends it to the verifier. After verifying the integrity
of the checksumming function, it can be leveraged to establish a dynamic root of trust
on the prover through measuring every executable before invoking it uninterrupted. In
order to ensure security, Pioneer assumes that interrupts are disabled during the exe-
cution of the checksumming function. PioneerNG [121] extends Pioneer by relaxing its
assumptions. This is done by including more system state components in the genera-
tion of the software measurement. Finally, Checkmate [86] provides a dynamic root of
trust that is resilient to TOCTOU attacks based on PioneerNG’s checksumming function.
In particular, Checkmate combines Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) with
PionerNG’s checksumming function. This function is indeed modified to tolerate ASLR.
SWATT. SWATT [126] is another time-based attestation scheme for embedded devices.
In SWATT random memory addresses traversed by the checksumming function are gen-
erated using Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG) seeded by the challenge re-
ceived from the verifier. In fact, SWATT identifies the properties that should be satisfied
by this function in order for software-based attestation to be secure. The checksumming
function should be non-parallelizable, and resistant to replay and pre-computation at-
tacks. Moreover, it should have a small code size, perform memory accesses in a pseudo-
random manner, and generate (with high probability) an invalid measurement if a single
memory location was modified. Satisfying these properties would lead to a noticeable in-
crease in the function’s execution time if the adversary tries to hide modifications to the
prover’s memory. SBAP [88] presents an optimization of SWATT that allows its applica-
tion to low-end microcontrollers such as peripherals. This is done by replacing SWATT’s
PRNG with a more efficient one. Further, SBAP proposes thwarting Return-Oriented
Programming (ROP) attacks on software-based attestation by measuring both data and
program memory. It also fills the unused memory of the prover with randomness in
order to leave no free space for the adversary to exploit. Finally, VIPER [89] also aims
at verifying integrity of peripherals’ firmware. It improves the security of previously
proposed software-based attestation schemes by mitigating proxy attacks. In particular,
VIPER thwarts onboard proxies by attesting all peripherals in decreasing order of their
computing power. It also prevents remote proxy attacks by increasing the size of the
verifier’s challenge or performing multiple iteration of the attestation protocol.
ICE. ICE [124] aims at providing untampered code execution on low-end embedded
devices that have a simple processor architecture. In order to thwart TOCTOU and
memory shadowing attacks, the checksumming function of ICE incorporates the data
pointer, program counter, processor’s interrupt vector table, and interrupt disable bit
in the generation of the software measurement. SCUBA [124] exploits ICE to enable se-
cure software update for sensor nodes in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). FIRE [123]
presents a suite of protocols that are capable of detecting node compromise in WSN,
while enabling revocation or recovery of malicious nodes. In particular, ICE’s checksum-
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ming function is used to verify its own integrity as well as the integrity of one of the
FIRE protocols. The verified protocol is then executed uninterrupted. In contrast to ICE,
the checksumming function in FIRE performs multiple linear memory traversals instead
of a random one. Moreover, in order to enable software integrity verification of remote
devices, FIRE proposes using the expanding ring method, where every node recursively
attests its neighbors until the targeted node is reached. Finally, SAKE [122] uses ICE
to allow secure key establishment in WSN. In particular, by ensuring untampered exe-
cution of SAKE’s code on sensor nodes involved in sharing a key, ICE guarantees that
the shared key is not revealed to any malicious code on any of these nodes. SAKE uses
embedded silicon IDs to achieve authenticity of the involved nodes. The correct reading
of these IDs is also guaranteed by ICE.
TEAS. The following time-based attestation schemes require the verifier to construct
and send the prover a new checksumming function or a Time Executable Agent Sys-
tem (TEAS) for each execution of the attestation protocol. TEAS [60] hides the critical
functionality of the checksumming function within randomly generated code. Further, it
thwarts online/offline analysis of checksumming functions by imposing strict time lim-
its on its execution, leveraging code obfuscation, and providing a very large library of
different functions. In particular online analysis is prevented by permuting the prover’s
memory content before each attestation. On the other hand, offline analysis on the check-
summing function is prevented by increasing its complexity, e.g., adding jumps into a
loop body. This complicates the construction of a Control-Flow Graph (CFG) by making
it super-linear in space and time. Shaneck et al. also proposes a software-based attes-
tation solution, where the verifier constructs a randomized checksumming function for
each protocol execution [129]. This solution exploits code obfuscation techniques such
as junk instruction, opaque predicates, and self-modification to thwart attacks that are
based on static and dynamic analysis of the verification function. The main motivation
behind this is to enable software-based attestation to be applied remotely by making its
security less dependent on the execution time of the checksumming function.
3.4.2 Untimed Software-Based Attestation
This refers to attestation solutions that are not dependent on the execution time of the
verification function. They are mostly based on leaving no free space for storing mali-
cious code on the prover by filling its memory with randomness. Security of untimed
software-based attestation schemes is based on memory constraints of the prover and
on the incompressibility of randomness.
Filling Memory. Choi et al. propose an untimed software-based attestation solution for
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) that is based on clearing all the free space on a prover’s
memory before the execution of attestation [38]. In particular, prior to measuring the soft-
ware on the prover, its unused memory space is filled with pseudorandomness, which is
generated based on a random seed included in the challenge received from the verifier.
Cao et al. present a distributed untimed software-based attestation scheme [152]. In this
scheme the neighbors of the prover collaborate to attest its software. In particular, before
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deployment the unused space in a sensor’s memory is filled with pseudorandomness.
To attest a sensor node, the neighbors collaborate to reconstruct the content of its un-
used memory and verify its software measurement. The software measurement in this
scheme is generated based on random memory traversal.
Reflection. Reflection [136] denotes the process through which a software reads and
measures its own code using cryptographic hashes. It is used to attest a device’s soft-
ware state. Reflection assumes that the memory of a device has no space with low en-
tropy, i.e., it assumes that unused memory space is filled with randomness. In order to
measure the software state of a device, its memory is split into two overlapping regions,
which are then measured and reported to the verifier. The boundaries of these regions
are determined within the challenge sent by the verifier and are different for each ex-
ecution. To account for compressibility of code and low entropy of memory content
the prover also incorporates processor state in the generation of the measurement. Al-
though the security of reflection is not based on the time required to generate a software
measurement, the authors suggest using timing for detection of relay attacks.
PIV. PIV [107] is a software-based attestation scheme for verifying the software integrity
of sensor nodes in WSN. Similar to TEAS, in PIV the verifier creates a new checksum-
ming function for each execution of the attestation protocol. However, PIV does not
impose any constraints on the time required by the prover to measure its software. PIV
is based on so-called Randomized Hash Functions (RHF), which are created using mul-
tivariate quadratic polynomials and aim to replacing keyed hash functions. In particular,
for each attestation the verifier creates a different randomized hash function and sends
it to the prover as the attestation challenge.
3.5 hardware-based attestation
While software-based attestation is based on strong assumptions and cannot be applied
remotely, hardware-based attestation aims at providing secure remote attestation with
strong security guarantees. Hardware-based attestation refers to attestation solutions
that rely on hardware modifications or secure co-processors that provide authentication
and integrity verification. Note that authentication and integrity verification are con-
sidered the enablers for secure remote attestation. Security hardware usually provide
trusted execution of the attestation code, and secure storage for sensitive data such as
cryptographic secrets. The underlying security architecture of hardware-based attesta-
tion is too complex and expensive. Therefore, these schemes are suitable for high-end
computing devices, e.g., laptops, servers, and smartphones.
3.5.1 TPM and TPM-based Attestation
Secure Boot. Secure boot [14] guarantees that a computer comes up to a secure and
reliable software state directly after boot. It is based on a chain of trust built starting at
the Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) and ending at the operating system. In particular,
when a computer is powered up the integrity of each software is verified prior to its
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execution by the software that passes control to it. Integrity verification is based on
comparing a cryptographic hash of the binaries of the loaded software to a digitally
signed reference value. Integrity of the software that is first to load is ensured through
hardware, e.g., by storing it in Read-Only Memory (ROM). If the integrity verification
failed, e.g., due to a modified software component, the systems boots a recovery kernel
which contacts a remote host and requests the original software component. Integrity of
recovery kernel is also ensured through ROM.
TPM. Trusted Platform Module1 (TPM) represents a specification of a cryptographic co-
processor that provides integrity protection and handles cryptographic operations. As
specified by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [144], TPM contains a group of Plat-
form Configuration Registers (PCR) that are only resettable upon reboot. These PCRs
are extended with the measurements (i.e., cryptographic hash) of every software exe-
cuted on a device. Similar to secure boot, a chain of trust is built by TPM by extending
the value of a certain PCR with the hash of every software (starting with BIOS) before
transferring control to it. This is usually referred to as static root of trust or trusted boot.
However, unlike secure boot, TPM records the execution of modified code but does not
prohibit it. In order to provide remote attestation, TPM allows signing a PCR value
along with a received challenge (i.e., random nonce) based on the TPM’s securely stored
private key. TPM v1.2 [143] allows establishing a dynamic root of trust. It provides the
specifications for a dynamic PCR that can be reset using a dedicated instruction. Intel
and AMD provide a late lunch functionality through the instructions SKINIT and SEN-
TER respectively, which reset the value of PCR 17, and store the measurement of the
executed software into that PCR. Similarly, the value stored in PCR 17 can be signed
using TPM’s secret key providing remote attestation.
TCG-based Attestation. TCG-based attestation [117] aims at extending TPM’s chain
of trust to the application layer. In particular, it presents modifications to the kernel
that allow it to measure itself (i.e., the loadable kernel modules) as well as executed
applications and extend this measurement to a certain PCR. To allow verification of the
PCR’s content, the kernel also keeps a log of all applications and modules that were
measured and extended to the PCR. During attestation, the kernel sends the content of
the PCR signed by TPM along with the log file to the remote verifier.
OSLO. Due to multiple vulnerabilites identified in TPM’s implementation of static root
of trust, OSLO [79] exploits AMD’s SKINT and TPM to provide a dynamic root of trust.
Identified vulnerabilities include: freely batchable BIOS, buggy bootloader that allows
executing code without extending it to PCR, and hardware resettable PCRs in TPM v1.1.
In OSLO, SKINT is used to reset PCR 17 and extend the measurement of a secure loader
to that PCR. When executed, the loader provides a dynamic root of trust on the device by
measuring and keeping track of all executed software. However, OSLO does not allow
reporting recorded measurements to a remote verifier.
TPM for Timestamping. Schellekens et al. propose using TPM’s timestamping function-
ality to improve the security guarantees of time-based attestation and enable its appli-
cability in remote settings. In particular, TPM’s timestamping is used for determining
1 https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/tpm-main-specification
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the exact execution time of Poineer’s checksumming function [125], thus eliminating the
non-deterministic network delay. Unlike TPM’s attestation, combing TPM with software-
based attestation does not require trusting the operating system. However, it provides
the same weak security guarantees of software-based attestation while requiring com-
plex hardware.
Terra. In Terra [63], a general purpose platform is partitioned into multiple (general and
special purpose) virtual machines (VM), which are isolated based on a Trusted Virtual
Machine Monitor (TVMM). This isolation allows multiple applications with different se-
curity requirements to execute concurrently. Integrity and confidentiality of VM’s data
and code is provided based on cryptography and secure hardware. Terra is based on
certificate chains that bind public keys to hashes of programs that possess their corre-
sponding private keys. A certificate chain starts with TPM’s hardware and ends at the
involved VM. It allows a VM to securely communicate and attest its software to a re-
mote entity. Security of remote attestation in Terra relies on TPM’s secure storage and
attestation.
Nizza. Nizza [66] is a security architecture that provides isolation of software compo-
nents on a device based on TPM and L4 microkernel. Nizza executes software compo-
nents as threads and exploits address space separation to enable their isolation. Further,
it relies on Inter-Process Communication (IPC) to provide communication between iso-
lated components. Authenticity of executing software components is assured based on
TPM’s trusted boot, which also allows remote attestation of these components. Singar-
avelu et al. exploits Nizza’s isolation to allow reducing the Trusted Computing Base
(TCB) of security sensitive operations. To achieve this, the authors propose extracting
the security sensitive parts of a program and executing them isolated based on Nizza.
The remaining of the program can be executed within the legacy operating system.
Flicker and TrustVisor. Flicker [97] presents another isolation architecture based on
TPM. Flicker aims at executing small chunks of security sensitive code denoted by Piece
of Application Logic (PAL) in isolation of the rest of the software components on the
device. A Secure Loader Block (SLB) formed of 250 lines of code is the only software
TCB of Flicker. The main task of SLB is to prepare a protected execution environment
before executing a PAL and deleting all traces after a PAL’s execution terminates. Flicker
is based on late launch provided by Intel’s Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) through
the SKINIT instruction, and by AMD’s Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) through the SEN-
TER instruction. It allows attesting isolated code as well as providing a proof of secure
execution of that code. Attestation, secure multitasking, and establishment of secure
channels are enabled by Flicker based on TPM’s attestation and secure storage. More-
over, minimal modifications to Intel’s TXT and AMD’s SVM were identified in [96] to
enhance Flicker’s performance. In particular, these modification enable hardware con-
text switching and memory isolation, through a single instruction, multiple additional
PCRs, and an access control table. Finally, in order to further improve the efficiency of
Flicker, TrustVisor [95] implements some of TPM’s functionality in software and adds
it to Flicker’s TCB. TrustVisor exploits hardware visualization to enable isolation while
supporting attestation based on a chain of trust that starts at TPM, i.e., TPM measures
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TrustVisor’s software, which in turn measures the software of concerned PALs. TrustVi-
sor also incorporates a mechanism for registering PALs which required custom compi-
lation in Flicker.
SICE. SICE [17] presents an isolation architecture for x86 multicore hardware platforms.
The TCB of SICE is formed of the hardware, the BIOS, and a small piece of software
denoted by the System Management Mode (SMM). SMM resides on the System Man-
agement Random Access Memory (SMRAM) of the x86 architecture, and is responsible
for providing secure attestation. One motivation behind the design of SICE is that SM-
RAM can only be triggered by system management interrupts and can be managed
by applying modifications to only two registers. Further, time sharing between isolated
software can be done by simply resizing SMRAM. This leads to fast context switching.
Based on TPM’s attestation, SICE is capable of attesting the integrity of its own code or
the code of isolated software, and establishing secure communication to a remote entity.
Logic for TPM. Datta et al. present a logic that allows proving secuirty of protocols
as a high level of abstraction regardless of the actions taken by the adversary [45]. The
authors were capable of modeling several features through their model, e.g., machine
reset, dynamic code loading and execution, access control, shared memory, and cryp-
tographic operations. Finally, the security of two remote attestation protocols based on
TPM was proven based on this logic. In particular, constructs of this logic were used
to characterize primitives of trusted computing, which allowed extracting assumptions
required for securing these protocols.
3.5.2 Others
This refers to attestation solutions that require complex hardware but are not based on
TCG’s TPM.
Copilot. In order to detect malicious modifications to kernels on commodity device,
e.g., rootkit installations, Copilot [111] allows periodic monitoring of the software in-
tegrity of these kernels. Copilot resides on a PCI card providing a secure co-processor.
It exploits specific PCI bus features of IBM and Linux virtual memory to detect kernel
modifications. In particular, Copilot periodically calculates a hash of the kernel code and
compares it to a reference value. Detected modifications are then reported to a remote
entity for manual inspection through an out of band communication channel. Copilot
accesses the kernel code via Direct Memory Access (DMA) without the processor’s in-
tervention.
Proxos. Proxos [142] aims at providing isolation of security sensitive code from the op-
erating system based on a Xen Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM). Unlike Flicker, Proxos
does not require developers to specify the security sensitive parts of their applications.
It achieves isolation by partitioning application’s system calls and forwarding them to
either a trusted or an untrusted operating system. This partitioning is determined by
routing rules specified by the developer. The VMM guarantees process isolation. How-
ever, calls routed to the untrusted operating system are routed through inter-VM remote
procedure call.
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TEM. TEM [43] is a scheme that allows execution of encrypted software within a trusted
environment. The main goal of TEM is to provide both integrity and confidentiality
of software executing on a computing device. In order to provide confidentiality, data
provided to TEM are encrypted based on TEM’s public key. This data is also stored at
randomized memory addresses. The integrity of data is provided based on Merkle Hash
Trees (MHT). Finally, secure execution of software is enabled by executing one software
at a time. The intermediate results of software execution are deleted when it terminates,
and its persistent modifications are rolled back if it was aborted.
3.6 hybrid attestation
Hybrid attestation [52, 84, 57, 28] aims at providing the same strong security guarantees
of hardware-based attestation while minimizing the required hardware. Examples of
such hardware requirements include: a Read Only Memory (ROM) this is used for en-
suring code and data integrity, and a Memory Protection Unit (MPU) that is required to
preserve the secrecy of cryptographic keys. These requirements make hybrid attestation
solutions applicable to low-end but not legacy computing devices.
3.6.1 Minimalist Approach for Attestation
PoSE. PoSE [109] aims at undoing malicious modifications to a device’s software rather
than detecting this modification. In particular, PoSE resets a device’s memory to a known
good state by first filling it with randomness. This randomness is then queried before
installing benign software on the device. This procedure guarantees the deletion of all
code from device’s memory before reset. PoSE requires only a small piece of ROM for
storing its code. Similar to software-based attestation, PoSE assumes adversarial silence
during the protocol execution.
SMART. SMART [52] is a security architecture for low-end embedded devices, which
aims at providing secure remote attestation with minimal hardware requirements. SMART’s
main hardware components are a ROM that stores the attestation code and a secret
authentication key, and an MPU that control access to this key. ROM and MPU are in-
expensive and easy to realize in hardware. They are considered minimal requirements
for securing remote attestation. The security of SMART is based on the immutability of
ROM, which preserves the integrity of the attestation code and the authentication key.
On the other hand, MPU preserves confidentiality of the secret key by restricting access
to it to attestation code only. MPU’s access control is based on the value of the program
counter. In particular, MPU checks whether program counter is within the address space
of ROM before granting access to the key. Otherwise, the device is reset. Consequently,
SMART guarantees that genuine attestation code is the only entity that has access to the
secret key and is capable of generating a correctly authenticated software measurement.
Systematic Treatment. Francillon et al. present a systematic analysis of remote attesta-
tion on low-end embedded devices in order to extract its desired properties and security
requirements [56, 57]. The extracted requirements are then mapped into architectural
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features that are translated into hardware components. The minimal hardware require-
ments for securing remote attestation are identified to be a ROM, secure storage, secure
memory erasure and reset mechanisms, and instructions that allow invoking attestation
code from start and disabling interrupts. These requirements are claimed by the authors
to be both sufficient and necessary for enabling secure remote attestation. The authors
also highlight weaknesses in existing hybrid attestation solutions (e.g., SMART [52]) and
devise a generic hybrid attestation scheme that satisfies the extracted properties..
TrustLite. TrustLite [84] is a lightweight security architecture that provides strong isola-
tion on low-end embedded devices. TrustLite is based on Intel’s Siskiyou Peak research
platform [112]. It allows isolation of small code chunks denoted by trustlets from the rest
of the system including the operating system. The main component of TrustLite is an
Execution Aware Memory Protection Unit (EA-MPU), which ensures that data stored on
a device is only accessible to the trustlet that owns this data. Similar to SMART’s MPU,
EA-MPU access control is based on the value of the program counter. In fact, TrustLite
can be viewed as a generalization of SMART that: allows MPU rules to be dynamically
programmed thus enabling isolation; uses secure boot to ensure authenticity of trust-
let’s code and data; and allows interrupts. Interrupts in TrustLite are securely handled
via storing a trustlet’s state in predefined CPU registers and erasing it before passing
control to the legacy interrupt handler.
TyTAN. Based on TrustLite, TyTAN [28] aims at providing isolation while satisfying real-
time requirements, i.e., it ensures acting reliable within strict time constraints. Real-time
requirement is not considered in most of security architectures for embedded devices
(including TrustLite) despite being increasingly relevant. Unlike TrustLite, TyTAN also
allows dynamic loading, unloading, launching, and halting of executing trustlets at run-
time. This feature increases the efficiency of TyTAN considerably by allowing better
utilization of resources. Moreover, trustlets can be securely updated in order to account
for software bugs. TyTAN allows local attestation where different trustlets verify each
others integrity, e.g., to establish a secure communication, and remote attestation allow-
ing a trustlet to prove its integrity to a remote entity. The security properties of TyTAN
are achieved based on a small amount of software TCB which excludes the operating
system. The integrity of this software TCB is ensured through means of secure boot.
3.6.2 Attestation based on Isolation
SPM. SPM [138] refers to software modules that are capable of isolating themselves
from every other software on the same device. Similar to SMART and TrustLite, the
core component of SPM is memory access control that is based on the value of the
program counter. Security guarantees provided by SPM include confidentiality of data
processed and stored by isolated software modules. The hardware features required
by SPM are access control rules that provide confidentiality of data, and three new
instructions that configure access control rules and control a software’s life cycle. In
addition to the hardware, SPM’s TCB include a small part of the boot process and the
code of the isolated module.
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Sancus. Sancus [101] is security architecture for low-end embedded devices that aims at
providing isolation, remote attestation, and secure communication, without relying on
any software in its TCB. Isolation in Sancus is based on memory access control of SPM.
This is extended with a key management protocol in order to allow secure communica-
tion and remote attestation. In particular, each software module in Sancus has its own
key that is derived from the module’s code, size, position in memory. Sancus leverages
a new instruction that, when invoked, generates a Message Authentication Code (MAC)
based on the key of the module that called this instruction. In order to avoid leakage of
a module’s key, MAC generation instruction is only available when memory protection
is enabled for the calling module. Remote attestation in Sancus is achieved by simply
generating a MAC on the challenge sent from the verifier. Sancus incurs a very high
hardware cost, as it requires three additional instructions to implement its features.
3.7 runtime attestation
While static attestation ensures that the code loaded for execution is not maliciously
modified, runtime attestation [46, 20, 83, 65, 155, 9, 49] aims at verifying the integrity
of the code’s behavior at runtime. Runtime attestation usually target attacks that hijack
the control flow of a program to execute an arbitrary malicious functionality without
changing the underlying program code [141]. The most prominent example of runtime
attacks is the Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) attack [127] that exploit a memory
corruption vulnerability to stitch together small code snippets and execute a malicious
functionality. Existing runtime attestation solutions measure critical aspects of a pro-
gram’s execution that are relevant to runtime attacks such as the base pointer of called
functions. Recent effort has lead to Control-Flow Attestation (CFA) schemes that allow
measuring the exact execution path followed by a program.
3.7.1 Dynamic Attestation
Semantic Remote Attestation. Semantic remote attestation [65] (TrustedVM) aims at en-
abling attestation of dynamic system properties using language-based virtual machines.
The main idea of TrustedVM is to allow the enforcement of various high-level and dy-
namic properties on an application running within a remote party. In particular, an
application is executing within a language-based virtual machine that can derive and
enforce various properties in that application. Such properties include dynamic proper-
ties such as constraints on its input and runtime state, and system properties identified
using test suites.
ReDAS. Dynamic remote attestation [83] (ReDAS) is an attestation scheme that aims
at allowing integrity verification of the runtime behavior of the software running on a
remote prover. The main idea of ReDAS is to identify a set of properties that must be
satisfied by dynamic objects during their lifetimes, and use these properties to verify the
overall integrity of an executing program at runtime. These properties are referred to as
dynamic system properties. One example of dynamic objects considered by ReDAS is
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the frame pointer that has the property of being linked to other frame pointers within
the stack. ReDAS is based on identifying the challenges for dynamic attestation, which
are characterized by the large number of dynamic objects whose known good states is
not easy to identify, in addition to the stronger adversary that is capable of launching
runtime attacks on the attestation itself. To address these challenges, ReDAS identifies
two dynamic properties that are used to prove the integrity of a running program: struc-
tural and global data integrity. Finally, ReDAS allows automatic extraction of dynamic
system properties for an application through the Daikon system for dynamic detection
of likely invariants [53]. Further, it uses TPM to protect the integrity of the attestation
report. ReDAS is not a complete solution. It is based on a small number of dynamic
properties and is only capable of detecting runtime attacks that violate these properties.
Trusted Virtual Containers. Trusted virtual containers [20] (TVC) addresses the static
nature of hardware-based attestation by extending attestation to a program’s runtime
properties. TVC identifies the shortcomings of TPM-based attestation to be scalability,
dynamicity, and flexibility of trusted environments. To address these limitations, TVC
leverages Solaris containers to provide virtualized environments each having a certified
key pair rooted within the TPM. Containers are created on demand based on a set of
trust attributes agreed upon from both the prover and the verifier. Finally, the DTrace
tool of Solaris is used to monitor the behavior of programs executing within different
containers and revoke the certificate of those containers that violate a set of predefined
specifications.
DynIMA. The goal of DynIMA [46] is to detect ROP attacks by monitoring the behavior
of a program during execution. This goal is achieved by modifying the program loader
of the operating system to allow the instrumentation of all executed programs. Binary
instrumentation enables monitoring dynamic events that can be either generic or spe-
cific to the executing program. Consequently, a ROP attack is detected and reported
when a predefined policy is violated, e.g., three consecutive returns with less than five
instructions inbetween. This solutions is based on heuristics that can cause a large num-
ber of false positive and false negatives. It has a significant performance overhead. And,
it only targets ROP attacks. DynIMA is incapable of detecting other runtime attacks, e.g.,
Data-Oriented Programming (DOP) attacks [71].
3.7.2 Control-Flow Attestation (CFA)
C-FLAT. C-FLAT [9] is the first CFA scheme for detecting control-flow attacks on low-
end embedded devices. It allows a device to compute a measurement of the exact ex-
ecution path of an executing program and report it to a remote entity. The reported
measurements enables tracing the device’s execution and detecting runtime attacks that
modify the control flow of the program. Security of C-FLAT is based on a hardware
trust anchor that allows isolated execution, e.g., TrustLite. Moreover, it requires binary
instrumentation of the attested program that is assumed not to be maliciously modified.
Furthermore, C-FLAT assumes Data Execution Prevention (DEP) that thwarts malicious
code injection attacks. C-FLAT has high overhead on the prover that is required to in-
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terrupt and record every control-flow event, and on the verifier that should store and
search of very large database of benign attestation responses. In practice, C-FLAT’s ap-
plicability is limited to the attestation of very small programs.
LO-FAT. LO-FAT [49] is a hardware-based architecture for CFA that aims at overcoming
the limitation of C-FLAT in terms of runtime overhead and applicability to legacy code.
In particular, LO-FAT leverages custom hardware to measure a program’s control flow
in parallel to its execution, thus incurring no runtime overhead on the prover. LO-FAT’s
hardware is tightly integrated within the prover’s processor, which allows it to collect
information about control-flow events that are available to the processor. Therefore, it
requires no instrumentation of the attested software and is applicable to legacy code.
Although LO-FAT requires no new CPU instructions, it incurs a very large area overhead
which hinders its adaptation in real systems.
ATRIUM. ATRIUM [155] is another hardware-based architecture that combines static
and CFA. The goal of ATRIUM is to thwart a hardware adversary that can modify
the program binaries at runtime, thus executing a Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOC-
TOU) attack. Such TOCTOU attacks may allow bypassing both static attestation (e.g.,
SMART [52]) and CFA (e.g., C-FLAT [9]). The goal of ATRIUM is achieved by gener-
ating an attestation response that incorporates both control-flow events and program
binaries measured at the time of execution. ATRIUM requires no new CPU instructions.
However, its large area overhead also hinders its adaptation in real systems.
LiteHAX. LiteHAX [48] aims at detecting data-only runtime attacks that do not change
the control flow of a program through means of hardware-assisted CFA. LiteHAX achieves
its goal by incorporating in the attestation response a compact encoding of the execu-
tion path and a digest of memory access operations, e.g., load and store instructions. In
addition to verifying the integrity of the execution path, the verifier leverages symbolic
execution based on this path to generate and verify executed memory operations, thus,
verifying data-flow integrity. Although LiteHAX requires minimal non-invasive interfac-
ing with the processor with no new instructions introduced, it is unlikely to be realized
in real systems due to its large area overhead.
3.8 comparison
In Table 3.1 we compare existing attestation classes in terms of properties, requirements,
and the attacks they detect or are vulnerable to. The basic information that can be ex-
tracted from the table are summarized in the following:
• Software-based attestation has no hardware or cryptographic requirements. How-
ever, it provides weak security guarantees as its based on strong assumptions (e.g.,
adversarial silence during attestation). This has made software-based attestation
the target of a wide range of attacks (e.g., proxy/collusion attack). Furthermore,
software-based attestation induces a very high overhead on the prover that is re-
quired to randomly access its whole memory, and the verifier that is expected to
simulate the prover’s execution.
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Table 3.1: Comparison between different classes of attestation
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ﬀ C-FLAT [9] does not satisfy this property.
• Hardware based attestation provides better efficiency and stronger security guar-
antees. This has made hardware-based attestation resilient to a wide range of at-
tacks that target software-based attestation. However, hardware-based attestation
requires complex and expensive hardware and is not applicable to low-end and
legacy computing devices. Moreover, Hardware-based attestation is vulnerable to
a number of attacks, e.g., physical and runtime attacks.
• The security guarantees and efficiency of hybrid attestation are similar to that
provided by hardware-based attestation. This is achieved with simpler hardware
requirements. As a consequence, hybrid attestation currently presents the best al-
ternative for enabling attestation on low-end embedded devices.
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• Runtime attestation allows the detection of more sophisticated runtime attacks
that do not change the program code, e.g., control-flow attacks detected by Control-
Flow Attestation (CFA). However, the requirements imposed by existing CFA schemes
may not be applicable in all realistic settings, e.g., access to source code of the at-
tested program. Furthermore, they induce a high overhead on the prover that is
required to measure every single control-flow event, and the verifier that is ex-
pected to search a very large database of benign control-flow paths.
Finally, its important to mention that static attestation for a single device seems to
be a well established area research. However, runtime attestation solutions could still
be enhanced in order to provide better efficiency and allow the detection of a wider
range of runtime attacks, e.g., Data-Oriented Programming (DOP) attacks [71]. On the
other hand, both static and dynamic attestation solutions cannot be applied to emerging
systems that are formed of a very large number of embedded devices. In particular,
due to reasons of efficiency, these solutions cannot be scaled to attest a large number of
devices. Furthermore, they cannot be extended to large embedded networks as they are
vulnerable to attacks that are more relevant in these networks, e.g., physical attacks.
3.9 conclusion and open problems
Over the past two decades, attestation has become a popular security solution that al-
lows establishing trust in a remote device. The goal of attestation has evolved from the
detection of malware infestation that changes a software binaries to ensuring the correct
execution of that software. Existing attestation solutions are not applicable to emerging
embedded networks that are formed a very large number of devices which hinders their
deployment. In fact, these solutions have high overhead that does not scale to very large
systems, and are vulnerable to attacks that are relevant for such systems. Consequently,
designing scalable attestation solutions that are applicable to such networks and are
capable of detecting a wider range of attacks is considered a challenging open problem.

4
D E T E C T I O N O F M A LWA R E I N F E S TAT I O N
Envisioned embedded deployments involve networks that are formed of a very large
number of heterogeneous embedded devices. Such networks represent an attractive tar-
get for attacks. While the most prominent attack on embedded systems is malware
infestation, e.g., Stuxnet [148], remote attestation represents the most popular mecha-
nism for detecting malware infestation attacks. Unfortunately, all existing attestation
schemes consider one single prover and one verifier. They are not scalable to large net-
works of embedded devices. In this chapter, we present two attestation protocols for
large networks of embedded devices, i.e, we devise two collective attestation solutions
that leverage in-network verification and aggregate signatures to scale static attestation
to large embedded networks, thus allowing efficient detection of malware infestation in
such networks. In Section 4.1, we present the first attestation protocol that is capable
of efficiently and collectively verifying the software integrity of a very large number of
embedded devices. The presented solution adapts the assumptions of single-device at-
testation in order to achieve best efficiency. It targets large embedded networks that are
physically protected. Next, Section 4.2 presents another collective attestation solution
for embedded networks that is applicable to a wider range of scenarios. This solution
exploits our novel aggregate signature construction to achieve its goals while inducing
minimal additional runtime overhead. The two presented solutions complete each other.
They present a tradeoff between security and efficiency. While the solution in Section 4.1
provides better efficiency when applied to scenarios with no physical attacks, the so-
lutions of Section 4.2 should be applied when physical attacks on some of the devices
is possible inducing a limited additional overhead. Finally, we present in Section 4.3 a
systematic analysis of collective attestation in terms of requirements, components, and
security guarantees. Our analysis aims at putting collective attestation on solid ground
and providing a guide for researchers in this area.
Remark. The results presented in this chapter are due to the author of this work and
the result of many intensive discussions and collaboration with Christian Wachsmann
(Intel Labs, Nürnberg), Moreno Ambrosin (Intel Labs, Oregon), Gregory Neven (IBM
Research, Zurich), Matthias Schunter (Intel Labs, Darmstadt), Shaza Zeitouni (TU Darm-
stadt, Germany), Ghada Dessouky (TU Darmstadt, Germany), Gene Tsudik (UCI, Cali-
fornia), Mauro Conti (University of Padua, Italy), N. Asokan (Aalto University, Finland),
Ferdinand Brasser (TU Darmstadt, Germany), and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi (TU Darmstadt,
Germany). Parts of this chapter have been published in [16], [12], [77], and [102].
4.1 scalable embedded device attestation
Large networks of embedded devices, such as industrial control systems, have been the
target of a wide range of attacks. A prominant example of such attacks is the Stuxnet
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episode [148]. A key challenge for securing embedded networks and their operations is
verifying the software integrity of individual devices in the face of malware infestation
attacks. This illustrates the need for an attestation solution that efficiently and collec-
tively verifies the software integrity and correct operation of a large number of low-end
embedded devices. Indeed, such a solution should overcome multiple challenges related
to network discovery, key management and routing, while maintaining scalability and
low overhead.
The solution we present in this section targets centrally managed systems such as IoT
networks e.g., home/office automation. These networks are usually formed of heteroge-
neous mobile devices. The burden of the solution, in terms of communication, compu-
tation, and energy cost is distributed over all the devices in the network. This is crucial
to prevent some devices, e.g., the verifier, from becoming a performance bottleneck.
Contribution. We investigate the security of large dynamic networks of heterogeneous
embedded devices and design the first collective attestation solution for these networks.
Our solution is generic, i.e., it is independent of the underlying software measurement
process which can be either static or dynamic. It represents the first step in our line of
research on collective attestation. We assess the security of our solution in a security
model that allows software-only attacks assumed in most existing attestation schemes.
Moreover, in order to demonstrate feasibility, we show how to instantiate the solution on
two security architecture for low-end embedded devices with different security features
and functional capabilities: SMART [52] and TrustLite [84]. Finally, we present extensive
performance evaluation based on these two instantiations, in addition to simulations of
the solution in networks of up to 1, 000, 000 devices. The solution allows a verifier to
verify the integrity of a network formed of one million devices in order of seconds. This
is achieved by distributing the burden of attestation on all the devices in the network
and enabling neighboring devices to attest each other, accumulate attestation result, and
send it to the verifier. Further, in order to provide efficiency our solution uses symmetric
key cryptography for authentication between devices in the network, while public key
cryptography is used between the network and the verifier in order to enable public
verfiability.
Outline. After providing a brief overview of our solution in Section 4.1.1, we present its
details in Section 4.1.2, and describe our implementation in Section 4.1.3. Performance
evaluation is then presented on Section 4.1.4. Security of the solution is examined in Sec-
tion 4.1.5, possible extensions are described in Section 4.1.6, and this section concludes
in Section 4.1.7.
4.1.1 Collective Attestation
4.1.1.1 Problem Description and System Model
We consider a dynamic network N that is formed of n interconnected heterogeneous
devices. The network operator O is responsible for initializing each device Di in a secure
environment. V is an entity that is interested in assessing the trustworthiness of N.
Further, N may not have a routing protocol in place. However, devices in N should
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be able to communicate to their direct neighbors [44, 68, 114, 115]. Since the mobility
of devices can be involuntary, i.e., guided by ambient factors, neither operator O nor
the verifier V are assumed to be aware of the network topology at any given time. A
collective attestation solution allows a verifier V (which could be a local or remote entity)
to verify the software integrity of N in an efficient and scalable manner. The basic idea
is that N is considered trustworthy if all of its devices have a benign software deployed
and certified by O, i.e., N is trustworthy if none of its devices is infested by malware.
4.1.1.2 Requirements Analysis
Objectives. A collective attestation solution for a network of embedded devices should
satisfy the following five properties:
• Property #1: Allow the attestation of the network N as a whole.
• Property #2: Be efficient and scalable, i.e., more efficient than attesting every device
in N individually.
• Property #3: Not depend on V’s knowledge of N’s configuration, e.g., topology or
types or version of software on devices.
• Property #4: Allow parallel execution of multiple attestation instances, e.g., by dif-
ferent verifiers.
• Property #5: Not depend on the properties of the underlying measurement scheme
used by devices in N.
The main objective of collective attestation is satisfying property #1 and property #2,
which are critical in large networks. Further, collective attestation is simplified by prop-
erty #3 which is required when V has no access to device’s software configuration, e.g.,
outsourced maintenance in smart factories which requires setup of production system to
remain secret [98, 90, 158]. Property #4 is needed when multiple verifiers are expected to
independently attest the network. Finally, property #5 enables extensibility by support-
ing applicability to wide range of measurement mechanisms, e.g., static or Control-Flow
Attestation (CFA).
Adversary Model. We assume an adversary A that can modify the software on any de-
vice Di in N except what is protected by hardware, e.g., A cannot modify code stored
in ROM. A can eavesdrop on, modify, replay, or drop any message exchanged between
devices in N and between any device Di and the verifier V. We assume that both the op-
erator O and V are trusted. Moreover, A is not capable of tampering with the hardware
of any device Di, i.e., physical attacks are ruled out in the present context. A software-
only adversary is a common adversary model in most existing attestation schemes. This
adversary is realistic in most existing IoT networks, e.g., smart home or office, and is in
line with our goal of detecting malware infestation. Furthermore, we assume a stealthy
adversary that aims at compromising as much devices as possible while evading detec-
tion by our solution, hence, we do not consider Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on the
attestation protocol itself which would reveal A’s presence.
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Figure 4.1: Example 8-device network: D1, . . . , D8
Device Requirements. The design of our solution satisfies property #4 and property #5.
However, satisfying the remaining three properties requires the ability to remotely attest
each device in N. Consequently, the following requirements should be satisfied by each
Di in N [52, 57]:
• Integrity measurement: A should not be able to tamper with the measurement mech-
anism responsible for measuring the software state of any device Di.
• Integrity reporting: A should not be able to forge the measurement c ′i of Di’s soft-
ware that is sent to V.
• Secure storage: A should not have access to the cryptographic key(s) that are used
in the attestation protocol.
If one of these requirements is not achieved, V might not be able to detect whether A
has tampered with Di’s software. The implementation of our solution in Section 4.1.3
exploits two security architecture for low-end embedded devices that satisfy these re-
quirements (SMART [52] and TrustLite [84]).
Assumptions. Devices in N may be heterogeneous (i.e., have multiple hardware and
software configurations). However, we assume that every device Di in N satisfies the
above requirements that allow secure remote attestation. Devices can communicate with
each other, i.e., every device Di can at least communicate to its neighboring device.
Further, during the execution of the attestation protocol, the network is assumed to
be connected and its topology should remain static. In particular, each device Di in N
should be reachable. Cryptographic primitives are assumed to be secure along with their
implementations.
Protocol Overview. Figure 4.1 shows an overview of our solution in a network formed of
eight devices D1 through D8. The proposed solution consists of three protocols: device
initialization, device registration, and attestation. In the device initialization protocol init,
O initializes each device (D8 in Figure 4.1) in a secure environment with cryptographic
secrets that are later used in the device registration and attestation protocols. When a
device (e.g., D8) detects a new neighbor (e.g., when it is introduced into, or changes its
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position in, N), it runs the device registration protocol join to establish attestation keys and
learn the software configuration of new neighbors. Keys and software configurations
are required for executing the attestation protocol. In the attestation protocol, V veri-
fies the software integrity of all devices in N. The attestation protocol consists of three
sub-protocols: (1) attest executed between V and N (i.e., between V and D1), (2) attdev
executed between devices in N (e.g., between D1 and D2), (3) clear which ends the attes-
tation session between V and N. attest is based on pubic key cryptography to support
arbitrary verifiers that may be unknown to O at deployment time. These verifiers do
not share a keys with any device in N. attdev is based on symmetric cryptography in
order to minimize cryptographic costs. Attestation begins with V contacting a random
device D1 denoted by initiator, i.e., initiating attest. From that point on, each device in
N first attests all of its direct neighbors (in parallel) and then returns the accumulated
attestation result to the device that sent the attestation request, i.e., devices recursively
perform attdev.
4.1.2 Protocol Description
In this section we describe the details of the protocols involved in our solution. We
present the protocols in two different scenarios: Section 4.1.2.1 describes the scenario
where attestation is realized as an interactive protocols, and Section 4.1.2.2 describes the
non-interactive scenario.
4.1.2.1 Interactive Protocol Description
All existing attestation schemes are realized as an interactive protocol initiated by the
verifier through sending the prover a random challenge. The challenge reflects the ver-
ifier’s interest in checking the trustworthiness of the prover. It also serves as a mean
for mitigating replay attacks. This setting seems natural when attestation is driven by
the verifier’s desire to attest the prover. However, it renders the prover susceptible to
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. When attestation is executed interactively, the details of
protocols involved in our collective attestation solution are as follows:
Device Initialization. Before deployment, the network operator O initializes each device
Di in N with O’s public verification key, which is needed for verifying certificates issued
by O, a software configuration ci (e.g., the hash of Di’s binaries), a signing key pair
(ski, pki) ← genkeysign(1`), and two certificates issued and signed by O: An identity
certificate cert(pki) certifying that pki is Di’s public key to which it securely store a
secret key ski, and software configuration certificate cert(ci) certifying that Di’s reference
software configuration is ci. Finally, Di’s list of active session identifiers is also initialized
Qi ← { }. Initialization is done in a secure environment and is formally:
init(ci, 1`)→
(
ski, pki, cert(pki), cert(ci),Qi
)
.
Device Registration. When a device Di detects a new neighbor Dj (e.g., when Di
changes its position in N or joins another network), it runs the join protocol to es-
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tablish an attestation key kij with Dj and learn Dj’s reference software configuration.
One approach to establish these keys is using an authenticated key agreement proto-
col based on signing keys ski and skj and identity certificates cert(pki) and cert(pkj)
(e.g., authenticated Diffie Hellman). Key establishment can also be done using key pre-
distribution [30]. Through join, each device Di shares one attestation key kij with each
of its neighbors. We denote the set of all attestation keys of Di by Ki.
In addition sharing keys, Di and Dj exchange their code certificates cert(ci) and
cert(cj). Di and Dj then verify these certificates using O’s public key. If verification
succeeds, Di and Dj store cj and ci respectively. Otherwise, if Di cannot verify the soft-
ware configuration of Dj it does not accept Dj as a neighbor. Note that, this solution
does not hinder software updates. a device Di whose software is updated should only
send the new software configuration certificate to its current neighbors for verification.
join is formally:
join
[
Di : ski; Dj : skj; ∗ : cert(pki), cert(pkj), cert(ci), cert(cj)
]→ [Di : kij; Dj : kij] .
Device Attestation. Our solution internally uses the attdev protocol (see Figure 4.2),
where a device Di verifies the integrity of the software configuration of another device
Dj. A session identifier q is used to identify different instances of the attestation protocol.
The goal of q is to allow multiple protocol instances to run concurrently and to enable
the construction of an attestation spanning tree over N. In particular, when a new q is
received by Dj from Di, Dj marks Di as its parent in the spanning tree and stores q
as an active session identifier in the list Qj. Consequently, a spanning tree is formed,
where connected nodes are neighbors in N. The construction of the spanning tree can
be influenced by setting up an upper bound for the number of children for each node.
This allows the spanning tree grow in height while limiting its fan-out, thus leading
to the formation of balanced trees from mesh networks. We leverage this measure to
enable optimizing our attestation solution (see Section 4.1.4). In attdev, each device Dj
is responsible for attesting its children in the tree. The results of this attestation are
then accumulated along with the results reported to these children by their children, i.e.,
attestation results for the subtrees rooted at each of the children. The accumulated result
is then reported by Dj to its parent Di. attdev is executed in parallel with every neighbor
Dk of Dj, using only symmetric cryptography. It is based on the attestation key kij and
the reference software configuration cj established through join.
The output of attdev for a device Di is: The bit b that indicates whether the attestation
of child Dj was successful, i.e. it returns b = 1 if the software configuration of Dj
matches the software configuration stored at Di and b = 0 otherwise. The number β of
devices whose authenticity and software integrity has been successfully verified in the
subtree rooted at Dj (excluding Dj). And the total number τ of attested devices in the
subtree rooted at Dj (excluding Dj).
If a device Dj received an old global session identifier for an attestation instance to
which it has already participated, Dj does not respond to that session identifier. The
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q, kij , cj
Device Di
βj , τj , µ0, µ1
Device Dj
Qj , Kj , c′j
µ0 ← mac
(
kij ;Ni‖q‖βj‖τj
)
if vermac(kij ;Ni‖q‖βj‖τj , µ0) = 1 then
else b← 0
endif
q, NiNi ∈R {0, 1}`N
for each kl ∈ Kj \ {kij} do
attdev
[
Dj : kl;Dl : Ql,Kl, c′l; ∗ : q, cl
]→ [Dj : bl, βl, τl;Dl : −]
endfor
βj ← βj + bl + βl
βj ← 0, τj ← 0
µ1 ← mac
(
kij ;Ni‖q‖c′j
)
endif
if vermac (kij ;Ni‖q‖cj , µ1) = 1 then b← 1
else b← 0, β ← 0, τ ← 0
τj ← τj + 1 + τl
if q ∈ Qj then
else
endif
Qj ← Qj ∪ {q}
βj ← ⊥, τj ← ⊥
if β 6= ⊥ ∧ τ 6= ⊥ then β ← βj , τ ← τj
else b← 0, β ← 0, τ ← −1
endif
Figure 4.2: Protocol attdev
output of attdev for Di is then b = 0, β = 0, and τ = −1 after a time-out has occurred.
attdev is formally:
attdev
[
Di : kij; Dj : Qj,Kj, c ′j; ∗ : q, cj
]→ [Di : b,β, τ; Dj : −] .
The details of attdev are shown in Figure 4.2 and are as follows: Di sends each neigh-
bor Dj a fresh nonce Ni and a session identifier q. Dj then checks whether q is an active
session identifier belonging to its list Qj. If so, it replies with βj ← ⊥ and τj ← ⊥. Other-
wise, if q is a new session identifier, Dj executes attdev with its every neighbor Dk and
adds q to the list Qj. Eventually, when Dj receives the attestation results from all neigh-
bors, it accumulates them into βj and τj, which are then authenticated with a MAC
µ0 based on kij. Dj also attests itself to Di with the MAC µ1 over its current software
configuration. If µ0 and µ1 verify successfully, Di accepts the attestation response of Dj.
Network Attestation. To verify the integrity of N, V initiates attest by contacting an
arbitrary D1 ∈ N. This initiates a recursive attestation process in N. Eventually, V returns
a bit b = 1 indicating that the attestation of N was successful, or b = 0 if the attestation
failed. D1 is either chosen randomly by V or based on preference or location. Note that,
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Device D1
Q1, K1, sk1, c′1, cert(pk1), cert(c1)n
Verifier V
N1 ∈R {0, 1}`N
else b← 0
endif
if versig(pk1;N1‖β1‖τ1‖c1, σ1) = 1 ∧ β1 = τ1 = n− 1 then
b = 1
cert(pk1), cert(c1), β1, τ1, σ1
N1
σ1 ← sign
(
sk1;N1‖β1‖τ1‖c′1
)
attdev
[
D1 : ki;Di : Qi,Ki, c′i; ∗ : q, ci
]→ [D1 : bi, βi, τi;Di : −]
β1 ← β1 + bi + βi
β1 ← 0, τ1 ← 0
τ1 ← τ1 + 1 + τi
for each ki ∈ K1 do
endfor
q ∈R {0, 1}`q
for each ki ∈ K1 do
clear [D1 : q, ki;Di : Qi,Ki; ∗ : −]→ [V : −;D : −]
endfor
Q1 ← Q1 ∪ {q}
Q1 ← Q1 \ {q}
Figure 4.3: Protocol attest
V can either be remote or within the communication range of some devices in N. attest
is formally:
attest
[
V : −; D1 : Q1,K1, sk1, c ′1; ∗ : n, cert(pk1), cert(c1)
]→ [V : b; D1 : −] .
The attest protocol is shown in Figure 4.3 and works as follows: The protocol starts by
V sending an attestation request to D1 that contains a fresh nonce N1. D1 then generates
a new session identifier q and sends it to all its neighbors along with a a new fresh Ni for
each neighbor Di, i.e., D1 executes attdev with each of its neighbors. The neighbors then
recursively execute attdev with their neighbors. While q identifies the current attestation
instance and assist in the construction of the spanning tree, the goal of the nonces is to
thwart replay attacks on the communication between devices and between D1 and V.
Eventually, accumulated attestation reports of all the devices in N are received by D1,
which accumulates them into τ1 and β1. D1 then authenticates τ1, β1, and its current
software configuration c ′1 with a signature σ1 based on its secret signing key sk1. It then
sends σ1, β1, and τ1 along with its certificates cert(pk1) and cert(c1) to V. Using O’s
public key, cert(pk1) and cert(c1), V first verifies the authenticity of pk1 and c1. V then
uses pk1, c1 and σ1 to verify the authenticity of β1, τ1. If verification of σ1 succeeds, V
concludes that attestation was successful. V then uses τ1 and β1 to learn the respective
number of devices that participated in protocol and were successfully attested, and to
determine the output b of attest. Attestation fails if the verification of σ1 fails or D1 did
not respond to V. When D1 sends its response to V, it also initiates the clear protocol in
order to delete the current global session identifier q from every device in N.
Clear. A device Di sends to every neighbor Dj a global session identifier that is authenti-
cated with kij. Upon receiving q, each neighbor Dj deletes q from its list of active session
identifiers Qj, and executes clear recursively with all its neighbors. clear is formally:
clear
[
Di : q,kij; Dj : Qj,Kj; ∗ : −
]→ [Di : −; Dj : −] .
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4.1.2.2 Non-Interactive Protocol Description
On the other hand, there exists certain scenarios where attestation is triggered by factors
that can be known to the prover, e.g., regular maintenance. In such scenarios, attestation
can also be realized as a non-interactive protocol initiated by the prover. When attesta-
tion is executed non-interactively, the details of the protocols involved in our collective
attestation solution deviate from the protocol description presented above. Moreover, in
addition to the devices requirements in Section 4.1.1, non-interactive attestation requires
every device Di in N to be equipped with: (1) a Reliable Read-Only Clock (RROC) that
cannot be modified by any software that is residing on Di, and (2) a dedicated timeout
circuit that allows triggering attestation without revealing the attestation time. Finally,
non-interactive collective attestation assumes the existence of a spanning tree over N,
and time synchronization between V and every device in N. In the following we present
details of the protocols involved in our solution when attestation is non-interactive:
Device Initialization. In addition to key pairs, software configuration, and certificates,
every device Di in N is also initialized by the network operator O with a random seed
si that is required to randomly generate attestation time. Initialization is formally:
init(ci, 1`)→
(
ski, pki, cert(pki), cert(ci), si
)
.
Device Attestation. The non-interactive solution uses attdev protocol to allow a device
Di to verify the integrity of its children in the spanning tree. This protocol is similar to
the attdev protocol described above. However, it is initiated by the child nodes at the
attestation time tattest. Further, it uses tattest instead of fresh nonces to protect against
replay attacks. In particular, at tattest, every device Dj sends to its parent Di in the span-
ning tree an attestation response including: the number βj of devices whose authenticity
and software integrity has been successfully verified in the subtree rooted at Dj (exclud-
ing Dj); the total number τj of attested devices in the subtree rooted at Dj (excluding
Dj); a MAC µ0 over τj, βj, and tattest; and a MAC µ1 over Dj’s software configuration
c ′j and tattest. The parent Di verifies the MACs, accumulates the results received from
its children, and reports the accumulated result to its parent in the tree. The output of
attdev for a device Di is: The bit b that indicates whether the attestation of child Dj was
successful, and the numbers β and τ received from Dj. Protocol attdev is formally:
attdev
[
Di : kij, si; Dj : Kj, c ′j, sj; ∗ : cj
]→ [Di : b,β, τ; Dj : −] .
After attesting itself to its parent, each device Dj uses the random seed sj to determine
the next attestation time, i.e., tattest = tattest + rand(sj), where rand is a Pseudorandom
Number Generator (PRNG).
Network Attestation. The protocol attest allows the network to attest itself to the verifier
V. This protocol is similar to the attest protocol described above. However, it is initiated
at tattest by the root device D1 of the spanning tree. Further, it also uses tattest instead of
fresh nonces to protect against replay attacks. In particular, at tattest, D1 accumulates all
the attestation responses coming from its children along with its own software config-
uration into a single response that is formed of: the number β1 of devices in N whose
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Figure 4.4: Implementation based on SMART [52]
authenticity and software integrity has been successfully verified (excluding D1); the
total number τ1 of attested devices in N (excluding D1); and a digital signature σ1 over
τj, βj, D1’s software configuration c ′1, and tattest. D1 then sends σ1, β1, and τ1 along
with its certificates cert(pk1) and cert(c1) to V. V accepts the attestation response only if
received within short interval around tattest, i.e., within [tattest− δt, tattest+ δt,+ttr] where
δt is the maximum clock skew between V and N and ttr is the upper bound on the time
required to perform collective attestation. After verifying σ1, β1, and τ1, V determines
the output b of attest as above. Protocol attest is formally:
attest
[
V : s1; D1 : K1, sk1, c ′1, s1; ∗ : n, cert(pk1), cert(c1)
]→ [V : b; D1 : −] .
4.1.3 Implementation
We present two instantiations of our solution, based on interactive attestation, on top
of two lightweight security architectures for low-end embedded systems: SMART [52]
and TrustLite [84] (see Chapter 3). The two architectures we chose provide strong secu-
rity guarantees for remote attestation while imposing minimal hardware features, i.e.,
a small amount of Read-Only Memory (ROM) and a simple Memory Protection Unit
(MPU).
Implementation on SMART. In order to enable secure implementation of our solution
on SMART [52]. we require slight modifications to SMART’s architecture allowing the
MPU to control access to a small amount of rewritable memory. Rewritable memory is
needed to securely store cryptographic keys and session identifiers generated during
the execution of the protocols, e.g., attestation keys established through join and used
in attdev. For our implementation, we store in ROM of every device the program code,
i.e. the code responsible for executing the protocols join, attdev, attest, and clear. We
also store in ROM of each device Di the signing key ski. The integrity of the code and
the signing key is then ensured through the emutability of ROM. Further, we store the
lists Qi of active session identifiers, and Ki of keys shared with neighbors in rewritable
memory of each device Di. Note that, these lists are updated during the lifetime of
Di. Our implementation is shown in Figure 4.4 where rewritable memory is denoted by
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Figure 4.5: Implementation based on TrustLite [84]
RAM. SMART’s MPU ensures that secret data are only accessible to unmodified protocol
code in ROM that requires access to this data. For example rule #1 ensures that only join
and attest have read access to ski, rules #2 and #3 ensure that only join, attdev, attest, and
clear have read access to Ki, which is write accessible to join only, and rule #4 ensures
that only attdev, attest, and clear have write access to Qi, which is read accessible to all
code on Di.
Implementation on TrustLite. Our solution is implemented as trustlets on the TrustLite
security architecture [84] (see Chapter 3). More precisely, we implemented each of the
protocols join, attdev, attest, and clear as a single independent trustlet on device Di. Our
implementation is shown in Figure 4.5. Trustlite ensures the software integrity of each of
these protocols via the secure boot component SecureBoot on Di. Further, as in SMART,
the MPU of TrustLite ensures that secret data of Di is only accessible to appropriate
trustlets. For example rule #1 ensures that SecureBoot has exclusive read access to the
memory housing the program code of join, attdev, attest, and clear, rule #2 ensures that
only join and attest have read access to ski, rules #3 and #4 ensure that join, attdev,
attest, and clear have exclusive read access to Ki, which is write accessible to join only,
and rule #5 ensures that only attdev, attest, and clear have write access to Qi, which is
publicly read accessible.
4.1.4 Performance Evaluation
We assess performance of our solution, based on interactive attestation, in terms of
computational, communication, memory, runtime, and energy costs. We further present
simulation results for networks of up to 1, 000, 000 devices. Our performance evaluation
is based on the implementation in Section 4.1.3. It assumes that the topology of the
network does not change during the execution of the attestation.
Computation Cost. Cryptographic operations, such as MAC generation, constitute the
major part of the computation cost. Let gi denote the number of neighbors of every
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device Di, and hi 6 gi − 1 be the upper bound on the number of children of Di in the
spanning tree. The initiator D1, which is chosen by the verifier V to be the interface to N,
verifies up to 2g1 MACs and generates only 1 digital signature. Each device Di verifies
up to 2hi MACs and generates only 2 MACs.
Communication Cost. We used HMAC based on SHA-1 as our MAC implementation,
and ECDSA as our digital signature scheme, i.e., `mac = 160 and `sign = 320. We further
used a 64 bit counter for τ, and β, and chose `N = 160 and `q = 64. As a consequence,
signing keys, nonces, and MACs, are 20 Bytes each. β, τ, and the global session identifier
q are 8 Bytes each. Digital signatures are 40 Bytes each. And, certificates are 60 Bytes each.
The initiator D1 has a communication overhead, which is upper bounded by receiving
20+ 56g1 Bytes and sending 48g1 + 176 Bytes. The upper bound on the communication
overhead of each device Di is receiving 68gi + 56 Bytes and sending 56gi + 68 Bytes.
Memory Cost. Every device Di in N should store the following: (1) an authentication
key pair (ski, pki) and the corresponding identity certificate cert(pki); (2) a software con-
figuration ci and the corresponding software configuration certificate cert(ci); (3) a set
of attestation keys that it shares with neighboring devices – Ki; and (4) the list Qi of
active session identifiers that should at least hold one active identifier q. The memory
cost of Di is around 20gi + 168 Bytes. Low-end embedded devices, which we target in
this solution, have more than 1, 024 Bytes of Flash memory. Applications where devices
have 12 neighbors require each device to use less than half of this memory. Other appli-
cations that require more neighbors per device usually incorporate more power devices
with larger Flash memory, e.g., vehicular ad-hoc networks.
Runtime. The design of our solution allows devices at the same level of the spanning tree
to perform their execution of the attestation protocol at the same time, i.e., in parallel.
However, the verification of MACs on level l of the tree requires the generation of these
MACs by level l− 1. Consequently, runtime of the attestation protocol is dependent on
the overall height d = f(n) ∈ O(log(n)) of the spanning tree.1 Moreover, as can be seen
from the computation costs per device, the overall runtime is also affected by the fan-out
of the tree, i.e., the number of children per device.
We denote by tsign, tmac, tprng, and ttr the time that a device Di requires to perform the
sign operation, to execute mac or vermac, to generate a fresh nonce, and to communicate
1 Byte to a neighboring device Dj respectively. The overall runtime of the attestation
protocol is:
t 6
(
280+ 168d+
d∑
i=0
gi
)
ttr +
(
2+ 4d+
d∑
i=0
gi
)
tmac + (d+ 1)tprng + tsign
We show in Figure 4.6a the runtime of the attestation protocol per device. The runtime
of attestation on one device increases linearly on with the number of neighbors of this
device.2 Further, because of public key cryptography, runtime on the initiator device D1
1 The height d of the spanning tree excludes the initiator D1, i.e., the height of a tree formed of one device is
d = 0.
2 Due to the graph scale, runtime on TrustLite appear to be constant when it is in fact linear in number of
neighbors.
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(a) Runtime of attestation (b) Energy consumption of attestation
Figure 4.6: Performance of attestation per device
is more than that on any other device inN. Finally, TrustLite implementation seems more
efficient than that of SMART because of the higher clock speed of TrustLite hardware.
Energy Cost. We denote by Eprng, Esign, Emac, Erecv, Esend, the energy that a device Di
needs for generating a fresh nonce, performing the sign operation, executing mac or
vermac, receiving 1 Byte, and sending 1 Byte respectively. During one execution of the
attestation protocol, the energy E1 consumed by initiator D1 can be estimated as:
E1 6 (176+ 68g1)Esend + (20+ 56g1)Erecv + 3g1Emac + g1Eprng + Esign
Further, the energy Ei consumed by every other device Di in N can be estimated as:
Ei 6 (56+ 68gi)Esend + (68+ 56gi)Erecv + (3+ 3gi)Emac + giEprng
We estimated the energy consumption of attestation based on the energy costs of
communication and cryptographic operations reported for two sensor nodes: MICAz
and TelosB [47], which belong to the same class of low-end embedded systems that are
targeted by our solution.3 Our energy consumption estimations are presented in Fig-
ure 4.6b. The energy consumption on each device Di increases linearly with the number
of neighbors gi of this device. Therefore, in applications where all devices have the same
number of neighbors, our solution distributes energy consumption evenly across all de-
vices in the network N. Due to the use of public key cryptography, energy consumed
by the initiator D1 is more than all other devices. However, if a different initiator device
was used for each execution of the attestation protocol, the energy needed for public key
cryptography would be amortized among all the devices in N.
Simulation Results. We used the OMNeT++ [104] network simulator to assess the per-
formance of our solutions for large networks of embedded devices. The attestation pro-
tocol was implemented on the application layer, where cryptographic operations were
emulated with delays corresponding to real measurments of their execution time on
SMART [52] and TrustLite [84]. For our simulations, the average end-to-end delay of
the communication between devices was set to 20 ms, which corresponds to the average
3 SMART and TrustLite are only available as FPGA implementations, which tend to consume more energy
than manufactured chips.
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delay in sensor networks communicating over ZigBee [135]. Further, we compared our
solution to the naïve approach that requires the verifier to attest each device in N indi-
vidually. The verification of the attestation response was excluded from the simulation.
Note that, while the verification time increases linearly with the size of the network
in the naïve approach, it is constant for in our solution. We considered three popular
topologies: a star topology, a chain topology, and tree topologies with number of child
nodes varying from 2 to 12. Further, we simulated various network sizes, which ranged
from 10 to 1, 000, 000. Figure 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 show the results of our simulations.
(a) SMART [52] (b) TrustLite [84]
Figure 4.7: Performance of attestation for tree topologies
(a) SMART [52] (b) TrustLite [84]
Figure 4.8: Performance of attestation for chain and star topologies
Runtime of our solution is linear in the size of the network for star and chain topolo-
gies (see Figure 4.8), and logarithmic for tree topologies (see Figure 4.7). The runtime of
our solution as function of the number of neighbor per device is shown in Figure 4.9 for
networks with different sizes. The figure shows how the number of neighbors per device
can be optimized with respect to a given network size. For example, in Figure 4.9a) the
attestation runtime in networks with 10, 000 devices decreases with the number of neigh-
bors, then it starts to increase when it reaches a certain threshold. This happens because
the number of neighbors per device affects the performance of attestation in two ways.
First, it increases the runtime on individual devices, which have to verify more MACs.
This leads to longer overall runtime. Second, it increases the fan-out of the spanning tree,
thus decreasing its height. This leads to shorter overall runtime. Therefore, the increase
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(a) SMART [52] (b) TrustLite [84]
Figure 4.9: Performance of attestation for networks with tree topologies and varying numbers of
neighbors per device
in number of neighbors per devices increases the efficiency of attestation up until indi-
vidual runtime overshadows the benefit of lower height. Note that, this optimal number
is dependent on device and network characteristics, i.e., network delays and computa-
tional power of devices. The figure shows that for SMART devices, the optimal number
of neighbors per device is 2 in networks with 10 to 100 devices, and 4 in networks with
1, 000 to 10, 000 devices.
A comparison between our solution and the the naïve approach, which requires the
verifier to attest each device in N individually, is shown in Figure 4.10. Our solution
performs significantly better than the naïve approach, whose performance is quadratic
in the network size for all simulated topologies, i.e., tree, chain, and star topologies.
(a) SMART [52] (b) TrustLite [84]
Figure 4.10: Performance of our attestation compared to the naïve approach
Further, we compare our solution based on interactive and non-interactive attestation.
The results are shown in Figure 4.11 for binary trees of up to 1, 000, 000 devices. Non-
interactive attestation shows a significant performance improvement, which can be as
high as 28% in very large networks. This performance improvement comes at the cost
of additional hardware requirements and assumptions regarding the network topology
and the use case scenario.
Our simulation shows that the best performance of our solution is in topologies that
allow constructing a spanning tree with a limited fan-out. This is due to the fact that
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Figure 4.11: Comparison between interactive and non-interactive collective attestation
spanning trees enable parallelism, while the limited fan-out limits the verification over-
head on individual devices in the network. In topologies where spanning trees cannot
be established, such as chain and star topologies, our attestation is still significantly
better than attesting each device individually. Finally, we discuss in Section 4.1.6 an ex-
tension of our scheme, which is based on random sampling and is capable of reducing
the overhead of attestation for such topologies.
4.1.5 Security Analysis
The goal of our attestation solution is to enable the verifier V to check the software
integrity of all devices in a network N, i.e., V should accept the attestation report and
return b = 1 if every device Di in N has an unmodified software correctly certified by the
network operator O. We formalize this goal as a security experiment ExpA, where the
adversary A can interact with every device in N as well as V. A has full control over the
communication channel between every two devices in N, and between N and V, i.e., it
can eavesdrop on, modify, drop, and inject arbitrary messages to any Di ∈ N and to V. A
maliciously modifies of at least one device in N. At the end of the experiment, V outputs
the result of attestation b indicating whether it has accepted the attestation report or
not, following a polynomial number (in `N, `q, `mac, and `sign) of steps performed by
A. The output of V represents the result of this security experiment, i.e., ExpA = b. In
the following we provide the definition of secure collective attestation under the pre-
described adversary model:
Definition 4.1 (Secure collective attestation under software attacks). Let f be a polyno-
mial function in `N, `q, `mac, and `sign. We consider a collective attestation scheme to be se-
cure under software attacks if the probability Pr
[
b = 1|ExpA(1
`) = b
]
is negligible in ` =
f(`N, `q, `mac, `sign).
Theorem 4.1 (Security of our attestation solution). The attestation solution presented in
this section is a secure collective attestation scheme (Definition 4.1) if the underlying MAC and
signature schemes are selective forgery resistant.
Proof sketch of Theorem 7.1. Let pk1, c1, cert(pk1), cert(c1) be the public key, the reference
software configuration, the identity certificate, and the software configuration certificate
of the initiator D1 respectively. As a response to a challenge containing the nonce N1,
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the verifier V receives from D1 a message (β1, τ1,σ1, cert(pk1), cert(sk1)). V accepts and
returns b = 1 only if versig(pk1; N1‖β1‖τ1‖c1,σ1) = 1, and β1 = τ1 = n − 1. Consider
the two cases where A either maliciously modifies the (1) the software of the initiator
D1, or (2) the software of any other device Dj in the network N. It is easy to see that all
possible attacks by A compromising the software of at least on device in N is covered by
a combination of these cases.
We first consider the case where A compromises D1. Due to hardware security ar-
chitecture, A is not capable of tampering with the code of attest responsible for mea-
surement and reporting of D1’s software. Consequently, the software configuration c ′1
included in σ1 = sign(sk1; N1‖q‖β1‖τ1‖c ′1) will be different than the reference software
configuration c1 of D1. In order to convince V to accept and return b = 1, A then must
forge the signature σ1. However, since the signature scheme is selective forgery resistant,
the probability of A forging σ is negligible in `sign.
We now consider the case where A compromises Dj. Assume that the device Di is the
parent of Dj in the spanning tree, i.e., Di attest Dj through attdev. Similar to the case of
initiator, the secure hardware of Dj prevents A from tampering with the code of attdev
responsible for measurement and reporting of Dj’s software. Consequently, the software
configuration c ′j included in µ0 = mac(kij; Ni‖q‖c ′j) will be different than the reference
software configuration cj of Dj. In order to make up for the fact that attestation of Dj
was not successful, A then must forge the MAC µ0. However, since the MAC scheme is
selective forgery resistant, the probability of A forging µ0 is negligible in `mac. A could
also compensate for this failure in attesting Dj by either decreasing τj, increasing βj,
or double counting one of the benign devices Db. However, since the code of attdev
responsible for authenticating βj and τj with µ1 = mac(kij; Ni‖q‖βj‖τj) is protected
by hardware on Dj, A would have to forge µ1 which is negligible in `mac. Similarly, to
change βj and τj, A may try to change (βa, τa) that are involved in the computation of
βj and τj. However, this is negligible in `mac. Finally, as every attestation report includes
a global session identifier q, A trying to make a device Db report twice for the same
value of q is also negligible in `mac.
Therefore, the probability ofA convincing V to accept the attestation report and return
b = 1 after maliciously modifying the software of at least one device in N is negligible
in `mac and `sign.
4.1.6 Protocol Extensions
We now decibel different extensions of our solution that enable more services, provide
better efficiency, or go beyond the threat model described in Section 4.1.1.
Identification of Compromised Devices. The solution we present assures the verifier
V that none of the devices in the network N has been software compromised. In fact,
it reports to V the number of successfully attested devices in N. However, in certain
scenarios it might be crucial to pinpoint devices with compromised software. This can
be easily done by modifying the code of attdev, to also record the identifier of devices
that failed attestation and append it to the attestation report. Consequently, the attes-
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tation report accumulated by the initiator D1 will include of a list of all devices in N,
whose software integrity could not be verified. Clearly, this approach increases the mes-
sage complexity, and hereby the communication overhead, of our attestation solution.
It is best suited for scenarios where compromised devices are expected to have a small
count. In Section 4.2 we show another collective attestation solution that is capable of
identifying compromised devices.
Support for Devices of Different Priority. In the presented solution all devices are as-
sumed to be of the same importance. However, in some scenarios, certain devices might
be considered more critical than others. For example, a cluster head in a Wireless Sensor
Network (WSN) is much more important than a regular sensor node, and its software
integrity is hereby more critical than that of a sensor node. By weighting the attestation
results of devices, our solution enables supporting such scenarios. In particular, when
a critical device is attested successfully by a device Di, the counters βi and τi of Di
are incremented by a weighted factor that reflects the importance of that attested device.
For example, a device that is at least three times as important as any regular device in
N will lead to an increase of 3 to βi and τi when attested successfully.
Random Sampling. One way to enhance the performance of our solutions is to use
random sampling, i.e., verify the integrity of a small subset N ′ ⊂ N, which is statistically
representative of N. This is particularly useful for worst case scenarios, such as chain
and star topologies. Random sampling provides V with probabilistic assurance about the
integrity of a certain number of devices in N, i.e., V learns that with probability p at least
x devices in N are running a benign software certified by the network operator O. This
extension executes as follows: Along with the nonce N, V sends in the challenge of attest
the desired size z of the sample N’. This size z is broadcasted across the network along
with q through attdev. Every device Dj ∈ N \ {D1} uses a global deterministic function
f and the parameters z and n to determine whether it is part of the sample N’. Devices
also use f to find out whether their children in the spanning tree need to be attested.
Finally, V only receives the attestation results of devices in N’. This approach provides
V with assurance that the attestation results of N ′ reflect, with certain confidence interval
and confidence level, the actual state of N. Consider a network N with 105 devices. By
attesting a sample N’ including 9% of N’s devices, V obtains a confidence interval of 1%
and confidence level of 95%.
Software Updates. Our solutions can also be used to check correctness of software up-
dates. In particular, each software update includes a new software configuration certifi-
cate cert(cnew). This certificate is authenticated by the updated devices Di based on the
keys in Ki and shared with all of its neighbors. If certificate verifies successfully, neigh-
bors replace the old reference software configuration of Di with cnew. Finally, to ensure
that the software of Di was updated successfully, Di can be either attested by a remote
verifier V based on its secret key ski, or by one (or more) neighbors using key(s) from
Ki. Further, while attesting the network, V can detect roll-back attacks, where A installs
old (probably vulnerable) software versions.
Highly dynamic swarms. Our solution assumes that the topology of N is static during
the execution of the attestation protocol. However, it may leverage an existing routing
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protocol to allow attestation of highly dynamic networks, where the topology changes
are often and may occur during attestation execution. The main idea is to generate a
a virtual spanning and count on the routing protocol to ensure delivery of protocol
messages from child to parent nodes. This approach leads to a higher communication
overhead as messages between neighboring devices are instead sent through multiple
hops.
Mitigation of Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks. The design of our solutions, which is
mostly based on symmetric cryptography, makes it a less attractive target for DoS at-
tacks. However, the protocols that are based on asymmetric cryptography, i.e., join and
attest, can be still targeted by DoS attack. For instance, A can make a compromised de-
vice repeatedly send fake certificates to its neighbors as part of join. This will exhaust
the resources of the neighbors that have to perform computationally expensive asym-
metric cryptography to verify the certificates. We imagine two solutions for thwarting
DoS on join. The first solutions is to limit the frequency of execution of join, while the
second involves executing join with low priority. Current lightweight security architec-
ture for embedded networks provide support for real-time execution, e.g., TyTAN [28].
Consequently, some events, such as join execution can be handled with lower priority,
allowing the resources of the device to be allocated to other tasks. This ensures that
the CPU dedicates only otherwise idle cycles for executing join protocol. DoS attacks on
attest are also critical as A can execute a global DoS on the whole network through one
device, i.e., by sending one attestation request. In Section 4.2 we show how such attacks
can be thwarted.
Physical Attacks. In some applications, such as IoT networks we consider in this sec-
tion, it might be reasonable to assume no physical attacks on any of the devices in the
network. However, other applications involve devices that can be the target of physical
attacks. Our solution assumes that none of the devices can be physical attacks. An ad-
versary A who is capable of physically attacking one device can undermine the security
of our solution and evade detection of an arbitrary number of compromised devices.
Several mitigation techniques may serve for thwarting A. One can use Physical Un-
clonable functions (PUFs) as the primitive for authenticating attestation reports. PUFs
are considered tamper-resistant and can aid in mitigating physical attacks. Another ap-
proach is absence detection to detect all physically attacked devices. We elaborate on
this approach in Chapter 5, where we describe our collective attestation solution that
detect physical attacks. Furthermore, the collective attestation solution we describe in
Section 4.2 is more resilient to physical attacks, since a physically attacked device can
only evade its own detection by that solution.
4.1.7 Conclusion
The solution we presented in this section represents the first attestation solution that
allows efficient and scalable attestation of networks formed of a very large number
of heterogeneous embedded devices. This solution represents the most efficient multi-
device attestation as it allows attesting a million-device network in order of seconds. The
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security of this solution is analyzed in the first security model for collective attestation,
which adheres to the security model of single-device attestation. Note that, this solution
is most suitable for networks, where none of the devices can be physically attacked. It
considers DoS attacks on the attestation protocol to be out of scope. And, it allows the
verifier to learn only the number of devices in the network that were attested successfully.
Based on these properties that adhere to single-device attestation, this solutions is able to
guarantee best efficiency. In Section 4.2 we present another solution that allows detection
malware infestation in large networks. However, the solution we present in Section 4.2 is
resilient to DoS and physical attacks, and is capable of identifying compromised devices
while imposing minimal additional overhead.
4.2 secure and scalable aggregate network attestation
The solution we presented in Section 4.1 constitutes a first step towards secure and
scalable attestation for large embedded networks. However, to achieve best efficiency,
this solution adheres to the adversary model of single-device attestation, i.e., it assumes
a software-only adversary that is not capable of performing physical attacks. This as-
sumption allows using hop-by-hop authentication and attestation based in symmetric
key cryptography. Further, efficiency is also enhanced by only collecting the number of
devices that were not attested successfully and not their identity or software configura-
tion. While the design of this solution increases its efficiency considerably and hereby
its scalability, it imposes several assumptions that limits its applicability. For example,
hop-by-hop attestation requires trusting all intermediaries, i.e., every device involved in
the protocol should participate in the attestation process, and should be equipped with
a lightweight security architecture as described in Section 4.1.1. Moreover, an adversary
that is capable of tampering with the lightweight security architecture of a small number
of devices can undermine the security of the proposed solution. All these assumptions
and requirements limits the applicability of this solutions to scenarios where all devices
are trusted (i.e., owned) by the same entity, e.g., smart home/office.
In this section we present a second collective attestation solution for centrally man-
aged systems of heterogeneous devices. However, while this solution imposes additional
overhead, it imposes less assumptions, provides stronger security guarantees, and is ap-
plicable to a wider range of applications, e.g., scenarios where devices involved in the
attestation protocol are not all deployed/trusted by the same entity. The security of the
scheme is based on a novel signature scheme that allows: (1) scalability, i.e., can be effi-
ciently applied to large networks of embedded devices; (2) public verifiability, i.e., can
be verified by any entity that holds the public key; and (3) untrusted intermediaries, i.e.,
devices that are not involved in signing do not have to be trusted. As mentioned earlier,
the two solutions presented in this chapter complete each other. While Section 4.1 pro-
vides best efficiency, this section provides applicability to a wider range of application
with strong security guarantees.
Contribution. We investigate security of a large embedded networks that have a stronger
adversary model and different requirements. Then we devise a secure collective attesta-
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tion solution which satisfies the requirements in these networks. Our solution is based
on a novel signature scheme that we design, which combines aggregate and multisigna-
tures providing both scalability and heterogeneity.4 In particular, the devised signature
scheme allows aggregating signatures on attestation reports of heterogeneous devices,
with an overhead on the verifier that is constant in the number of devices in the network.
We denote this signature scheme by Optimistic Aggregate Signature (OAS). The attesta-
tion solution leverages OAS to (1) enable applicability to large scale IoT deployments,
where not all devices can be trusted, e.g., cloud servers and router; and (2) provide re-
siliency against physical attacks. In order to demonstrate feasibility, we also show how
to instantiate this solution on the two recent security architecture for low-end embedded
devices used in Section 4.1, i.e., SMART [52] and TrustLite [84]. Moreover, we present
extensive performance evaluation based on these two instantiations, in addition to simu-
lations of the solution in networks of up to 1, 000, 000 devices demonstrating scalability.
Assuming the devices that perform the aggregation to be untrusted, this solution allows
attestation a million-device network in 2.5 seconds.
Outline. We provide a brief overview of our solution in Section 4.2.1, present our OAS
signature scheme in Section 4.2.2, and provide details of our solution in Section 4.2.3.
Our implementation on SMART and TrustLite is described in Section 4.2.4. In Sec-
tion 4.2.5 we present our performance evaluation, and we examine security of this solu-
tion in Section 4.2.6. An extension to the solution is described in Section 4.2.7, and this
section concludes in Section 4.2.8.
4.2.1 Collective Attestation
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Figure 4.12: Example 7-device network (four aggregators and five provers)
4.2.1.1 Problem Description and System Model
As in Section 4.1.1, we consider a centrally managed dynamic network N that is formed
of a large number n of heterogeneous devices. O is the owner/operator of N, and V is an
entity that is interested in assessing the trustworthiness of N. While a routing protocol
is not assumed, the devices in N should at least be capable of communicating to their
neighboring devices [44, 68, 114, 115]. Devices’ mobility might be involuntary. Therefore,
4 Combining aggregate and multisignature and devising our own signature scheme was necessary as existing
schemes did not satisfy the requirements of collective attestation.
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neither operator O nor the verifier V are assumed to be aware of the network topology
at any given time.
An example network is shown in Figure 4.12. We consider four logical entities partic-
ipating in the attestation protocol: operator (O), verifier (V), aggregator (A), and prover (P).
A prover Pi is related to a specific device, and can be seen, for example, as a software
component running on it. The role of a prover is to compose the attestation response,
i.e, an integrity proof of the software of that device, which is then sent through a set
of aggregators to V. Provers are heterogeneous, i.e., they may have different hardware
and software. However, it is assumed that most of the provers have the most recent ver-
sion of a benign software. These provers are denoted by good provers P˜i. The remaining
provers that have outdated or compromised software are referred to as bad provers P̂i.
Similar to a prover, an aggregator Ai can be seen as a software components running
on a device. The purpose of an aggregator, however, is only to collect and aggregate
attestation responses generated by other entities, i.e., other provers or aggregators. O is
the entity responsible for initialization, deployment, and maintenance of every prover
Pi in N. O is not responsible for aggregators, which could be owned/deployed by other
entities. A physical device can be formed of one or more of these logical entities, e.g.,
D7 in Figure 4.12 is formed of both the aggregator A4 and the prover P̂5. Device D1, on
the other hand, is only formed of the aggregator A1.
In this model, a collective attestation solution enables a verifier V (which can be re-
mote or local) to assess the trustworthiness of N in a secure, scalable, and efficient
manner. The basic idea is that, if none of the provers has been physically attacked, we
consider N to be trustworthy if all provers have the most recent version of a benign
software that is accepted by V. Further, the collective attestation solution should allow
V to pinpoint compromised devices. Finally, although physically attacked devices can
evade detection, which is also the case when attesting each device individually, a phys-
ically attacked devices should not be capable of helping other devices evade detection
by collective attestation.
4.2.1.2 Requirements Analysis
Objectives. Based on the model described above, a collective attestation solution for
large networks of embedded devices should provide, in addition to the five properties
described in Section 4.1.1, the following properties:
• Property #1: Guarantee for every prover whose hardware has not been maliciously
tampered with, that the attestation report generated by this prover reflects the
actual software state of the prover during the execution of the attestation protocol.
We refer to this property as the Unforgeability property.
• Property #2: Ensure for every prover whose hardware has not been maliciously
tampered with, that the attestation report generated by this prover was incorpo-
rated into the aggregate attestation report received by the verifier. This property is
denoted by the Completeness property.
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• Property #3: Allow the verification of the aggregated attestation report sent to the
verifier by any other entity. We refer to this property as Public Verifiability. Note
that, for public verifiability, the verification of the attestation report ensures that
software trustworthiness of N at a given point in time between creation of the
attestation challenge and the receipt of the attestation report from V.
• Property #4: Ensure applicability to networks where devices are heterogeneous, and
enable the usage of every integrity measurement adopted by the devices in N. We
refer to this property as Heterogeneity.
• Property #5: Guarantee the generation of an aggregate attestation report when all
the devices in N are available and all the communication links are up. This prop-
erty is denoted by Availability.
• Property #6: Provide no additional Denial of Service (DoS) attack vector for the
adversary, i.e., the adversary should not be capable of running a global DoS attack
on the network via a single device.
The satisfaction of property #1 and property #2 constitute the main security objective
of collective attestation. Moreover, a secure collective attestation solution should also
satisfy property #6. Property #3 and property #4 are needed when the configuration of
the network should be hidden from the verifier. It is achieved through digital signatures.
Finally, property #5 is required for supporting new device types and is achieved through
combining aggregate and multisignatures in our novel Optimistic Aggregate Signature
(OAS) scheme.
Adversary Model. As in Section 4.1 we assume A can eavesdrop on, modify, drop, or
replay any message exchanged between all devices in N and between any device Di
and the verifier V. We assume that both O and V are trusted. However, we consider two
kinds of adversaries: The software-only adversary from single-device attestation, which
can maliciously modify all the software on any device Di in N except what is protected
by hardware. And, a physical attacker that can tamper with the hardware of any aggre-
gator entity Ai, i.e., the attacker can tamper with the hardware of any device acting as
aggregtor, and modify the software or extract the secrets of the aggregator logical entity
that are protected by hardware. Finally, we assume a stealthy adversary that aims at
evading detection. Hence we consider DoS attacks to be out of scope. Nevertheless, we
limit such attacks by not allowing A to run a global DoS on N through one device D1.
Device Requirements. The design of our solution aims as satisfying all properties #1
to #6 as well as properties #1 to #5 described in Section 4.1.1. However, in order to satisfy
these properties, it should be possible to remotely attest each prover in N, i.e., every
device Di acting as a prover should satisfy the requirement for secure remote attestation
as discussed in Section 4.1.1. A prover that does not satisfy these requirements can evade
detection by our attestation solution.
Assumptions. Devices can have different hardware and/or software. However we as-
sume that every prover (i.e., every device Di that acts as prover) in N satisfies the re-
quirements for secure remote attestation. We assume that all devices can communicate,
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i.e., devices can at least communicate to their direct neighbors. Further, throughout the
execution of the attestation, the network is assumed to be connected and its topology
has to remain static. More importantly, each device Di in N should be reachable from
any other device Dj. Finally, we assume that all cryptographic primitives, such as the
Optimistic Aggregate Signature (OAS), and their implementations are secure.
Protocol Overview. The concept of our solution is illustrated in Figure 4.1 in a setting
where N is formed of seven physical devices (D1 through D7). The setting incorporates
the following logical entities: the operator O, the verifier V, the five provers (P˜1 through
P̂5), and the four aggregators (A1 through A4). Our solution consists of three protocols:
device initialization, token request, and attestation. O initializes every device (e.g., D2 in
Figure 4.12) with the cryptographic keys required for executing the attestation protocol.
This initialization is denoted by init (operation 1 in Figure 4.12). init is performed by O
in a secure environment.
Only a verifier V that has an valid attestation token can attest N at any given time.
The attestation token is generated by O, and is securely transferred to V through the
tokenReq protocol (operation 2 ). For verifying N, V picks a random device as an ini-
tiator D1, which acts as the root aggregator A1. V then sends the attestation challenge,
which includes the attestation token, to A1 (operation 3 ). This challenge is flooded
across N, and a spanning tree is formed rooted at A1. The tree constitutes of aggregtors
as intermediate nodes, and provers as leafs. Note that, an edge in the spanning tree
may represent a communication link between two devices, or a virtual link between an
aggregator and a prover residing on the same device (e.g., between P˜3 and A2).
Eventually, the provers (P˜1, P̂2, P˜3, P̂4 and P˜5 in the figure) generate a measurement
of their software configuration and send it the their parents as their attestation response
(operation 4 ). These responses are then collected and aggregated by the aggregators
(A1, A2, A3 and A4), which forward the aggregation results to their parents and so on
(operation 4 ). A final aggregated report is then sent by A1 to V (operation 5 ), which
then verifies it and learns the identities of all compromised devices. This protocol is
referred to as attest.
4.2.2 Proposed Signature Scheme
Before going into the details of our attestation solution we first present Optimistic Aggre-
gate Signatures (OAS). OAS is a generalization of multisignatures and aggregate signa-
tures that allows signing multiple messagesm1, . . . ,mn by n different signers. Messages
m1, . . . ,mn can be different. However, most of them are expected to be equal to the “de-
fault” message M. OAS allows aggregating multiple signatures into a single aggregate
signature. In the optimisitic case where most of the signed messages are equal to M,
the generated aggregate signature is considerably shorter, and has less verification time
than the separate n signatures. Concretely, the verification time and signature size in
an OAS scheme should be constant in the number of signatures on the default message
M. In Section 4.2.2.2 we present an instantiation of OAS, where the size of aggregate
signatures increases linearly with the number of messages that are not equal to the de-
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fault message M and with the number of different signers that signed these messages.
The time required to verify an aggregate signature is constant increases linearly with
the number of messages different from M, while is constant in the number of signers of
these messages.
4.2.2.1 Definition of an OAS
We now formally define OAS (Definition 4.2), and define its correctness (Definition 4.3)
and unforgeability property (Definition 4.4). Note that, OAS is considered a basic block
for secure collective attestation as it satisfies both heterogeneity and scalability proper-
ties.
Definition 4.2 (Optimistic Aggregate Signatures). We define an Optimistic Aggregate
Signature (OAS) scheme as a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms denoted by
(genkeysign, aggPK, sign, aggsign, veraggsign). Algorithm genkeysign takes a security parameter
`sign ∈ N as input, and outputs for each device Di a key pair (ski, pki), where ski is the se-
cret signing key and pki is the public verification key, i.e., (ski, pki) ← genkeysign(1`sign). The
security parameter `sign determines the message space M of the signature scheme. Algorithm
aggPK takes a set {pk1, . . . , pkn} of public keys as inputs, and outputs the aggregate public key
apk, i.e., apk ← aggPK(pk1, . . . , pkn). Algorithm sign takes a message m ∈ M, the default
message M ∈ {0, 1}∗, and secret key ski of Di as input, and outputs a signature αi on m,
i.e., αi ← sign(sk;m, M). An individual signature αi, generated by sign over message m us-
ing ski, is considered in OAS as an aggregate signature that contains a single signature over
m. Algorithm aggsign takes as input two OAS signatures αi,αj and the default message M,
and outputs a new OAS signature αk, which contains all the signatures in α1 and α2, i.e.,
αk ← aggsign(αi,αj, M). Finally, on input of an OAS signature αi, an aggregate public key
apk, the default message M, and the set of public keys S⊥ that are in apk but did not contribute
to the generation of αi, algorithm veraggsign outputs ⊥ indicating that the verification failed,
or the set B = {(mi,Si) : i = 1, . . . ,ω}, which shows for each message mi all the public keys
pki ∈ Si that signed this message otherwise.
An intuitive definition of the correctness of an OAS scheme can be described as fol-
lows: when all the signers that are involved in the scheme are honest contributing at
most one correct signature to the aggregate signature, the verification will output the cor-
rect set, which associate each signer to the message it signed. Because of the many possi-
ble orders in which one can aggregate signatures, it becomes increasingly tedious to pro-
vide a formal definition of the correctness of OAS. For simplification, we provide the fol-
lowing notation. Let Bi,Bj be two sets that contain the tuples (m,S) ∈ {0, 1}∗× ({0, 1}∗)∗,
we denote by Bk = Bi unionsqBj the “merged” set of tuples (m,S), such that S = Si ∪ Sj if
∃(m,Si) ∈ Bi and ∃(m,Sj) ∈ Bj, where S = Si if ∃(m,Si) ∈ Bi and 6 ∃(m,Sj) ∈ Bj, and
where S = Sj if ∃(m,Sj) ∈ Bj and 6 ∃(m,Si) ∈ Bi.
Definition 4.3 (Correctness of OAS). An Optimistic Aggregate Signature (OAS) scheme is
correct if:
• The signing works correctly, if ∀m, M ∈ {0, 1}∗, ∀`sign ∈N, ∀(pki, ski)← genkeysign(`sign),
and ∀S⊥/pk 6∈ S⊥ the following holds: if m = M, veraggsign(apk,S⊥,α, M) outputs ∅;
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and ifm 6= M, veraggsign(apk,S⊥,α, M) outputs {m, {pk}} whenever α← sign(sk,m, M)
and apk← aggPK(S⊥ ∪ {pk}).
• The aggregation works correctly, i.e., for all disjoint sets S1,S2, all OAS signatures αi,αj,
all default messages M ∈ {0, 1}∗, and all subsets S⊥,1 ⊆ S1 and S⊥,2 ⊆ S2, it should hold
that veraggsign(apk,S⊥,i ∪ S⊥,j,αk, M) = Bi unionsqBj if veraggsign(apki,S⊥,i,αi, M) = Bi
and veraggsign(apkj,S⊥,j,αj, M) = Bj for apki ← aggPK(Si), apkj ← aggPK(Sj), and
apk← aggPK(Si ∪ Sj).
Definition 4.4 (Unforgeability of OAS). Unforgeability of OAS implies that the adversary
is not capable of generating an OAS signature α that associates to an honest signer a message
that it has never signed, even when all the other involved signers are dishonest. Formally, the
experiment below should with negligible probability return 0 for every polynomial time adversary
A:
(pk, sk)← genkeysign(`sign)
(α,S⊥, (pk1, . . . , pkn), (sk1, . . . , skn))← Asign(sk,·)(pk)
If ∃ i : pki 6= pk∧ (pki, ski) 6∈ genkeysign(`sign) then return 0
Let S← {pk1, . . . , pkn}
apk← aggPK(S)
B← veraggsign(apk,S⊥,α, M)
If S⊥ 6⊆ S or ∃(mi,Si) ∈ B : Si 6⊆ S then return 0
If ∃(mi,Si) ∈ B : pk ∈ Si and mi 6∈ Q then return 1
Let SM ← S \
(
S⊥ ∪
⋃
(mi,Si)∈B Si
)
If pk ∈ SM and M 6∈ Q then return 1
Else return 0
where Q denotes the set of all messages queried by A from the sign(sk, ·) oracle.
For the unforgeability notion in Definition 4.4 it is required that A knows the keys of
every dishonest signer. We model this requirement in the security experiment by requir-
ing A to return those keys along with his forged signature. Realizing such a requirement
can be done in practice by relaying on a trusted third party that generates all the keys,
e.g., O, or making every signer execute an extractable proof of knowledge for its secret
key. The proof of knowledge can be executed interactively with a trusted third party,
or included within the public key. Finally, it has been shown by Ristenpart et al. [113]
that some schemes require only minor modifications to allow generating a simple proof
of possession of the secret key. This proof is basically a signature on a challenge. These
schemes include the Boldyreva’s multisignature scheme [24], which we base our OAS
construction in Section 4.2.2.2 on. Therefore, the technique described by Ristenpart et al.
is also applicable to our OAS construction. Note that, we require in the unforgeability
definition that the public key sets S⊥ and Si should be subsets of S = {pk1, . . . , pkn}. This
check can be performed by the entity that verifies the signature, either by searching for
the keys in S, or making each signer provide a proof that apk indeed includes its key.
This can be done through a certificate for example.
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4.2.2.2 Instantiation from pairings
We now present an instantiation from pairings for our OAS scheme. This intantiation
is a combination of the aggregate signature scheme from Boneh et al. [25], and the
multisignature scheme from Boldyreva [24]. Recall that, an aggregate signature scheme,
such as Boneh et al.’s scheme, allows signers to sign different messages while having a
verification time of an aggregate signature, which is linear in the number of signatures
included in it. On the contrary, in a multisignature scheme, such as Boldyreva’s scheme,
signatures on the same message can only be aggregated. However, the verification time
of an aggregate signature is constant in the number of aggregated messages. The con-
struction we present here basically uses Boldyreva’s scheme for aggregating signatures
on the same message while on top of it leveraging Boneh et al.’s scheme to aggregate the
resulting multisignatures. It is easy to see that the algebra easily adds up. However, such
a combination should be carefully considered in terms of security. In particular, aggre-
gate signatures are popular for having sophisticated constraint concerning the signed
messages, the composition of signers, and key setup. These restrictions may break the
security of the signature scheme if not adhered to correctly [22]. A formal proof of un-
forgeability of our OAS construction according to Definition 4.4 can be found in [12].
Consider two multiplicative groups G1,G2,GT with prime order p, where g1,g2,gt
are generators G1,G2,GT respectively. Let e : G1 ×G2 → GT be a bilinear map such
that e is efficiently computable, e(gx1,g
y
2 ) = g
xy
t ∀x,y ∈ Zp, and let ψ : G2 → G1 be an
efficiently computable isomorphism such that ψ(g2) = g1. We denote byH : {0, 1}∗ → G1
a hash function mapping bit strings of arbitrary limited length to elements of G1. H is
modeled as a random oracle [23]. Our OAS instantiation is defined as follows:
key generation. Each participant chooses a random value x ∈R Zp as its secret key
sk. The public key is then pk← gx2.
public key aggregation. Individual public keys pk1, . . . , pkn can be aggregated into
an aggregate public key apk =
∏n
i=1 pki.
signing . A messagem is signed as α← (H(m)x, ∅) ifm = M, and as α← (H(m)x, {(m, {pk})})
if m 6= M
signature aggregation. To aggregate two OAS signatures αi = (τi,Bi) and αj =
(τj,Bj), one should compute τk ← τi · τj, and “merging” the sets Bi and Bj
into Bk, i.e., Bk ← Bi unionsqBj. The output of signature aggregation is the signature
αk = (τk,Bk).
verification. Let M be the default message, apk be the aggregate public key, and S⊥
be the set of public keys in apk that did not contribute to the generation of an OAS
signature α = (τ,B = {(m1,S1), . . . , (mv,Sv)}). To verify α, compute:
apkM ←
apk∏
pk∈S⊥ pk ·
∏v
i=1
∏
pk∈Si pk
.
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then verify that:
e(τ,g2) = e
(
H(M), apkM
) · v∏
i=1
e
(
H(mi),
∏
pk∈Si
pk
)
.
Return B if verification succeeded and ⊥ otherwise.
We emphasize that in order to guarantee unforgeability of this construction, the signers
should provide a proof that they possess their secret key. Another option is to rely on a
trusted third party for the generation and distribution of these keys. This requirement
is shared with other existing multisignature schemes, e.g., [24, 91]. Proof of possession
can be achieved in this scheme by signing an arbitrary message, however, based on
a different hash function [113],5 and appending this signature to the public key. It can
also be achieved by including a Schnorr signature, that secret keys can be extracted from
through applying the generalized forking lemma [19].
4.2.3 Protocol Description
Our solution allows the verifier V to distribute an attestation challenge on every prover
Pi in the network N. Each prover is then expected to produce a measurement of its
software configuration and sign it using our OAS scheme. Signed measurements are
aggregated by aggregators Ai en route to V. The solution also involves a verifier autho-
rization scheme that forbid unauthorized verifiers from attesting N. This is required to
thwart Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on N.
The solution constitute multiple protocols that are executed between the operator O,
V, the provers Pi, and the aggregators Ai in N. These protocols are described in details
in the following:
Device Initialization. Before deployment, the network operator O initializes each device
Di in N with O’s public key pkO, an OAS key pair (ski ∈R Zp, pki ← gski2 ), and an identity
certificate cert(pki) certifying that Di with identity idi has a valid OAS key pki to which
it securely stores a secret key ski. This protocol is denoted by init and is formally:
init(1`)→ (ski, pki, cert(pki)) .
Token request. Attesting N requires authorization of the verifier. This is important to
mitigate global DoS attacks that can be launched on the entire network through a single
device. For this reason, every verifier V that wishes to attest N should possess a valid
attestation token T. The token should be issued by the N’s operator O, and is acquired
offline by V through tokenReq protocol. The main goal of tokenReq is allowing public
verfiability while thwarting DoS attacks.
The main parameter of tokenReq is the list of monotonic counters ctr1, . . . , ctrs with
values val1, . . . , vals that are stored by O. These counters mainly serve for preventing
5 One can also use the same hash if the message space for regular signature is different than that of proofs
of possession.
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δt, skV , cert(pkV )
Verifier V
NV ∈R {0, 1}`N NV
Operator O
skO , apk , cert(pkO )
NO
σV ← sign
(
skV ;NO‖t+
)
if versig(pkO ;NV ‖apk , σO ) = 1 then
store ({T , apk})
endif
endif
t+, σV , cert(pkV )
, apk , σO , cert(pkO )
NO ∈R {0, 1}`N
t+O ← checkPolicy
(
idV , t
+
)
if versig(pkV ;NO‖t+, σV ) = 1 ∧ t+O 6= 0 then
σT ← sign
(
skO ; cg‖ctr‖val‖texp = time() + t+O
)
T ← {C, ctr , val , texp, σT}
← encrypt(pkV ;T)
σO ← sign
(
skO ;NV ‖apk
)
endif
[ctr , val ]← getFreeCounter()
C = {c1, . . . , cz} ← getGoodConfigs()
cg ← hash(c1‖ . . . ‖cz)
T ← decrypt(skV ; )
if versig(pkO ; cg‖ctr‖val‖texp , σT ) = 1 then
Figure 4.13: Protocol tokenReq
replay attacks on tokenReq. In particular, each counter is assigned for a single token T
for a limited amount of time texp during which this counter is marked as “busy”. texp
represents the expiry time of T, and is chosen by V through tokenReq. When tokenReq is
initialized by V, O checks for a counter ctr that is not busy. The value val of ctr is then
incremented and the tuple (ctr, val) is included in the token. This procedure is denoted
by getFreeCounter(). A separate copy of these counters is also kept by each device in N.
When an attestation request containing T is received, each device checks the value of
the counter in T, before proceeding with the attestation or forwarding the attestation
request to neighbors. Attestation is only proceeded if the received value of the counter
is greater than the locally stored one. In this case, the local value is replaced with the
received one. This procedure is referred to as checkCounter().
The details of tokenReq are shown in Figure 4.13. tokenReq is initiated by V by sending
a fresh nonce NV to O. This nonce reflects V’s interest in a token for the attestation of
N. O replies with another fresh nonce NO. As a response to NO, V generates a signature
σ over a parameter t+ and NO.6 The signature is then sent back to O along with V’s
identity certificate cert(pkV) and t
+. The value of t+ reflects the desired token expiration
period chosen by V.
After V has been authenticated and its identity is known to O, O then decides ac-
cording to a given policy, which can be application specific, whether to accept or deny
V’s request for an attestation token. We denote this procedure as checkPolicy(). It takes
t+ and the identity idV of V as input. O then generates T as follows: It first fetches
the set C = {c1, . . . , cz} of benign software configuration for provers in N. This pro-
cedure is denoted by getGoodConfigs(). O then hashes this list into one single value
6 The signature scheme used in this protocol does not have to be an OAS scheme. tokenReq can be based on
any other digital signature scheme that exploits on existing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
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apk , T = {C. ctr , val , texp, σT}
Verifier V
N ∈R {0, 1}`N
(1) verifyChallenge()
pkO
Aggregator A1
req = {N,T}
if texp < time() ∨ ¬checkCounter(ctr , val) then
else if ¬versig(pkO ; cg‖ctr‖val‖texp, σT ) then
end if
abort()
abort()
cg ← hash(c1‖ . . . ‖cz)
req
(2) createResponse()
(1) verifyChallenge()
(3) aggregateResponse()
αi
α1 ← ⊥
M ← cg‖N‖ctr‖val
if B1 = {(mi,Si) : i = 1, . . . ,m} ← veraggsig
(
apk ;S⊥ = φ;M,α1
) 6= ⊥ then
if B1 = φ then
α1
α1 ← aggsign(α1, αi,M )
M ← (hash(c1‖ . . . ‖cz))‖N‖ctr‖val
end if
b← 1
else b← 0
end if
Prover Pi
pkO , ski
if ci ∈ C then
αi ← sign
(
ski; ci‖N‖ctr‖val ,M
)
ci ← cg
end if
ci ← getSoftConf()
Figure 4.14: Protocol attest
cg = hash(c1‖ . . . ‖cz), generates the token T, encrypts it, and sends it to V. In particular,
V receives from O: an encrypted7 token , the aggregate public key apk of N, and O’s
signature σO over apk. After verifying σO, V decrypts T and stores it with apk. The token
T = {C, ctr, val, texp, σT} is formed of the benign configuration set C, the free counter
ctr and its value val, an expiry time texp (output of the checkPolicy() algorithm), and the
signature σT. tokenReq is formally:
tokenReq[V : t+, skV; O : skO, apk; ∗ : cert(pkO), cert(pkV)]→
[
V : T, apk; O : texp
]
.
Attestation: Having a valid attestation token T. a verifier V may attest the network at any
time before the token expiry texp indicated in T. In order to attest N, V picks a random
device as initiator D1, which acts as the root aggregator A1. A1 represents the interface
for V to attest the network through attest. The details of attest are shown in Figure 4.14.
V initiates attest by sending A1 an attestation request containing the attestation token T
and a fresh nonce N. The root aggregator A1 verifies the request by: checking the counter
value in T using checkCounter(), and verifying the signature σT included in T using
the public key of O. This procedure is referred to as verifyChallenge(). A1 forwards the
attestation request to its neighbors only if verifyChallenge() was successful. The request is
then verified and forwarded by every aggregator Ai inN until it received by every prover
Pi in N. As already discussed in Section 4.1.2, this operation leads to the formation of
a spanning tree that has provers as leaf nodes, aggregators as intermediaries, and is
rooted at A1.
7 T is encrypted based on V’s public key pkV
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Next, every prover Pi measures it software state generating the software configuration
ci, which is then matched within the set of benign software configurations. If ci ∈ C, the
attestation report of Ai is generated as an OAS signature αi based on Pi’s secret key
ski over the nonce N, the counter id ctr and its value val, and the hash cg of all benign
software configuration from T. If ci /∈ C, Ai generates the response as αi over its actual
software configuration ci. Ai then sends αi to its parent in the spanning tree. This
procedure is referred to as createResponse().
When an aggregator Aj receives attestation responses from its children in the tree, it
aggregates them into one OAS signature αj which is created using aggsign (see Defini-
tion 4.2). Note that, aggsign takes M = cg‖N‖ctr‖val as the default message. Aj then sends
αj to its parent, which aggregates it with other received signatures and sends it to its par-
ent and so on. This procedure is denoted by aggregateResponse(). As a consequence, the
provers’ attestation reports are propagated and aggregated along the spanning tree until
they reach the root aggregator A1, which creates and sends the aggregated signature α1
of all provers in N to V.
V then uses veraggsign to verify α1 (see Definition 4.2). If veraggsign outputs B1 = φ,
V deduces that all provers in N have a good software configuration from C and outputs
b = 1. Otherwise, if the output of veraggsign is B1 6= φ V outputs b = 0. In this case, V
can extract from B1 the exact software configuration and identity of all proves that do
not have a good software configuration. attest fails when veraggsign fails. This protocol
is formed of two sub-protocols, which are formally:
attest1
[
V : T, apk; A1 : −; ∗ : pkO
]→ [V : b; A1 : T, N] .
and:
attest2
[
Ai : T, N; Dj : (skj); ∗ : pkO
]→ [Ai : αj; Dj : T, N] .
4.2.4 Implementation
We also present two instantiations of this solution on top of SMART [52] and TrustLite [84]
security architectures (see Chapter 3). Recall that, these architectures provide their secu-
rity guarantees based on minimal hardware features. The main features incorporated
are a small amount of Read-Only Memory (ROM) and a simple Memory Protection
Unit (MPU). In the following we present the two instantiations:
Implementation on SMART. Our implementation on SMART [52] requires the same
modifications to SMART’s architecture presented in Section 4.1.3, i.e., the MPU is ex-
tended to control access to a small amount of rewritable memory. We mainly use this
memory to store the list of counters required for mitigating DoS attacks on attestation.
We store in ROM of every device the program code responsible for executing all com-
ponents of attest on a prover, i.e., verifyChallenge() and createResponse(). The ROM also
stores for each prover Pi the OAS secret key ski. Consequently, integrity of all code
and the OAS key is ensured via emutability of ROM. Further, we store the list of coun-
ters ctr1, . . . , ctrs and their values val1, . . . , vals in rewritable memory of each prover
70 detection of malware infestation
Memory System
ctr1	,	…	,	ctrs
val1	,	…	,	vals
cert(pki)
Device	OS
Task	1
verifyCh()
createResp()
aggResp()
ski
ROM RAM
PROCESSOR
MPU
# if	PC	in access	to is	(rw)12 r6-7r1r2 r4 1110
read	protected r/w	protected none
r1r2
r3r4 r6r7
pkOr5
3 r2 r6-7 10
Figure 4.15: Implementation based on SMART [52]
Pi. Note that, this list have to be updated during Pi’s lifetime. The implementation
on SMART is shown in Figure 4.15 where we denote by RAM the rewritable memory
region. SMART’s MPU is configured such that it ensures data of attest are only acces-
sible to the unmodified part of its code that requires access to this data. For example
rule #2 ensures that createResponse() has read access to ski, and rule #1 and #3 ensure
that only verifyChallenge() has write access to the counters ctr1, . . . , ctrs and their values
val1, . . . , vals, which are read accessible to verifyChallenge() and createResponse().
Implementation on TrustLite. Our solution is also implemented as trustlets on TrustLite [84]
(see Chapter 3). More precisely, we implemented the code responsible for executing each
component of attest on a prover, i.e., verifyChallenge() and createResponse(), as a single
independent trustlet. Our implementation is shown in Figure 4.16. Trustlite ensures
the software integrity of each of the components through the secure boot component
SecureBoot on Pi. Further, as in SMART, the MPU of TrustLite was configured such that
it ensures data of attest is only accessible to appropriate trustlets. For example rule #1
ensures that only SecureBoot has read access to the memory storing the program code of
attest. rule #3 ensures that only createResponse() has read access to ski, and rule #2 and #4
ensure that only verifyChallenge() has write access to the counters ctr1, . . . , ctrs and their
values val1, . . . , vals, which are read accessible to verifyChallenge() and createResponse().
Implementation of OAS. Our instantiation of OAS from pairings was implemented for
the two security architecture as well as other commodity hardware. For this implemen-
tation we used the library from [145] that provides efficient cryptographic operations
based on pairing, which are suitable for the low-end devices that we target. Finally, we
defined the operations of OAS over the pairing friendly elliptic curve BN254 [145]. The
security level provided by BN254 is 128 bits.
4.2.5 Performance Evaluation
We assess performance of this solution in terms of computational, communication, mem-
ory, runtime, and energy costs. Moreover, we also present simulations results for net-
works of up to 1, 000, 000 devices as in Section 4.1.4. This performance evaluation is
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Figure 4.16: Implementation based on TrustLite [84]
based on the implementation from Section 4.2.4. Note that, we also assume here that the
topology of the network does not change while the attestation protocol is executing.
Computation Cost. Cryptographic operations, such as generation of the hash cg of good
software configurations or of an OAS signature, constitute the major part of the computa-
tion cost. Let gi denote the number of neighbors of every aggregator Ai, and hi 6 gi − 1
be the upper bound on the number of children of Ai in the spanning tree. The root
aggregator A1, which is chosen by the verifier V to be the interface to N, aggregates up
to g1 OAS signatures and generates only 1 hash. Each aggregator Di aggregates up to
hi OAS signatures while also generating 1 hash only. Finally, every prover Pi generates
1 hash and 1 OAS signature.
Communication Cost. We used ECDSA as our digital signature scheme, i.e., `sign = 320.
The signature size of our implementation of OAS is `sign = 256. We further used 64 bit
for counter values, and chose `N = 160. As a consequence, nonces and software con-
figurations are 20 Bytes each. Counters are 2 Bytes and their values are 8 Bytes each.
Digital signatures are 40 Bytes each. And, OAS signatures and keys are 32 Bytes each.
Let u be the number of good software configurations in C, v be the number of software
configurations c1, . . . , cv in N that do not belong to C, and w be the number of provers
having one of the configurations not in C. The size of a token is 20u+ 58 Bytes, while the
size of an attestation report containing an aggregate signature is 32+ 32w+ 20v Bytes.
Consequently, each aggregator has a communication overhead, which is upper bounded
by receiving 20u+ 78+ 32gi + 32w+ 20v Bytes and sending 32+ (20u+ 78)gi + 32w+
20v Bytes The upper bound on the communication overhead of each prover Pi is receiv-
ing 20u+ 78 Bytes and sending 84 Bytes.
Memory Cost. Every prover Pi in N should store the following: (1) an OAS key pair
(ski, pki) and the corresponding identity certificate cert(pki); (2) the list of s counters
ctr1, . . . , ctrs and their values val1, . . . , vals; and (3) the public key pkO of N’s operator
O. The memory cost of Ai is around 10s + 228 Bytes, where s is a constant protocol
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parameter. Low-end embedded devices, which we target in this solution, have more than
1, 024 Bytes of Flash memory. Our solution required less than 34% of a that memory on
every prover in order to allow 12 verifiers to execute attestation in the same time interval,
i.e., by setting s = 12.
Runtime. Similar to Section 4.1, the design of this solution allow devices at the same
level of the spanning tree to perform their execution of the attestation protocol at the
same time, i.e., in parallel. However, the aggregation of OAS signatures on level l of
the tree requires the generation of these signatures by level l− 1. The overall runtime is
also affected by the fan-out of the tree, i.e., the number of children per device, which
increases the aggregation time on individual aggregators. Moreover, this solution opti-
mizes the overall communication overhead, such that it is constant if all provers have
good software configuration. Consequently, runtime of the attestation protocol is depen-
dent on the overall height d = f(n) ∈ O(log(n)) of the spanning tree, the number of
provers that do not have a good software configuration, and the number of children per
aggregator.
We denote by tsign, taggsign, tversig, thash, and ttr be the time that a device Di requires
to perform operation sign of OAS scheme, to execute aggsign aggregating two OAS sig-
natures, to verify a digital signature, to generate the hash cg of all good software config-
uration in N, and to communicate 1 Byte to a neighboring device Dj respectively. The
overall runtime of the attestation protocol is:
t 6
[
110l+
d∑
i=0
(32wi + 20vi)
] · ttr + ( l∑
i=0
hi
) · taggsign + d · (tversig + thash) + tsign
Where vi denotes the number of software configurations that do not belong to C in the
subtree rooted at aggregator Ai.
In Table 4.1, we show the runtime of all cryptographic operations we used in our
solution for TrustLite [84] and a t2.micro Amazon EC2 instance [6].8 The runtimes shown
are in ms and are the average of 100 executions. Empty cells reflect computations that are
not performed on the given platform. Further, we show in Table 4.2 the evaluation results
the OAS instantiation. The table shows the runtime for each of the algorithms defined
in Section 4.2.2.2 in terms of the number n of provers in N, v of software configurations
not in C, and hi of children for each aggregator Ai.
Energy Cost. We denote by Eaggsign, Esign, Eversig, Erecv, Esend, and Ehash the energy that
a device Di needs for aggregating two OAS signatures, generating an OAS signature,
verifying a digital signature, receiving 1 Byte, and sending 1 Byte respectively. During
one execution of the attestation protocol, the energy E(Ai) consumed by each aggregator
Ai can be estimated as:
8 Amazon EC2 we used has 1 GByte of RAM, a 3.3 GHz Intel Xeon Processor, and is running Ubuntu server
14.04.
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Table 4.1: Performance of cryptographic functions
Function TrustLite [84] EC2 t2.micro [6]
Run-time (ms) Run-time (ms)
H : {0, 1}l → G1 921.52 3.39
gx, g ∈ G1 1282.71 4.71
gx, g ∈ G2 — 11.60
ab, a,b ∈ G1 86.48 0.32
ab, a,b ∈ G2 — 0.33
ab, a,b ∈ GT — 0.07
e : G1 ·G2 → GT — 7.67
Table 4.2: Performance of OAS algorithms
Function TrustLite [84] EC2 t2.micro [6]
Run-time (ms) Run-time (ms)
sign 2204.23 8.1
genkeysign — 11.60
aggPK — 0.33 · n
aggsign 86.48 · hi 0.32 · hi
veraggsign — 0.33 ·∑v2(|Si|− 1) + (8.16) · v
E(Ai) 6
(
32+ (20u+ 78)gi + 32w+ 20v
) · Esend +
+
(
20u+ 78+ 32gi + 32w+ 20v
) · Erecv +
+ hi · Eaggsign + Eversig + Ehash
Further, the energy E(Pi) consumed by every prover Pi in N can be estimated as:
E(Pi) 6 84 · Esend + (20u+ 78) · Erecv + Esign + Ehash
Simulation Results. We used the OMNeT++ [104] network simulator to assess the per-
formance of this solution for very large networks of embedded devices. The attestation
protocol was again implemented on the application layer, where cryptographic opera-
tion were emulated with delays corresponding to real measurments of their execution
time on TrustLite [84]. For our simulations, the average communication rate between de-
vices was set to 250 Kbps, which corresponds to the defined bandwidth for ZigBee [135].
We considered four topologies for evaluating this solution: a star topology, a chain topol-
ogy, networks with fixed number of neighbors per device, and tree topologies with num-
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ber of child nodes varying from 2 to 12. Further, we simulated various network sizes,
which ranged from 10 to 1, 000, 000. Figure 4.17 shows the simulation results for tree
topologies and networks with fixed number of neighbors. Results for star and chain
topologies are omitted as these topologies are not considered an interesting application
scenario for collective attestation.
We also compared this solution to the one presented in Section 4.1. We carried out
the comparison via simulations in two different scenarios. In the first scenarios we con-
sidered every device in N to be a low-end prover device, i.e., a device with TrustLite
architecture that should be attested. The second scenario corresponds to the targeted
setting of this solution. In this scenario we assume that aggregators reside on more pow-
erful devices that have a faster intercommunication rate. In particular, the aggregators
in N were composed of 20% t2.micro EC2 instances [6], 30% Intel Galileo9 devices, and
50% Raspberry Pi10 devices. The results of these simulations are shown in Figure 4.18.
(a) Tree topologies (b) Fixed number of neighbors
Figure 4.17: Performance of attestation
(a) First scenario (b) Second scenario
Figure 4.18: Comparison to the other solution
The results of our simulations show that, for a fixed number of provers with malicious
software, the runtime of attestation is logarithmic in the size of the network for both tree
topologies (Figure 4.17a) and networks where devices have a fixed number of neighbors
(Figure 4.17b).
9 Intel Galileo is equipped with a 256 MBytes of RAM and a 400 MHz CPU.
10 Raspberry Pi is equipped with a 512 MBytes of RAM and a 700 MHz CPU.
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Figure 4.19: Performance of attestation as function of the number of malicious provers
The comparison in Figure 4.18a shows that the solution from Section 4.1 performs bet-
ter compared to the solution we present in this section, when all devices in the network
are low-end embedded device communicating over ZigBee. However, the solution we
present in this section provides more flexibility as its does not impose any constraints
on the devices that act as aggregators. In particular, aggregators do not have to be on
low-end IoT devices equipped with lightweight security architecture. Devices acting as
aggregators can be completely untrusted network devices, e.g., cloud servers or routers.
Further, this solution also provides better resiliency against physical attacks, which al-
lows its applicability to a wider range of applications.
Therefore, for a fair comparison, we present in Figure 4.18b the runtimes of the two
solutions in a more realistic scenario. The figure shows that for very large deployments
the runtime difference between the two solutions is as low as 1.5 seconds.
In conclusion, our evaluation shows that the solution presented in this chapter per-
forms in its targeted settings almost as good as the solution presented in Section 4.1,
while providing DoS mitigation, resiliency to physical attacks, and reporting the soft-
ware configurations of devices that failed attestation. The performance of this solution
may also leverage hardware acceleration for the signature computation, aggregation,
and verification.
Finally, we show in Figure 4.19 the runtime of attestation as a function of the percent-
age of malicious provers. The results show that the runtime is linear in tree topologies in
the number of malicious provers. This is a direct consequence of the fact that attestation
responses include the public keys of all malicious provers. Therefore, the communica-
tion overhead is linear in the number of those devices. The figure demonstrates that the
runtime is still acceptable in large networks with 10, 000 devices, even if a large fraction,
i.e., up to 50%, of provers have a malicious software configuration.
4.2.6 Security Analysis
As in Section 4.1.5, the goal of our attestation solution is to enable the verifier V to check
the software integrity of all provers in a network N, i.e., V should return b = 1, i.e.,
accept the attestation report, if every prover Pi in N has an unmodified software that
is accepted by V, e.g., latest version of benign software. This should hold even if all
aggregators are under full control of the adversary. Moreover, even though physically
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attacked prover may evade their own detection, they should not be able to help other
provers evade detection. This security goal can be formalized as a security experiment
ExpA, where the adversary A can interact with every device in N as well as V. A has full
control over the communication channel between every two devices in N, and between
N and V, i.e., it can eavesdrop on, modify, drop, and inject arbitrary messages to any
Di ∈ N and V. A exploits physical proximity to tamper with the hardware of a small
number of provers P1, . . .Pp, and some (or all) aggregators A1, . . .Aq. It also maliciously
modifies the software configuration of one (or more) provers Pc without tampering
with their hardware. At the end of the experiment, V outputs the result of attestation b
indicating whether it has accepted the attestation report or not, following a polynomial
number (in `N and `sign) of steps performed by A. The output of V represents the result
of this security experiment, i.e., ExpA = b. In the following we provide the definition of
secure collective attestation under the pre-described adversary model:
Definition 4.5 (Secure collective attestation under physical attacks). Let f be a polynomial
function in `N and `sign. We consider a collective attestation scheme to be secure under physical
attacks if the probability Pr
[
b = 1|ExpA(1
`) = b
]
is negligible in ` = f(`N, `sign).
Theorem 4.2 (Security of our attestation solution). The attestation solution presented in
this chapter is a secure collective attestation scheme (Definition 4.5) if the underlying digital
signature scheme is selective forgery resistant, and the OAS scheme is unforgeable according to
Definition 4.4.
Proof sketch of Theorem 4.2. Let apk be the aggregate OAS key of N, and let the default
message for attestation be M =
(
hash(c1‖ . . . ‖cz)‖N‖ctr‖val
)
, where c1, . . . , cz are the
good software configurations in C. As a response to a challenge containing the nonce N
and a token T including a counter ctr with value val, the verifier V receives from the root
aggregator an attestation report formed of the OAS signature α1. V accepts the attesta-
tion report and returns b = 1 only ifB = {(m1,S1), . . . , (mv,Sv)} = veraggsign(apk,S⊥, M,α1)
such that S⊥ = φ, and B = φ. Consider the following five strategies through which the
A tries to cover compromise of prover Pc: (1) A keeps Pc’s report αc unmodified, (2) A
replays an old report of Pc containing an OAS signature αold over the hash cg of all
good software configuration, (3) A tampers with C so that it includes Pc’s malicious
software configuration, (4) A forges an OAS signature which associates a signature over
M =
(
hash(c1‖ . . . ‖cz)‖N‖ctr‖val
)
to Pc; or (5) A tampers with the aggregate public key
apk used by V to verify the final attestation report.
We first consider the case where A keeps αc unmodified . Due to hardware security
architecture on devices acting as provers, A is not capable of tampering with the code of
attest responsible for measurement and reporting of Pc’s software or extracting its OAS
secret key skc. Consequently, the modified software configuration c ′c will be included in
the OAS signature αc generated by Pc as c ′c instead of cg, if the integrity measurement
responsible for the generation of c ′c is capable of detecting this modification, i.e., if
c ′c /∈ C. In this case, V will always return b = 0. On the other hand, when replaying an
old report containing the signature αold for cg, the signature will contain an old nonce
Nold. Consequently, V will only accept and return b = 1 if Nold = N which is negligible
in `N.
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We now consider the case where A tries tampering with C to include c ′c. In order to
achieve this, A must forge the digital signature σO, which is generated by O over the
token T. This strategy will be successful with a probability that is negligible in `sign, here
`sign is the security parameter of the digital signature scheme used to sign T. Additionally,
since C is also authenticated with αc in the attestation report of Pc, tampering with C
will change αc and cause V to return b = 0.
Next we consider the case where A tries to generate an OAS signature that associates
a signature on M =
(
hash(c1‖ . . . ‖cz)‖N‖ctr‖val
)
to Pc. However, Pc does not generate
such a message since c ′c /∈ C, and N is a newly generated nonce. Consequently, according
to the unforgeability of OAS defined in Definition 4.4, A can find such a signature with
a probability that is negligible in `sign, where `sign is the security parameter of the OAS
scheme used to sign attestation reports.
Finally, if A was capable of tampering with the apk to replace the public key pkc with
its own public key pkA, A would then be able to sign any message on behalf of Pc, i.e., A
would be able to generate an attestation report for Pc which contains an OAS signature
over M =
(
hash(c1‖ . . . ‖cz)‖N‖ctr‖val
)
independent of the software configuration of Pc.
The success probability of this strategy is negligible in `N and the security parameter
`sign of the digital signature that is used to protect the integrity of apk between V and O.
Therefore, the probability ofA convincing V to accept the attestation report and return
b = 1 after maliciously modifying the software of at least one prover in N is negligible
is negligible in `N, and `sign. This result is independent of the number of aggregators or
provers (other than Pc) that are physically attacked by A.
4.2.7 Threshold Attestation
As shown in Section 4.2.5, the runtime of our solution is constant in the network size,
however, it increases linearly with the number of malicious provers in N. Our ultimate
goal is to provide a collective attestation solution for networks of embedded devices
which is constant time. The solution should allow a low-end verifier to efficiently attest
a network of embedded devices, regardless of the number or condition of devices in this
network. We now present an simple extension to our solution that enables preserving the
constant time property independent of the number of provers with malicious software
configurations.
The intuition behind this extension is the following: Although there might be in some
applications a linear correlation between number of provers with malicious software
and the overall network size, i.e., a given percentage of provers in N are compromised,
the quantity of tolerated compromise is however usually limited. This is reasonable to
assume as the tolerated compromise is usually dependent on the amount redundancy
rather than number of devices in N. Therefore, one can limit the increase in runtime by
simply setting an upper bound (i.e., a threshold) on the number of compromised devices
to be identified by V.
The upper bound is determined by V, and is sent to O during tokenReq protocol in
order to be embedded in the token T. During attestation, aggregators use T to determine
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Figure 4.20: Verification of threshold attestation using an EC2 t2.micro verifier
this upper bound. They then stop aggregating OAS signatures over malicious software
whenever this upper bound is crossed. All signatures received after the upper bound has
been crossed are dropped. This will lead to the generation of final attestation report that
is not verifiable using the aggregate public key apk known to V. Consequently, whenever
V fails to verify the attestation report, it learns that the number of malicious provers in
N might have exceeded the accepted upper bound.
Note that, other factors could cause the verification of the attestation response to fail-
ure, e.g., DoS attacks or communication errors. Therefore, it is crucial to allow V to
ensure that verification failure was caused by large number of malicious provers that
exceeded the upper bound. A possible way to achieve this is by dividing the attestation
report in two parts: The first part is formed of a multisignature over the default message
allowing V to attest provers with good software configuration. The second part is an
aggregate signature over all malicious software configuration. This allows V to make
sure that the upper bound for malicious devices has been exceeded by verifying the ag-
gregate signature in constant time. By doing so, V also learns the identities of malicious
provers as well as their software configuration. Figure 4.20 shows how threshold attesta-
tion achieves a constant time verification time. The threshold in the figure is set to 1000
malicious provers in a network with 10, 000 provers and a fixed number 4 of neighbors
per device.
4.2.8 Conclusion
In this section we presented a second solution for efficient collective attestation. How-
ever, unlike Section 4.1, this solution provides stronger security guarantees, imposes less
assumptions, and is applicable to a wide range of applications involving devices that are
not trusted by the same entity. These benefits came at the cost of an additional overhead
caused by the use of a novel signature scheme. This scheme provides scalability and
public verifiability, and allows untrusted intermediaries. It is important to stress that
the two solutions presented in the previous and the current section complete each other.
Section 4.1 presents a solution that has best achievable efficiency and is applicable in
certain scenarios, while the solution presented in this section allows wider applicability
and provides stronger security guarantees by imposing minimal additional overhead.
Note that, these solutions are based on identifying security requirements in existing
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applications and designing solutions that satisfy these requirements. In Section 4.3 we
try to establish collective attestation on solid grounds by systematically analyzing its
requirements, components, and properties.
4.3 systematic treatment of collective attestation
So far, we have presented two collective attestation solutions for large networks of em-
bedded devices. The two solutions complete each other, as they are applicable in differ-
ent scenarios and have different requirements and security guarantees. However, these
solutions are created in an ad-hoc fashion. They are based on identifying the problem
setting and requirements in a specific use case scenario, and devising the appropriate
solution that is specifically tailored to satisfy these requirements in the specified setting.
In this section we aim at providing a generic solution for the problem of malware in-
festation that is not dependent on a well defined use case. First, we present the most real-
istic security model for collective attestation, outlining the different adversarial capabili-
ties and presenting various adversarial classes. We then provide a systematic treatment
of collective attestation, which establishes the problem of detecting malware infestation
in large networks on solid grounds, and represents a guide in this area. In particular, we
present a careful analysis of the security properties that should be provided by a secure
collective attestation solution. And, we identify the requirements in terms of hardware,
software, and protocol features, that allow satisfying these properties. Finally, we ana-
lyze the collective attestation solutions proposed in Section 4.1 and 4.2 in light of the
identified properties, and investigate their security under a stronger adversary model.
Contribution. We investigate the problem of detecting malware infestation in large em-
bedded networks and provide the first systematic treatment of collective attestation
which includes: (1) identifying the threat model, which is substantially different than
the standard adversary model assumed in all existing single device attestation proto-
cols; (2) extracting the security goals, properties, and requirements of a collective at-
testation solution; and (3) determining the features in terms of protocol, software, and
hardware components that should be maintained by a collective attestation solution.
Further, we evaluate the security of the collective attestation solutions presented earlier
in this chapter, and provide various attacks that could be launched on them by a more
powerful adversary. Moreover, we devise a generic collective attestation solution which
satisfies the identified requirements and properties, and is secure in the presence of our
realistic adversary. Finally, we show how to instantiate the generic solution on recent se-
curity architectures for low-end embedded devices with different security features and
functional capabilities, i.e., SMART [52] and TrustLite [84], and present extensive perfor-
mance evaluation based on these two instantiations, in addition to simulations of the
solution in networks of up to 1, 000, 000 devices.
Outline. After introducing the system and adversary models and defining our secu-
rity notion in Section 4.3.1, we present the properties required by a secure collective
attestation solutions in Section 4.3.2, and extract the features required to achieve these
properties in Section 4.3.3. Next, the security of the two collective attestation solutions
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presented earlier in this chapter is analyzed in Section 4.3.4, and a secure and generic
collective attestation solution is presented in Section 4.3.5. We describe our implemen-
tation of this solution in Section 4.3.6. Performance evaluation is then presented on
Section 4.3.7, and the section concludes in Section 4.3.8.
4.3.1 Definitions
4.3.1.1 Problem Description and System Model
Network. We consider a network N = D1, · · · , Dn that is formed of n interconnected
members Di collaborating to fulfill a task (see Figure 4.21). The members of N are usu-
ally (low-end or high-end) heterogeneous embedded devices that interact allowing N
to export services to other entities. It is assumed that N’s members are redundant in
order to tolerate failures and/or attacks against N. N may not have a routing protocol
in place. However, members of N should be able to communicate to their direct neigh-
bors [44, 68, 114, 115], exchanging commands or data. A verifier Va is an entity that is
interested in (one or more) services offered by N. Va assesses the trustworthiness of N
in order to ensure the trustworthiness of the requested service. The set of all verifiers is
denoted by V = {Va, · · · , Vz}. We denote by the interface I = Du, · · · , Dv of N the set
of all members that represent a gateway between N and the outside world. A specific
verifier Va may interact with N through multiple members of that set. We refer to these
members as Va’s attestation interface Ia to N. Finally, a trusted network operator O is
responsible for the establishment of a secure communication link from any verifier in V
to N. O acts as N’s certification authority. A collective attestation solution should allow
any verifier Va ∈ V to verify the trustworthiness of a requested service in an efficient
and scalable manner.
Members. Members of N may be heterogeneous (i.e., have multiple hardware and soft-
ware configurations). However, we assume that every member Di of N satisifes the
requirements that allow secure remote attestation as discussed in Section 4.1.1, i.e.,
Di should be equipped with a lightweight security architecture that has a minimal
amount of Read-Only Memory (ROM) and a simple Memory Protection Unit (MPU),
e.g., SMART [52] and TrustLite [84]. We consider two class of members: low-end em-
bedded devices that are constrained in resources, e.g., sensors, and high-end devices
with sufficient resources such as a Raspberry Pi. Every member of N is considered as
an independent entity that is capable of performing a specific task, e.g., sensing and/or
actuation.
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4.3.1.2 Collective Attestation
A collective attestation solution is a security protocol involving three different parties:
(1) the network N to be attested; (2) a verifier Va from the set V = {Va, · · · , Vz} of all
possible verifiers that is interested in a service offered by N; and (3) the network operator
O that is responsible for the establishment of secure communication links within N, and
between N and V. The goal of a secure collective attestation solution is to enable every
Va ∈ V to verify the trustworthiness of any service delivered by N. The trustworthiness
of the service is defined as the trustworthiness of N, which implies the software integrity
of every member Di in N. Consequently, a secure collective attestation solution should
ensure Va that the software state of every member Di in N has not been maliciously
modified.
Definition 4.6 (Collective Attestation). A secure collective attestation solution comprises the
following six protocols / functions:
• setup( · ): This protocol is executed between O from one side, and N and V from the other
side. It allows secure key provisioning by O for V and N, which in turn enables secure
interactions between these entities. Consequently, setup( · ) allows each member Di of N to
obtain: (1) the cryptographic key(s) ki that allows Di to authenticate messages exchanged
with every other member Dj ∈ N and verifier Va ∈ V; and (2) a token hi that enables
Di to announce its reference software state to every other member Dj ∈ N and a verifier
Va ∈ V. Similarly, every verifier Va ∈ V acquires the cryptographic key(s) K necessary to
authenticate N, and a token H for verifying N’s state.
• init( · ): This protocol allows the initiation of collective attestation. It is executed between
a verifier Va ∈ V and the member(s) Va’s attestation interface Ia to N. Consequently,
init( · ) allows each member Di of N to obtain an attestation challenge from Va.
• attest(k, ·): This represents a deterministic function executed on every member Di of N.
Having the cryptographic key(s) ki of Di as input, attest(k, ·) outputs the attestation
response θi which reflects its current software state.
• interact(k, ·, ·): This protocol allows the accumulation/aggregation of attestation responses.
It is executed between neighboring members of N, i.e., members that have a direct commu-
nication link. The protocol is based on the token hi, the cryptographic key(s) ki, and the
response θi of each involved member Di. Consequently, interact(k, ·, ·) allows the mem-
ber(s) of Ia to obtain the global attestation response(s) Θ of N, and every other member Di
of N to obtain an intermediate attestation response ϑj.
• report(k, ·): This protocol allows the verifier Va to obtain the global attestation response(s)
Θ of N from the member(s) of Ia.
• verify(K, ·, ·): This represents a deterministic function executed on the verifier Va . Having
the cryptographic key(s) K, the token H of Va, and the global attestation response(s) Θ of
N as input, verify(K, ·, ·) determines whether N is in a trustworthy state.
The software state of a member Di ∈ N is reflected in the attestation response θi of
Di, and the software state of all N’s members is reflected in Θ.
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4.3.1.3 Threat Model
We now present the most realistic adversary model in the context of large embedded net-
works. Indeed, our adversary model covers the standard adversary for remote attestation
that is only capable of software attacks. This model is extended with more capabilities
and strategies that are applicable in the context of large embedded networks. Based on
adversarial capabilities, we consider four kinds of adversaries targeting the devices in N.
In the following we present these adversaries:
Software Adversary. A software adversary is the standard adversary in all prior attesta-
tion protocols including the collective attestation solution presented in Section 4.1. A is
capable of exploiting software vulnerabilities to compromise the software of any mem-
ber Di of N. Compromising the software of Di allows A to execute malicious functional-
ity and extract the secrets of Di that are not protected by hardware. A may compromise
the software of an unlimited number of members of N. In fact, the adversary can exploit
a common vulnerability to compromise the software of all members that run the same
software.
Physical Adversary. A physical adversary is not considered in all prior attestation proto-
cols including the collective attestation solution presented in Section 4.1. A has physical
access, and is hereby capable of capturing and physically attacking the hardware of
some members of N. Manipulating with a device’s hardware allows A to execute mali-
cious functionality, and read/write to memory regions that are protected by hardware.
Furthermore, a physical adversary is capable of cloning physically attacked members,
and inserting these clones into the network. Physical attacks are indeed not scalable, and
A is limited to physically attacking a small number of N’s members.
Network Adversary. A network adversary has complete control over the communica-
tion channel, i.e., it can eavesdrop on, modify, drop, or replay any message exchanged
between all members in N and between any member Di of the interface Ia and the
verifier Va.
Mobile Adversary. A mobile adversary has the same capabilities of a software adversary.
However, it follows a distinct strategies for evading detection by an attestation protocol
which is mostly relevant for embedded networks. An important property of A is that
it is capable erasing all traces of software compromise of any member Di of N, by
restoring Di’s software to its genuine state. We distinguish between two actions that can
be performed by A:
• infect(Di): This action allows A to compromise the software of a member Di of N.
• disinfect(Di): This action allows A to restore the software of a member Di to its
genuine state.
We describe two important strategies that could be followed by A in order to under-
mine the security of a collective attestation solution, and evade the detection of software
compromise.
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• TOCTOU: In a Time of Check Time of Use (TOCTOU) attack, A identifies the mem-
bers Di, · · · , Dj of N whose software should be compromised in order to manipu-
late a service offered byN to the verifier Va. Next,A utilizes infect(Di), · · · , infect(Dj)
to compromise the software of these members in the time between the execution
of the collective attestation solutions by Va and the delivery of the service by
N. This attack may require utilizing disinfect(Di), · · · , disinfect(Dj) to disinfect the
members Di, · · · , Dj if software compromise is done before the execution of the
collective attestation solution.
• Hide & Seek: In a Hide & Seek attack, A simply moves between members of N
during the execution of the collective attestation solution in order to evade de-
tection. In particular, while the attestation protocol is being executed, A utilizes
infect(Di), · · · , infect(Dj) to compromise the software of members Di, · · · , Dj of N
that are not yet attested. Next, when those members are to be attested, A utilizes
disinfect(Di), · · · , disinfect(Dj) to restore their software to a genuine state, while
compromising the software of other members Dk, · · · , Dl that have already been
attested.
Finally, we present the game between a verifier Va and a network N that allows us to
define the security of a collective attestation solution:
Game 1 (Collective attestation forgery). The interaction between the verifier Va and the
network N is executed as follows:
1. This interaction is initiated by Va which executes init( · ) with N, i.e., Va generates and
sends to member(s) Di of its attestation interface Ia the challenge(s) reqi.
2. The members of N have oracle access to the function attest(k, ·). This oracle outputs for
every member Di the attestation responses {θ1i , · · · , θpi } as a response to p attestation
queries.
3. The members of N also have oracle access to the protocol interact(k, ·, ·). This oracle outputs
for every member Di the intermediate attestation responses {ϑ1i , · · · , ϑqi } as a response
to q attestation queries containing attestation responses of other members Dj of N. If
Di is a member of Ia, the oracle alternatively outputs the global attestation responses
{Θ1, · · · ,Θq} of N.
4. As a response to Va’s challenge, the member(s) of attestation interface Ia send the global
attestation response Θ to Va.
5. Upon receiving Θ, Va verifies it by executing verify(K, ·). verify(K, ·, ·) determines whether
N is in a trustworthy state. The output of verify(K, H,Θ) represents the output of this
game.
Trustworthy members of a network N utilize attest(k, ·) to create their attestation re-
sponses . Moreover, whenever a member Di interacts with other trustworthy members,
it utilizes interact(k, ·, ·) to create an intermediate attestation response. Similarly, if N is
trustworthy, the member(s) of the attestation interface Ia would utilize interact(k, ·, ·) to
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create a global attestation response(s). On the contrary, a malicious member that desires
to cover the compromise of its software or the software of neighboring members, should
simulate attest or interact respectively. Similarly, if N is not trustworthy, the member(s)
of STa should simulate interact in order to hide this fact from the verifier Va. According
to this game, the security of collective attestation is defined in the following:
Definition 4.7 (Security against collective attestation forgery). Let N be any network com-
prising probabilistic polynomial time members, and let K and k be two sufficiently large values.
A collective attestation solution CA = (setup, init, attest, interact, report, verify) is considered
secure if the probability Pr
[
Collective_Attestation_ForgeryVa, N (K, k) = 1
]
is negligible.
Theorem 4.3 (Secure collective attestation). A collective attestation solution is a secure remote
attestation protocol for large networks if it secure against Collective_Attestation_Forgery defined
in Definition 4.7.
4.3.2 Properties of Collective Attestation
In order to be secure against Collective_Attestation_Forgery, a collective attestation solu-
tion CA = (setup, init, attest, interact, report, verify) should retain a set of properties that
protect it against attacks. We start with the general properties required for securing re-
mote attestation. A remote attestation protocol is considered secure, if the component
that measures and reports the software state of the prover (i.e., attest) allows secure and
accurate measurement and reporting of this state [57]. In particular, a secure remote
attestation protocol requires the prover to retain the following properties:
• Property #1: Guarantee the secrecy of key(s) k, i.e., attest should not leak any infor-
mation regarding k, to which it has exclusive access.
• Property #2: Ensure immutability of attest’s code, i.e., the prover device should
prevent modifications to the code of attest which would lead to leaking k or taking
incorrect measurements of the prover’s software state.
• Property #3: Guarantee atomic execution of attest, i.e., the prover device should
ensure that attest is executed uninterrupted starting at its very first instruction.
Allowing attest to be executed partially would lead to leaking k or taking incorrect
measurements of the prover’s software state.
A collective attestation solution is secure against Collective_Attestation_Forgery, only if
every member Di of N executing attest satisfy the properties #1, #2, and #3. Additionally,
since all these properties are required to guarantee the secrecy of k, every component
that has access to k should retain these properties, e.g., interact that performs hop-by-
hop aggregation in Section 4.1. Similarly, property #2 and property #3 enable correct
measurement of the software state of the prover. Consequently, every component that
alters the measurement of the prover’s software state should retain these properties, e.g.,
interact that generates random challenges in Section 4.1.
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Having satisfied the properties that enable secure remote attestation, a collective attes-
tation solution would still not be secure against Collective_Attestation_Forgery. In particu-
lar, we provide multiple attack vectors on collective attestation solutions that satisfy the
properties mentioned above.
• Attack vector I: The interact protocol could be diverted by a network adversary in
order to convince multiple members of N to incorporate the attestation response
of the same member Di. This attack would lead to overcounting benign devices,
thus allowing malicious devices to evade detection.
• Attack vector II: The inconsistency of attestation responses, in terms of time of
measurement, could allow a mobile adversary to hide its presence in the network
following the Hide & Seek strategy. This attack would lead to convincing Va of
the trustworthiness of N, when the software of multiple members could have been
compromised.
• Attack vector III: The interact protocol could be diverted by a physical adversary
that has extracted the secret key(s) k of a member Di of N. This might allow the
adversary to forge the attestation response of the whole network.
• Attack vector IV: The time gap between the execution of the collective attestation
solution and the actual delivery of N’s service could allow a software adversary to
compromise that service after successfully passing the attestation protocol.
Based on these attack vectors, we identified four additional properties that should be
satisfied by a collective attestation solution CA = (setup, init, attest, interact, report, verify)
in order to be secure against Collective_Attestation_Forgery. In particular, it is required
that the reporting of CA provides correct and consistent attestation responses, where the
security of one member is independent on other members, and there exist no exploitable
time gap between attestation and service. The required properties are outlined below:
• Property #4: The goal of a collective attestation scheme is counting (see Section 4.1)
or identifying (see Section 4.2) members of N whose software is compromised. A
secure collective attestation solution should ensure reporting the correct software
state of every member Di in N, i.e., interact should enable a correct one-time inte-
gration of every measurement of members of N. This property closes attack vector
I.
• Property #5: A secure collective attestation solution should guarantee that the global
attestation response reflects the state of N at a specified point in time, i.e., attest
should guarantee that the measurements taken at every member of N are within a
negligible time frame. This property is denoted by the time consistency property. It
closes attack vector II.
• Property #6: Since attestation requires hardware features, a physical adversary may
allow a member Di of N to evade detection by collective attestation through
physically attacking its hardware. However, a secure collective attestation solu-
tion should not allow a physical attack on a member Di to affect the outcome of
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attestation of another member Dj whose hardware is not physically attacked. This
property is denoted by the hardware independence property. It closes attack vector
III.
• Property #7: Attestation is usually accompanied with the request of a service, i.e.,
the execution of certain pieces of code by various members ofN. A secure collective
attestation solution should guarantee that the executed code is the same as the
attested one, i.e., every member Di executes the same code it measures through
attest. This property is required to close attack vector IV.
4.3.3 Features of Collective Attestation
The properties identified in Section 4.3.2 allows securing collective attestation. In this
section we derive the features necessary for satisfying these properties, and allowing
collective attestation to be secure against Collective_Attestation_Forgery. These features
are classified into hardware and protocol features.
4.3.3.1 Hardware Features
We start with the hardware features that allow every attested member Di in N to per-
form secure remote attestation. In order to statify properties #1, #2, and #3, a device
Di performing attest should be equipped with the following security features in hard-
ware [57]:
• Hardware feature #1: A Read-Only Memory (ROM) which ensures the immutability
of attest code and prevent the adversary from being able to modify it. The im-
mutability of ROM could be either directly exploited by using it to store the code
for attest [52], or indirectly via secure boot [84].
• Hardware feature #2: A Memory Protection Unit (MPU) which guarantees the se-
crecy of the key(s) k by making them accessible only to the code of attest. This
kind of access control could be established based on the value of Program Counter
(PC) [52, 84].
• Hardware feature #3: A mechanism for enabling/disabling interrupts, which pre-
vents the adversary from partially executing the code of attest. This is done by
disabling interrupts before attest execution and enabling them after its termina-
tion.
• Hardware feature #4: A mechanism for enforcing attest to be invoked from its very
first instruction, which also prevents adversary from partially executing the code
of attest. This can be done through control hardware that only allows jumps to
attest code, when the source instruction also belongs to attest code.
• Hardware feature #5: A mechanism for securely resetting the device in case of viola-
tion of the MPU or atomic execution policies. Secure reset allows erasing execution
traces when one of the security policies is breached. Thus, preventing leakage of k.
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As already mentioned, these features are also required for other components that access
k or influence the generation of the measurement, e.g., interact in Section 4.1. On the
other hand, if interact requires no access to k and is not capable of altering the mea-
surement of software states, then members that only execute interact are not required to
possess these features, e.g., aggregators in Section 4.2.
On top of these features that allow securing remote attestation, one additional hard-
ware feature is required to enable security against Collective_Attestation_Forgery of collec-
tive attestation:
• Hardware feature #6: A Reliable Read-Only Clock (RROC) which enables each mem-
ber to securely indicate the time of measurement of software state through attest.
RROC denotes a clock that cannot be modified by a software adversary. It allows a
collective attestation scheme to guarantee that all measurements are taken within
the same time frame. Note that, a software adversary that is capable of tampering
with the clock of a member Di in N can trick Va into believing that a measurement
was taken at time t2 6= t1, where t1 is the actual time of measurement.
4.3.3.2 Protocol Features
Securing collective attestation also requires a set of features that should be satisfied by
the design of the solution itself. These features are described below:
• Protocol feature #1: A mechanism that guarantees a correct collection of measure-
ments. This can be done by sending all measurements from all members of N
to the verifier Va, which then checks whether the measurement of each member
was once correctly integrated (see Section 4.2). A second approach for ensuring
correct collection can be based on binding each attestation response to the attes-
tation session during which it was generated. By allowing attest to generate only
one response for each session which can be verified by only one member through
interact, this approach enables the correct collection of measurements while main-
taining distributed verification (see Section 4.1).
• Protocol feature #2: A mechanism that ensures time consistency of measurements.
This requires allowing attest to bind the time of every measurement to its time
of generation, securing time retrieval against software adversary through RROC,
sharing view of time between Va and N through clock synchronization, and allow-
ing Va to share and verify the expected time of measurement though init and verify
respectively.
• Protocol feature #3: A mechanism that ensures the independence between the attes-
tation procedures of each member of N. This requires that interact does not allow
the generation or verification of a measurement on a member Di to be influenced
by another member Dj, security of measurements are guaranteed on an end-to-end
manner, and the key(s) of any member Di are not known to other members of N.
Central verification used in Section 4.2 represents such a mechanism that ensures
independence.
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• Protocol feature #4: A mechanism for preventing an exploitable gap between attes-
tation and service delivery. This can be done by enforcing the uninterrupted deliv-
ery of the service directly after executing an instance of the attestation protocol. In
particular, every member Di in N executes the attested piece of code directly after
measuring it through attest as in SMART [52].
A collective attestation solution that implements the above protocol features over a net-
work N whose members are equipped with the hardware features described in the pre-
vious section would satisfy the properties of Section 4.3.2 and hereby be secure against
Collective_Attestation_Forgery according to Definition 4.7.
4.3.4 Protocol Analysis
The collective attestation solutions presented earlier in this chapter were not systemat-
ically analyzed in terms of security properties and provided features. This has made
an accurate comparison between them particularly challenging. In the following we an-
alyze the collective attestation solutions presented in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2. We
first show how they comply to the definition of collective attestation presented in Def-
inition 4.6 . Then we check whether they satisfy the identified properties that provide
security against Collective_Attestation_Forgery defined in Definition 4.7.
Collective Attestation Solution (Section 4.1): This collective attestation solution is de-
fined as follows:
• setup( · ): Setup is done by O initiating every member with an authentication key
pair, a public key certificate, a reference software configuration, a software con-
figuration certificate, and the public key of O. When two members meet, they
exchange reference software configuration, and use the authentication key pair to
share a symmetric key.
• init( · ): The protocol is initiated the verifier Va choosing a random member D1
of N to act the the only member of the attestation interface Ia. Va sends D1 an
attestation request formed of a fresh nonce.
• attest(k, ·): When a member receives an attestation request from a neighbor, it mea-
sures its software state and authenticates the result with a MAC based on the
symmetric key shared with that neighbor. D1, that receives its attestation request
from Va, authenticates its measurement with a digital signature based on its secret
key.
• interact(k, ·, ·): When D1 receives an attestation request from Va, it generates and
sends a new fresh nonce as an attestation request for every neighbor. These neigh-
bors then generate new nonces and send them to their neighbors and so on, un-
til an attestation request containing a different fresh nonce is received by every
member of N. On the other hand, after a device generates its attestation response
through attest(k, ·), it sends the response to the neighbor from which it received
the request. On every member, responses from all neighbors are aggregated into
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an intermediate response. D1 aggregate intermediate responses into a global re-
sponse.
• report(k, ·): D1 sends to Va a global attestation response which is an aggregate all
intermediate responses received from its neighbor along with its own software
measurement.
• verify(K, ·, ·): After verifying the digital signature on the received global attestation
response using the public key of D1, Va can determine the number of N’s members
whose software has not been compromised.
Collective Attestation Solution (Section 4.2): In the following we only present the dif-
ferences to the collective attestation solution in Section 4.1:
• setup( · ): Members of N are initialized with an Optimistic Aggregate Signature
(OAS) secret key (Section 4.2.2). Va is setup with the aggregate public key of N
and a secure token signed by O.
• init( · ): Va initiates collective attestation by sending D1 a fresh nonce along with
the secure token.
• attest(k, ·): All software measurements are signed with an OAS signature based on
the OAS secret key.
• interact(k, ·, ·): When a member of N receives an attestation request, it verifies the
signature of O and forwards the same nonce to its neighbors. Members aggregate
measurements of their neighbors along with their own based on the OAS signature
scheme.
• report(k, ·): The global attestation response sent from D1 to Va is formed of an OAS
signature of all members of N.
• verify(K, ·, ·): Va uses the aggregate public key of N to verify the OAS signature
and learn the IDs of N’s members whose software is compromised.
Protocols Properties: We now check whether these solutions satisfy the properties that
enable security under Collective_Attestation_Forgery:
• Properties #1, #2, and #3: The two solutions satisfy these properties. The solution
in Section 4.1 requires interact to have access to the key(s) k. Further, interact is
responsible for the generation of the random nonce which influences the measure-
ment process. This solution assumes that all members of N are equipped with
a lightweight security architecture that enables secure remote attestation. On the
other hand, interact in Section 4.2 requires no access to k, and has no influence on
the measurement process. In this solution, only members that should be attested
are assumed to be equipped with a lightweight security architecture.
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• Property #4: The two solutions satisfy this property. The solution in Section 4.1 is
based on distributed verification and only allows counting the number of benign
devices inN. To avoid double counting, the solution uses a session ID to identify an
attestation session. This ID is included in the attestation response. The lightweight
security architecture guarantees that every member generates one attestation re-
sponse directed to one single neighbor for every session ID. This is enabled by the
fact that members of N share different symmetric keys with each of their neigh-
bors. However, if the adversary could trick a member to share the same key with
multiple neighbors, it can then allow the attestation response of this member to
be overcounted. On the other hand, the verifier in Section 4.2 centrally verifies
that every member reported its correct state only once. This is guaranteed by the
properties of the OAS signature.
• Property #5: The two solutions do not satisfy this property. They allow software
measurements on different members of N to be taken at different times. In fact, the
difference between time of measurements on N’s members is not upper bounded.
Consequently, a mobile adversary may use the Hide & Seek strategy presented in
Section 4.3.1 to evade detection by both solutions.
• Property #6: The solution in Section 4.2 satisfies this property while the solution in
Section 4.1 does not. In Section 4.1 our solution relies on neighbors’ verification
and hop-by-hop aggregation based on symmetric keys, which implies that extract-
ing the secrets of one member would allow other software compromised members
to go undetected. On the other hand, the central verification strategy followed in
Section 4.2, that gives interact no influence on the measurement process or access
to the key(s), provides hardware independence between N’s members.
• Property #7: The two solutions do not satisfy this property. They do not bind the
attestation to any service delivery. As a consequence, a mobile adversary could
compromise the software of members of N which leads to disrupting a specific
service while not being detected by those solutions.
As can be seen the two solutions do not satisfy all the properties that provide security
against Collective_Attestation_Forgery. Therefore, they are susceptible to various attacks
through a stronger adversary. In Section 4.3.5 we present a generic collective attesta-
tion solution which completes the tradeoff between security/applicability and perfor-
mance/assumptions by providing stronger security under Collective_Attestation_Forgery.
4.3.5 Generic Solution
The generic collective attestation solution CA = (setup, init, attest, interact, report, verify) is
shown in Figure 4.22. The solution utilizes the Optimistic Aggregate Signature (OAS)
scheme to provide secure collection and hardware independence, and synchronized Re-
liable Read-Only Clocks (RROC) for time consistency. The details of the solution are
described in the following:
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Figure 4.22: Protocol CA
• setup( · ): Every member of N is initialized by O with a secure OAS key, and the
public key of the verifier Va. The verifier Va is setup with the aggregate key of
N and a signing key pair. Va’s setup can be done during initialization or using a
dedicated protocol as in Section 4.2.
• init( · ): Va chooses a random member D1 of N to act at the only member of the of
the attestation interface Ia and sends it an attestation request req1 = {N, tattest,σreq}.
The request is formed of a fresh nonce N and the attestation time tattest > tnow + δt
authenticated with a digital signature based on the secret key of Va, where tnow is
the time of generation of the attestation request and δtis the lower bound on the
time needed for broadcasting the request to all members of N.
• attest(k, ·): At attestation time tattest, every member of N that has received an attes-
tation request from a neighbor (containing tattest) measures its software state and
authenticates the result with an OAS signature based on its secret OAS key.
• interact(k, ·, ·): When D1 receives an attestation request from Va, it verifies the in-
tegrity of the signature of Va, and the freshness of the attestation time tattest. If the
verification was successful, it forwards the request to its neighbors. The neighbors
then verify and forward the request to their neighbors and so on, until the request
is received and verified by every member of N. On the other hand, after a device
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Figure 4.23: Implementation based on SMART [52]
generates its attestation response through attest(k, ·), it sends the response to the
neighbor from which it received the request. On every member, responses from
all neighbors are aggregated into an intermediate response based on the OAS
signature scheme. D1 aggregates intermediate responses into a global response
composed of one OAS signature.
• report(k, ·): D1 sends to Va a global attestation response which is formed of an OAS
signature of all members of N.
• verify(K, ·, ·): Va uses the aggregate public key of N to verify the OAS signature
and learn the IDs of N’s members whose software is compromised.
In order to mitigate Time of Check Time of Use (TOCTOU) attacks, it is proposed that
every member of N executes the attested code uninterrupted directly after executing
attest.
4.3.6 Implementation
For the generic collective attestation solution we also present two instantiations on top
of SMART [52] and TrustLite [84] security architectures (see Chapter 3). Recall that, these
architectures provide their security guarantees based on minimal hardware features. The
main features incorporated are a small amount of Read-Only Memory (ROM) and a sim-
ple Memory Protection Unit (MPU). In the following we present the two instantiations:
Implementation on SMART. For our implementation on SMART [52], we store in ROM
of every member the program code responsible for executing the collective attestation on
that member, i.e., init, attest, interact, and report. The ROM also stores for each member
Di the OAS secret key ski. Consequently, integrity of the measurement code and the
OAS key are ensured via emutability of ROM. All protocol intermediate values are
stored in rewritable memory of each member Di. Note that these values have to be
updated during Di’s lifetime. The implementation on SMART is shown in Figure 4.23
where we denote by RAM the rewritable memory region. SMART’s MPU is configured
such that it ensures secret data is only accessible to the unmodified part of code that
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Figure 4.24: Implementation based on TrustLite [84]
requires access to this data. In particular, rule #1 ensures that only attest has read access
to the OAS secret key ski, and rule #2 ensures that only init, attest, interact, and report
have read and write access to their private data datai.
Implementation on TrustLite. Our generic solution is also implemented as trustlets on
TrustLite [84] (see Chapter 3). More precisely, we implemented the code responsible for
executing each protocol/function, i.e., init, attest, interact, and report, as a single indepen-
dent trustlet. Our implementation is shown in Figure 4.24. Trustlite ensures the software
integrity of each of the protocols through the secure boot component SecureBoot on Ai.
Further, as in SMART, the MPU of TrustLite was configured such that it ensures that
secret data is only accessible to appropriate trustlets. In particular, rule #1 ensures that
only SecureBoot has read access to the memory storing the program code of the generic
solution, rule #2 ensures that only attest has read access to the OAS secret key ski, and
rule #3 ensures that only init, attest, interact, and report have read and write access to
their private data datai.
4.3.7 Performance Evaluation
The overhead of the generic solution is compatible in terms of computational, commu-
nication, and energy costs with that of the solution presented in Section 4.2. However,
its memory overhead is significantly reduced due to the elimination of monotonic coun-
ters (see Section 4.2.5). In this section we evaluate the runtime overhead of the generic
solution based on simulation results for networks of up to 1, 000, 000 devices. Our per-
formance evaluation is based on the implementation from Section 4.3.6. Note that, we
also assume here that the topology of the network does not change while the attestation
protocol is executing.
We used the OMNeT++ [104] network simulator to assess the performance of the
attestation protocol for very large networks of embedded devices. The attestation pro-
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Figure 4.25: Runtime of the generic solution
tocol was again implemented on the application layer, where cryptographic operations
were emulated with delays corresponding to real measurments of their execution time
on TrustLite [84]. For our simulations, the average communication rate between devices
was set to 250 Kbps, which corresponds to the defined bandwidth for ZigBee [135]. We
considered three topologies for our evaluation: a star topology, a chain topology, and
tree topologies with number of child nodes varying from 2 to 12. And, we simulated
various network sizes, which ranged from 10 to 1, 000, 000. However, since collective at-
testation is mostly relevant for tree topologies, we present our evaluation results only
for a tree with 4 neighbors per device, and compare it to the results of the solutions
presented in Section 4.2. Finally, we assume that each device has 50 KBytes of software
to be attested. The results of our evaluation are shown in Figure 4.25.
Similar to the previous solutions, the runtime overhead of the generic solution is log-
arithmic in the size of the network. It can be as low as 11 s for attesting a network
composed of 1, 000, 000 members. Moreover, the generic solution shows a constant in-
crease in runtime over the solution presented in Section 4.2. In order to understand the
source of this increase, we divided the attestation protocol execution into three parts
and measured the runtime required to execute each part. In particular, we distinguish
between: (1) inbound execution which allows attestation requests to be broadcasted in
the network N and verified by each member, (2) outbound execution through which at-
testation responses are aggregated in their way to the verifier, and (3) attestation which
corresponds to the actual generation and authentication of the software measurement
by each member of N. In addition to these parts of the protocol execution, the generic
solution imposes an additional delay that allows all members of N to generate their mea-
surement at the same time, i.e., waiting till tattest after receiving an attestation request.
The runtime increase is mainly caused by this delay.
4.3.8 Conclusion
In this section we presented a systematic treatment of collective attestation that allows
establishing such a security service on solid ground. This treatment enables analyzing
and comparing the properties and features of the solutions presented earlier in this
chapter. Further, we presented a generic collective attestation solution that satisfied all
the security properties identified in this section. The generic solution completes the
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tradeoff between security/applicability and performance/assumptions of collective at-
testation by providing stronger security guarantees at the cost of minimal additional
requirements and runtime overhead.
4.4 related work
In this section we present work from the literature that is directly related to the solu-
tions presented in this chapter. A survey of existing attestation schemes is presented in
Chapter 3.
Practicality of Collective Attestation. LISA [31] aims at investigating the applicability of
collective attestation in real networks. It provides two practical instantiations of the col-
lective attestation solution presented in Section 4.1. In particular, the main focus of LISA
is the spanning tree construction. It comprises a synchronous instantiation which aggre-
gates attestation reports as described in Section 4.1, and an asynchronous instantiation
where attestation reports are directly forwarded without aggregation. The authors inves-
tigate the requirements and overhead of each of these two instantiations demonstrating
the practicality of the solution described in Section 4.1.
Secure Data Aggregation. Secure data aggregation is a particularly popular research
topic in the field of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). The goal of secure data aggre-
gation schemes is to preserve the authenticity of data that is reported by sensor nodes
while reducing the overall communication overhead in the network. Existing propos-
als are either based on new cryptographic techniques [72, 93, 34, 33, 156, 87, 106], in-
corporate a witness-based solution [51], or rely on trust relations [105]. Unfortunately,
these approaches are based on computationally intensive public key cryptography [87],
require a shared global key [93], or assume that all devices in the network are synchro-
nized [51]. Finally, the majority of existing schemes impose high communication and
computation overhead [51, 100, 36]. The solution we present in Section 4.1 aggregates
attestation reports in a hop-by-hop manner as done by [92, 157], thus, avoiding the huge
overhead of other existing approaches. However, we exploit a lightweight security archi-
tecture to provide end-to-end authenticity. Further, in Section 4.2 we leverage a novel
aggregate signature scheme for aggregating attestation responses.
Random Sampling. As explained in Section 4.1.6, one can improve the efficiency of
our attestation solution by leveraging random sampling, and verifying the integrity of a
small subset of the whole network. McCune et al. use random sampling to detect when
a sensor node does not receive a certain broadcast message [94]. In particular, in their
solution only a randomly sampled subset of the sensor nodes acknowledge the receipt
of the broadcast. The main intuition behind the security of such schemes is that it is not
feasible for the adversary to find out in advance the particular sensor nodes that are
expected to acknowledge the broadcast.
Sensor Networks (SN). A large amount of research has been done in the area of SN and
WSN. This research mainly concerns topics like secure routing [73, 159], secure key man-
agement [154, 59], and secure broadcasting [7, 128]. To the best of our knowledge, our
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solutions represent the first to provide scalable software integrity verification solutions
in these areas or in any other area.
Distributed Signing The aggregate signature scheme of Boneh et al. [25] has already
been used by Syta et al. in a distributed signing application [139]. However, the protocol
presented by Syta et al. requires that all the signatures are generated on the same mes-
sage. Moreover, the authors do not provide a detailed security proof of their protocol
which is definitely more than just a formality.
4.5 conclusion
In this chapter we investigated the problem of malware infestation and presented two
collective attestation solutions that enable the detection of malware in large networks
of embedded devices. The presented solutions are based on different primitives and as-
sumptions, provide different security guarantees, have different cost, and are applicable
in different scenarios. They provide a tradeoff between security and efficiency. Together
the solutions enable software integrity checking for a wide range of applications. We fur-
ther presented a systematic analysis of collective attestation that puts it on solid grounds
and provides a guide for researchers working in this area. In Chapter 5, we investigate
the problem of physical attacks on attestation, which is realistic in large-scale settings,
and provide multiple collective attestation solutions that allow detection of physical
attacks in various application scenarios.
5
D E T E C T I O N O F P H Y S I C A L AT TA C K S
The collective attestation solutions presented in Chapter 4 adhere to the requirement
of attestation in the single-prover setting by targeting malware attacks only. These solu-
tions assume physical attacks on provers to be either not possible (Section 4.1) or very
unlikely (Section 4.2). This assumption is reasonable in the single-prover setting, where
devices can be unreachable or physically protected. It might also still hold for certain
embedded networks where most of the devices are within secure premises and are far
away from the reach of the adversary. However, emerging scenarios involve a large num-
ber of heterogeneous devices that are spread across a very large area. In such scenarios,
it is not reasonable to assume that physical attacks are not possible. While some de-
vices remain protected, others might become physically accessible to the adversary and
within its grasp, e.g., public devices in building automation. In this chapter, we present
two collective attestation solutions for large networks of embedded devices where phys-
ical attacks on devices are possible. The presented solutions allow the detection of both
software and physical attacks in centralized and decentralized networks by leveraging
attestation and absence detection. In Section 5.1, we present a solution for software and
physical attack detection in centralized networks. The solution builds on top of collec-
tive attestation presented in Chapter 4 and extends it with periodic presence checks in
order to enable detection of both attacks. Next, Section 5.2 presents a collective attesta-
tion solution for detecting software and physical attacks in autonomous networks. The
solution exploits neighbors’ attestation and presence checking to allow autonomous de-
tection of these attacks. It further relies on a novel migration protocol in order to tolerate
dynamic topologies.
Remark. The results presented in this chapter are due to the author of this work and
the result of many intensive discussions and collaboration with Shaza Zeitouni (TU
Darmstadt, Germany), Gene Tsudik (UCI, California), and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi (TU
Darmstadt, Germany). Parts of this chapter have been published in [76], [74], and [75].
5.1 device attestation resilient to physical attacks
It is not always enough to verify the software integrity of embedded networks in order
to ensure their correct operation. Emerging embedded networks might involve devices
that could be captured by the adversary and physically attacked. For example, devices
placed in public regions in a building automation scenario, or those on the edge of
the network in a smart factory or a perimeter monitoring scenario, are a natural target
for physical attacks. Consequently, a collective attestation solution for such networks,
that aims at verifying their safe and correct operation, should not only be secure under
a stronger adversary that is capable of physical attacks, but also provide means for
detecting those attacks.
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The core observation we make in this chapter is that, physically attacking a device
requires removing it from the network and turning it off for a non-negligible amount
of time. In particular, the adversary must take the device apart and disassemble its
components in order to extract its secrets [21]. Consequently, it is possible to detect a
physical attack on a device by monitoring its presence in the network and detecting
its absence. The solution presented in this section takes advantages of prior work on
absence detection in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) [41, 42, 150, 67, 69, 70, 37, 147].
It targets centrally managed systems where multiple devices are physically accessible
to the adversary, e.g., smart factories. Such networks are usually composed of a large
number of heterogeneous devices. Thus, it is crucial to distribute the burden across all
devices in the network in order to avoid performance bottlenecks.
Contribution. We investigate the security of large dynamic networks of heterogeneous
embedded devices where physical attacks are possible. We define the threat model for
these networks that allows physical attacks. And, we present the first collective attes-
tation solution for centralized embedded networks that is capable of detecting both
software and physical attacks. Our solution is based on collective attestation. It extends
our collective attestation solutions presented in Chapter 4 with an absence detection pro-
tocol in order to provide security under a stronger adversary model and allow detection
of both software and physical attacks. The presented solution allows detecting whether
a physical attack has occurred, and can be extended to detect attacked devices, e.g.,
using majority voting. We present two instantiation of our solution based on digital sig-
natures and Message Authentication Codes (MACs). Further, in order to demonstrate
feasibility, we show two implementation of the solution on two recent security archi-
tectures for low-end embedded devices with different security features and functional
capabilities: SMART [52] and TrustLite [84]. Finally, we present extensive performance
evaluation based on our implementations, in addition to simulations of the solution in
networks of up to 100, 000 devices demonstrating scalability. Our solution presents a first
step towards secure detection of software and physical attacks in centralized embedded
networks.
Outline. After providing a brief overview of our solution in Section 5.1.1, we present it
details in Section 5.1.2, and describe our implementation in Section 5.1.3. Performance
evaluation is then presented on Section 5.1.4. Security of the solution is examined in
Section 5.1.5, and this section concludes in Section 5.1.6.
5.1.1 Collective Attestation
5.1.1.1 Problem Description and System Model
We consider a dynamic centrally managed network N that is formed of n interconnected
heterogeneous devices Di. The network operator is denoted by O. A central entity de-
noted by verifier V infrequently inspects N and assesses its trustworthiness. We do not
assume the existence of a routing protocol. However, each device in N is at least capable
of communicating to its direct neighbor [44, 68, 114, 115]. Since the mobility of devices
can be involuntary, i.e., guided by ambient factors, neither the operator O nor the veri-
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fier V are assumed to be aware of the network topology at any given time. Some of the
devices in N are physically protected or inaccessible, while other devices are within the
adversary’s grasp and are subject to physical attacks. The goal of a collective attestation
solution is to enable the verifier V to verify the software and hardware integrity of N in
a secure and scalable manner. We consider a network to be trustworthy if all the devices
are running software deployed and certified by O and none of them has been physically
attacked.
5.1.1.2 Requirements Analysis
Objectives. Based on the model described above, a collective attestation solution for
large networks of embedded devices should provide, in addition to the five properties
described in Section 4.1.1, the following properties:
• Property #1: Allow verifying the collective integrity of the network N.
• Property #2: Detect and identify devices whose software has been compromised.
• Property #3: Be more efficient than individual attestation of every device in N.
• Property #4: Allow detection of devices whose hardware has been physically at-
tacked.
• Property #5: Report and allow verification of the network topology.
The satisfaction of property #1, property #2, and property #3 pertain to main security
objective of collective attestation presented in Chapter 4. The solution proposed in Sec-
tion 4.1 aims at satisfying these properties in a software-only threat model. Further, the
solution presented in Section 4.2 attempt to satisfy these properties even when a lim-
ited number of devices can be physically attacked. Neither of these solutions satisfy
property #4 and property #5. While property #4 is crucial in the presence of a power-
ful adversary that is capable of capturing and physically attacking the hardware of a
large number of devices in N, property #5 allows verifying the integrity of N’s topology,
which might be considered in certain scenarios an important part of N’s integrity.
Adversary Model. As in Chapter 4 we assume that the adversary A has complete control
over the communication channel, i.e., it can eavesdrop on, modify, drop, or replay any
message exchanged between all devices in N and between any device Di and the verifier
V. We assume that the operator O and the verifier V are trusted. Further, we consider
three kinds of adversaries targeting the devices in N:
• Software-only adversary Av,0: This adversary represents the standard adversary
in all prior attestation protocols including collective attestation presented in Chap-
ter 4. Av,0 is capable of compromising the software of v 6 n devices through
remote software attacks.
• Hardware-only adversary A0,w: This adversary has physical access, and is hereby
capable of capturing and physically attacking the hardware of w < n devices.
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• Hybrid adversary Av,w: This adversary can compromise the software of v devices
and physically attack the hardware of w devices.
Let the inter-attestation gap tatt denote the upper bound on the time between two suc-
cessive inspections of N by V, which indeed executes collective attestation to assess N’s
trustworthiness. The parameter v (resp. w) refer to the upper bound on the number of
devices whose software (resp. hardware) can be attacked by A within tatt. Moreover, we
denote by tphy the non-negligible amount of time that is required by A to physically
attack the hardware of one device. We place some constraints on the capabilities of A.
In particular, the following are out of scope:
1. Omnipotence: We claim that the strongest adversary that can be mitigated is
An,n−1, which compromises the software of all devices and physically attacks the
hardware of all but one device. Therefore, an almighty adversary A0,n that can
physically attack the hardware of all devices within tatt is considered out of scope.
2. Non-invasive physical attacks: We consider physical attacks that do not require
turning off the device for a non-negligible amount of time to be out of scope.
Examples of such attacks include hardware side-channel attacks that aim at ex-
tracting a device’s secrets during its normal functioning. These attacks represent
an orthogonal problem.
3. Denial of Service (DoS): We assume a stealthy adversary that aims at attacking
the largest number of devices while remaining undetected. Therefore, we consider
DoS attacks to be out of scope.
Device Requirements. Through the design of our solution we satisfy property #3 and
property #5. However, in order to satisfy property #1 and property #2 as well as the
five properties described in Section 4.1.1, it should be possible to securely attest each
device in N. Consequently, every device Di should satisfy the requirements for secure
remote attestation as discussed in Section 4.1.1. Further, satisfying property #4 requires
means of sharing time between devices, which should also be secure against software
attacks when these attack are considered within the adversary model. We now list all
the requirements that should be satisfied by each Di in N:
• Reliable Clocks: Devices in N should be equipped with reliable clocks that are
synchronized with the clock of the verifier V. We denote by δt the upper bound
on the clock skew between any two devices in N and between N and V.
• Reliable Read-Only Clocks (RROC): A RROC is a reliable clock that cannot be
modified by any software that is residing on the device, i.e., it is non-malleable.
• Lightweight Security Architecture: Each device is equipped with a lightweight
security architecture that enables secure remote attestation, e.g., SMART [52] and
TrustLite [84] (see Chapter 3).
If the first requirement is not achieved, V might not detect whether a hardware-only
adversary has physically attacked the hardware of a device Di. If the second requirement
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is not achieved, V might not detect whether a hybrid adversary has compromised the
software or physically attacked the hardware of a device Dj. And, if the third property
is not achieved V might not detect whether a software-only adversary has compromised
the software of a device Dk.
Assumptions. As mentioned in the system model, devices in N can be heterogeneous
in terms of hardware and/or software. However, each device should satisfy the require-
ments that allow secure detection of attacks under the specified adversary model. In
particular software-only adversary requires every device to have a lightweight secu-
rity architecture, hardware-only adversary requires reliable clocks in addition to the
lightweight security architecture, and hybrid adversary requires a synchronized RROC
in addition to the security architecture. We denote the maximum clock skew between
any two devices by δt. Devices in N can communicate with each other, i.e., any two
devices Di and Dj always have a communication path between them. The time required
to transmit a message between two devices is upper bounded by ttr. Further, while the
network topology is assumed dynamic, during the execution of the attestation proto-
col the network is assumed connected and its topology should remain static. Finally,
cryptographic primitives are assumed to be secure along with their implementations.
Protocol Overview. The core idea is that during the time when the network N is unat-
tended by V, devices in N periodically monitor each others presence. Eventually, when
the network is attended, V performs collective attestation of N as described in Chapter 4
and collects presence reports from all devices. The solution proposed in this section con-
sists of two protocols: beat and attest. beat allows every device to monitor the presence
of all other n− 1 devices in N. In particular, each device periodically broadcasts a heart-
beat to all other devices in the network through its immediate neighbors, thus proving
its presence in N during a specific period of time. Devices verify and log all heartbeats
received from all other devices for all time periods. attest allows V to collectively attest
all devices in N. Alongside V collects all heartbeats logged by all devices in N. Through
the collected logs, V can detect all devices that were not present in N for an extended
period of time. These devices are assumed to be physically attacked.
5.1.2 Protocol Description
We now describe in details the protocols involved in our solution. In order to motivate
different device requirements, we present three different versions of our solution that
are secure against the three different kinds of adversaries described in Section 5.1.1.
5.1.2.1 Mitigation of Hardware-Only Adversary
Lets assume a hardware-only adversary A0,n−1 as described in Section 5.1.1, i.e., an
adversary that can physically attack all but one device in N within the inter-attestation
gap tatt, while being incapable of compromising the software of that remaining device.
As mention earlier, in order to mitigate this adversary each device should be equipped
with a lightweight security architecture and a reliable clock.
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Intuition. The core idea of our solution is that if we know the minimum time tphy that is
required by A0,n−1 to physically attack a device Di, then running an absence checking
protocol at periods thb that are shorter than tphy would allow the detection of physical
attack on Di. Consequently, if these two conditions hold:
• All heartbeats generated by a devices whose hardware is not physically attacked
by A are unforgeable and uniquely bound to their generation time.
• All devices generate heartbeats in and timely manner (i.e., every thb < tphy) and log
all heartbeats received from all other devices.
Then the following assertion can be safely made
Assertion 1: [Alert] Assume that w devices are captured within a given inter-
attestation gap tatt, where 0 < w < n. Then the heartbeat logs of at least
one device Di, whose hardware has not been physically attacked, will be
missing at least one heartbeat of one other device Dj that corresponds to one
heartbeat period.
If a device Dj is physically attacked, then Dj should be absent for at least tphy. Since
tphy > thb, the log of Di will lack one heartbeat of Dj which corresponds to the heartbeat
generation time during which it was switched off due to the physical attack. Indeed,
the physical attack on Dj will allow A to extract its secrets and be able to re-generate
the missing heartbeat. However, it would then be too late as the absence of Dj has been
already recorded by Di.
It is important to note that the inverse of this assertion does not always hold. In
particular, if a heartbeat of Dj is missing from Di’s logs this does not imply that the
hardware of Dj has been physically attacked. A log inconsistency could be caused by
other factors such as network problems or device failures. Therefore, false positives are
possible while false negatives are not.
Moreover, the following assertion can be also made:
Assertion 2: [Normalcy:] After the execution of collective attestation, if all the
reported logs of every device in N contain all the heartbeats for all devices
for every thb period, then none of the devices was absent for a period longer
than thb.
Since tphy > thb the second assertion implies that A has not physically attacked the
hardware of any device in N. Consider one device Di whose hardware has not been
physically attacked. If the log of Di contains a heartbeat of every other device for every
period since the last time the network was attended, then none of the devices has been
absent for longer than thb. However, Di is not known to V. Since all logs of all devices
match and at least one device is not physically attacked, then none of the devices has
been absent and hereby physically attacked.
5.1 device attestation resilient to physical attacks 103
Figure 5.1 : protocol beat (as viewed by Di)
timeOut(timerhb)
startTimer (timerttol , ttol)
ti = tstart = time(), hbi = {p, ti, idi}
σi = sign(ski; hbi)
Set logi = hbi, startTimer (timerhb, thb)
Di
hbi, σi−−−−−→ all neighbors
while
(
¬ timeOut (timerttol) ∧ sizeof(logi) < n
)
do
Di
hbj, σj←−−−−− neighbor (Dj)
if (accept(tstart, tj) ∧ hbj /∈ logi) then
if versig(pkj, hbj,σj) then
Append
(
{hbj,σj}, logi
)
Di
hbj, σj−−−−−→ all neighbors
else
Discard hbj
end
else
Discard hbj
end
end
p = p+ 1
Heartbeat. Periodically, i.e., every thb time interval, each device Di generates a heartbeat
and broadcasts it to its neighboring devices. Every heartbeat has a timestamp indicating
its generation time and is signed by Di based on its secret signing key ski. On the other
hand, when a device Di receives a heartbeat from its neighboring device Dj it verifies
its freshness and authenticity by verifying the timestamp and the signature respectively.
If the verification of the heartbeat was successful, Di stores it in its log and forwards
it to all its neighbors. Di terminates the heartbeat protocol when it has receive and
stored heartbeats from every other device in N. The termination of the protocol can also
be based on a timeout denoted by the tolerance interval ttol. If Di does not receive a
heartbeat from some peer device Dj within ttol after the start of the protocol execution,
Di concludes that Dj has been absent. This protocol is denoted by beat and is described
in details in Figure 5.1.
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Let idi denote the unique ID of a device Di, and let ttr denote by the upper bound on
the time required to transmit a heartbeat between any two devices in N. Since the upper
bound tphy on the time required by A to physically attack the hardware of one device is
considerably larger than ttr, no tight upper bound on network delay is required. Note
that, beat can be either initiated based on a timeout, i.e., expiry of a timer indicating that
thb has passed since beat was last executed, or upon receipt of a heartbeat from one of
the neighbors. For the sake of clarity, Figure 5.1 shows the protocol starting based on a
timeout. We assume that all the heartbeats that are received before step 0 in Figure 5.1
are buffered.
Figure 5.2 : protocol collect (as viewed by V)
for 0 < i 6 n do
t = time(), N ∈R {0, 1}`N ,
σV = sign(skV; t‖N)}
V
Ch={t,N,σV}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Di
V
respi={LOGi,σi}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Di
if
(
versig(pki;LOGi‖Ch,σi)
)
then
Store LOGi
else
Discard respi
end
end
Attestation. As mentioned earlier, N is infrequently attended by the verifier V which
inspects it and assesses its trustworthiness. When present, V collects all the heartbeat
logs from all device in N. V initiates collection by generating a collection request Ch =
N, t,σV and sending it to a device Di in N. N denotes a random fresh nonce, t a new
timestamp, and σV a digital signature generated by V over N and t using its secret key
skV. Note that, V can be remote or has physical proximity to Di.
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Figure 5.3 : protocol collect (as viewed by Di)
Di
Ch={t,N,σV}←−−−−−−−−−−−−− V
if If
(
versig(pkV; t‖N,σV)
)
then
σi = sign(ski;LOGi‖Ch)
Di
respi={LOGi,σi}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ V
else
Discard Ch
end
When Di receives the request Ch, it verifies its freshness and authenticity by verifying
the timestamp and the signature. If the verification of the request was successful, Di
uses its secret key ski to sign the set LOGi = {logi, ∀p} of all logs collected since the
last collection instance along with the received challenge Ch. The signature and the log
are then sent to V which verifies the authenticity and freshness of the signature and
stores the received logs. Based on all logs collected from all devices, V can identify the
devices that were absent during at least one heartbeat execution since it last attended N.
According to the second assertion, if the logs of all devices contain all heartbeats of all
other devices, V concludes that A did not physically attack the hardware of any of the
devices. This protocol is denoted by collect and is described in details in Figure 5.2, and
5.3.
Efficiency Improvements. For the sake of clarity, the protocols described above involved
several costly operations and impractical assumptions. In the following we present sev-
eral intuitive protocol modifications that provide substantial simplifications and cost
reductions.
• Communication mode: The collection protocol described in Figure 5.2 and 5.3 as-
sumes that the verifier V collects the logs directly from each of the devices in N.
While this idealized communication setting is plausible, it is in fact unrealistic.
However, since both the collection request (Ch) sent by V to any device Di and the
response respi of Di are authenticated, an authentic channel is created between
V and Di. As a consequence, the security of the collection protocol remains intact
regardless of the communication setting, i.e., even if the messages between V and
Di went through one or more intermediate communication hops.
• Public key cryptography: The two protocols described above are based on digital
signatures, which is also mainly done to simplify presentation. Replacing digital
signature with MACs in the beat protocol is in fact straightforward. It only requires
that every device Di in N shares a symmetric key with each of its neighboring de-
vices. Similarly, having that each device shares a unique symmetric key with V, the
digital signatures in the collect protocol can be simply replaced with MACs. Note
that, under our hardware-only adversary A0,n−1 that is not capable of physically
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attacking the hardware of all devices, MACs are as secure as digital signatures. In
particular, if the hardware of at least one devices Di is not physically attacked, the
heartbeat log of Di would lack at least one heartbeat of one absent device. The
drawback of replacing digital signatures with MACs is that MACs require either a
key pre-distribution or a key establishment protocol to enable sharing symmetric
keys between neighboring devices.
• Heartbeat logs: The collect protocol description in Figure 5.2 and 5.3 shows that
each device Di should collect and send to V logs LOGi of all other devices which
are accumulated over and extended period of time through multiple executions of
the beat protocol. While this is also done for the ease of presentation, it is sufficient
for Di to send V during collect a list of absent or present devices. In fact, Di could
simply send V a single bit signifying whether the hardware of at least one device
in N is physically attacked.
In Section 5.1.2.3 we show a version of our protocol that considers all these improve-
ments.
5.1.2.2 Mitigation of Software-Only Adversary
Lets now assume a software-only adversary An,0 as described in Section 5.1.1, which in
contrast to A0,n−1 can compromise the software of all devices in N but is incapably of
physically attacking the hardware of a single device.
As already discussed, in order to mitigate this adversary each device in N should be
equipped with a lightweight security architecture that enables secure remote attestation.
In particular, on every device Di the secrecy of the cryptographic keys and the integrity
of the measurement and reporting mechanisms should be protected against software
attacks. This can be achieved using minimal features such as a Read-Only Memory
(ROM) for preserving the integrity of the measurement and reporting code, and a simple
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) for preserving the secrecy of the involved cryptographic
keys [52, 16, 84] (see Chapter 3 for more details).
If this requirement is satisfied, collective attestation presented in Chapter 4 can be
used to detect all devices whose software has been compromised. In particular, V picks
a random device D1 as initiator and sends it an attestation request containing a random
nonce N. The request is then flooded across the network and a spanning tree rooted
at initiator is formed. Next, starting at leaf nodes in the tree, each device creates an
attestation report and sends it to its parent. The reports are aggregated and propagate
the tree in reverse en route to the verifier V which receives a single aggregated report.
Upon verifying the report, V can determine the number (Section 4.1) or the IDs of the
compromised devices (Section 4.2).
5.1.2.3 Mitigation of Hybrid Adversary
We know assume a hybrid adversary An,n−1 as described in Section 5.1.1, i.e., an adver-
sary that can, within the inter-attestation gap tatt, compromise the software of all devices
and physically attack the hardware of all but one device. Let Db be the single device
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Figure 5.4: Protocol attest
whose hardware has not been physically attacked by An,n−1. An obvious approach for
mitigating An,n−1 is to combine collective attestation from Chapter 4 with absence detec-
tion described in Section 5.1.2.2, thus detecting both software compromise and physical
attacks.
In doing so, we also combine the respective assumptions and requirements needed
to mitigate the two respective (non-hybrid) adversary types. In particular, the combined
solution requires each device to be equipped with a ROM for preserving the integrity of
the code used for both attestation and absence detection, a simple MPU that preserves
the secrecy of the private protocol data including secret keys, and a reliable clock syn-
chronized with the clock of V. In the following we describe the combined protocol in
details. The protocol involves no public key operations and is based solely on symmetric
cryptography. We assume that every device Di shares a symmetric key kij with every
neighboring device Dj. Di also shares a key ki with the verifier V.
Collective Attestation. Figure 5.4 shows the details of the combined protocol denoted
by attest. Every device (e.g., D1 in the figure) periodically, i.e., every thb interval, gen-
erates a heartbeat hb1 = {p, t1, id1}, where p1 is a monotonic counter identifying the
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current heartbeat interval, t1 is a timestamp indicating the time of generation of hb1,
and id1 is the ID of D1 that uniquely identifies it. For every neighbor Dj, the heartbeat
is authenticated with a MAC µ1j based on the key k1j shared with Dj and then sent
to that neighbor. Upon receiving an authenticated heartbeat from D1, Dj verifies its au-
thenticity and freshness by (1) verifying the MAC µ1j and (2) ensuring that the heartbeat
corresponds to the correct heartbeat interval pj and was received within the tolerance
interval, i.e., accept = true.
If the verification of the heartbeat was successful, Dj notes the presence of D1 for the
current heartbeat interval indicated by pj (present[1] = 1). Dj then creates a new MAC
over the heartbeat of D1 and sends it along with hb1 to all its neighbors. Finally, upon
the expiry of a timeout (t = 2 · δt + ttr), every device Dj reviews its list present[] of
present devices. If the list indicates that at least one device was not present during the
current heartbeat interval, Dj notes this absence by setting the bit OK to 0.
When the network N is attended, V executes a collective attestation and collection
protocol with N. V chooses an arbitrary initiator device D1 and sends it an attestation
request Ch1 = {t, N,µ1} containing a fresh timestamp t, a fresh random nonce N, and a
MAC µ1 over t and N based on the symmetric key k1 shared with D1. Upon receiving
the request Ch1, D1 verifies the MAC µ1 and creates, for every neighbor Dj, a new
challenge Chj = {t, N,µ1j} that is authenticated with a MAC µ1j based on the key k1j
shared with Dj. D1 then sends Chj to Dj. The neighbors repeat this process securely
propagating the request to every device in N. This procedure forms a spanning tree
rooted at D1.
Next, starting at leaf nodes, every device Dk authenticates the bit OK, which indicates
whether any of the devices in N was absent for at least one heartbeat interval, along
with the received nonce N based on the key kk shared with V, thus generating respk.
Moreover, Dk generates an attestation response attestk based on collective attestation
described in Chapter 4. Dk then sends its response including respk and attestk to its
parent node in the spanning tree. Parents accumulate responses received from child
nodes by XORing every resp with their own and aggregating every attest according to
the description of the collective attestation solution. Consequently, the results propagate
the spanning in reverse en route to V, which receives and aggregated response resp1
formed of XORed MACs and a collective attestation report attest1. In order to verify
the response, V re-generates and XORs all the MACs. It then compares the outcome to
the received resp1. If the two match, V concludes that none of the devices in N was
physically attacked. V can then verify the collective attestation response and determine
the number (see Section 4.1) or IDs (see Section 4.2) of devices whose software has been
compromised.
In order to allow devices to attest each other and enable software update, every device
in N is initialized with a software configuration certificate. A software configuration
certificate indicates the software configuration of a device and is signed based on V’s
public key. When a device first joins the network, it broadcasts this certificate to all its
neighboring devices. Every neighbor then verifies the certificate and stores the software
configuration for future attestation. On the other hand, avoiding double counting of
devices may require a session identifier to be sent along with the attestation request.
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Figure 5.5: Implementation based on SMART [52]
This identifier should also be included in all attestation responses. For the ease of clarity,
these details were omitted from the protocol description. However, they can be found in
Chapter 4.
Discussion. Even though the protocol described above might look secure against a hy-
brid adversary, it is in fact not. The reason for this is that the reliable clock assumption
is not enough to mitigate An,n−1.
Assume that A physically attacked the hardware of a device Di during the heartbeat
interval p. Therefore, A will have access to all secret keys of Di. If A is capable of
compromising the software of all devices in N, it can roll back their clocks in order to
expand the tolerance interval during which a heartbeat is accepted. As a consequence,
A can then generate Di’s missing heartbeat, which will be accepted by all compromised
devices, since it appears to be received in the correct time. Numerous attacks can be
executed on that protocol, common to all of them is that A can tamper with the clock of
devices through remote software attacks.
As a consequence, mitigating a hybrid adversary requires that every device in N is
equipped with a Reliable Read-Only Clock (RROC) as described in Section 5.1.1. We
claim that RROC is both necessary and sufficient in the presence of such a strong ad-
versary. Note that, by RROC we do not mean a secure clock that is physically protected
or tamper evident. We simply require a clock that is not modifiable by software means.
Such a requirement can be realized through the cmmercially available Real-Time Clocks
(RTC) [4].
5.1.3 Implementation
We now present our implementation of the combined solution presented in Section 5.1.2.3
on top of two lightweight security architectures for low-end embedded systems: SMART [52]
and TrustLite [84] (see Chapter 3). As already discussed, these two architecture we chose
provide strong security guarantees for remote attestation based on minimal features in
hardware, i.e., a small amount of Read-Only Memory (ROM) and a simple Memory
Protection Unit (MPU).
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Implementation on SMART. Our implementation on SMART [52] requires the same
modifications to SMART’s architecture presented in Section 4.1.3, i.e., the MPU is ex-
tended to control access to a small amount of rewritable memory. We require secure
rewritable memory to store private data of both collective attestation, e.g., session iden-
tifiers, and absence detection, e.g., list of present devices. For this implementation we
stored in ROM of each device Di the program code, i.e., the code responsible for the
execution of attest and beat, and ID idi of Di. Consequently, the integrity of the pro-
gram code and the ID is ensured by the emutability of ROM. Moreover, we store the
keys Ki = {kij, · · · , kik}, ki shared with neighboring devices and with the verifier V in
the rewritable memory of every device Di since this list could be updated during the
lifetime of Di. Our implementation on SMART is shown in Figure 5.5 where we denote
rewritable memory by RAM. We configured SMART’s MPU to ensures that private data
is only accessible to unmodified code in ROM that needs to access this data. For exam-
ple, rule #1 ensures that only attest and beat have read access to the keys Ki, ki, and
rules #2 and #3 ensure that beat has read and write access to its private data, one of
which, i.e., OK is read accessible to attest.
Implementation on TrustLite. This solution was also implemented as trustlets on the
TrustLite security architecture [84] (see Chapter 3). More precisely, we implemented each
of the protocols attest and beat as a single independent trustlet on device Di. Our imple-
mentation is shown in Figure 4.5. In TrustLite, the integrity of each of these protocols is
ensured via the secure boot component SecureBoot on Di. Moreover, similar to SMART,
the MPU of TrustLite ensures that secret data of Di is only accessible to the appropriate
trustlets. For example, rule #1 ensures that only SecureBoot has exclusive read access to
the memory storing the program code attest and beat. rule #2 ensures that only attest
and beat have read access to the keys in Ki, rules #3 and #5 ensure that beat has read
and write access to its private data, one of which, i.e., OK is read accessible to attest, and
rules #4 ensures that attest also has read access to the key ki shared with V.
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5.1.4 Performance Evaluation
We assess performance of our solution in terms of computational, communication, mem-
ory, and energy costs. Further, we present simulation results for networks of up to
100, 000 devices. The performance evaluation we present in this section is based on our
implementation described in Section 4.1.3. It assumes that the topology of the network
is static during the execution of the protocols.
Computation Cost. Cryptographic operations, such as generation of a MAC or a digital
signature constitute the major part of the computation cost. Let gi denote the number
of neighbors of every device Di, and hi 6 gi − 1 be the upper bound on the number
of children of Di in the spanning tree. In the instantiation based on digital signatures,
each device Di creates one digital signature and verifies n while executing beat. During
collect, Di creates one signature and verifies hi− 1. Further, in the instantiation based on
MACs, Di creates n MACs and verifies n while executing beat. During attest, Di creates
gi + 1 MACs and verifies hi + 1.
Communication Cost. We used HMAC based on SHA-1 as our MAC implementation,
and ECDSA as our digital signature scheme, i.e., `mac = 160 and `sign = 320. We further
used a 64 bit timestamp and chose `N = 160 and `p = 64. As a consequence, nonces,
and MACs, are 20 Bytes each. The variables t, p and id are 8 Bytes each. And, digital
signatures are 40 Bytes each. In the instantiation based on digital signatures, each device
Di has a communication overhead, which is upper bounded by receiving 72gi Bytes and
sending 72gi Bytes in beat, and receiving 68gi + (40+ 72n · #hb · x)hi Bytes and sending
108+ 72n · #hb · x Bytes in collect. #hb represents the number of heartbeat intervals within
the inter-attestation gap tatt, and 0 < x 6 n denotes the number of logs in the response
which depends on Di position in the spanning tree. Further, in the instantiation based
on MACs, Di has a communication overhead, which is upper bounded by receiving
44n Bytes and sending (24+ 20gi)n Bytes in beat, and receiving 48gi + 20hi Bytes and
sending 28+ 20gi Bytes in attest.
Memory Cost. In the instantiation based on digital signatures, each device Di in N
should store: (1) an authentication key pair (ski, pki) and the corresponding identity
certificate cert(pki); (2) the public key pkV of the verifier V; and (3) and the log LOGi
of all heartbeats collected within tatt. The memory cost of this instantiation is around
100 + 72n · #hb Bytes. Further, in the instantiation based on MACs, Di should store:
(1) keys kij, · · · , kik, ki shared with neighboring devices and with V; (2) a bit string
present[] indicating which devices where present during the current heartbeat interval;
(3) a monotonic counter p that identifies the current heartbeat interval; (4) a flag accept
that determines whether we are with the tolerance interval; and (5) a flag OK indicating
whether at least one device was absent for at least one heartbeat interval. The memory
cost of this instantiation is around 226+ 160g+ n bits.
Energy Cost. We estimated the energy consumption of the solution presented in Sec-
tion 5.1.2.3 based on the energy costs of communication and cryptographic operations
reported for two sensor nodes: MICAz and TelosB [47], which belong to the same class
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(a) Instantiation based on signatures (b) Instantiation based on MACs
Figure 5.7: Energy consumption per device
of low-end embedded systems that are targeted by our solution.1 For our estimations
we chose the number of heartbeat intervals within tatt to be 20, i.e., #hb = 20. Energy con-
sumption estimations are presented in Figure 5.7. In the instantiation based on digital
signatures, the energy consumption on each device Di is quadratic in the size of the net-
work. On the other hand, in the instantiation based on MACs, Di’s energy consumption
is linear in the network size. This reduction is mainly due to the reduced communi-
cation overhead in addition to the use of computationally inexpensive MACs. Finally,
Figure 5.7b shows, for the instantiation based on MACs, that the energy consumption
increases with the number of neighbors per device. This increase is mainly due to the
verification and re-generation of MACs on a hop-by-hop manner.
Simulation Results. We utilized the OMNeT++ [104] network simulator to assess the
performance of our solution for large networks of embedded devices. Our protocols
were implemented on the application layer, where we emulated cryptographic operation
with delays corresponding to real measurments of their execution time on TrustLite [84].
For our simulations, the average communication rate between devices was set to 20 Kbps,
which corresponds to the minimum bandwidth for ZigBee [135] – a common protocol for
IoT devices. We considered three popular topologies: a star topology, a chain topology,
and tree topologies with number of child nodes varying from 2 to 12. We also simulated
various network sizes, which varied from 10 to 100, 000. We simulated the two instanti-
ation described in Section 5.1.2.1 and 5.1.2.3 which are based on digital signatures and
MACs respectively. Figure 5.8, and 5.9 show the results of our simulations.
For both instantiations and all the aforementioned topologies the runtime of beat in-
creases linearly with the size of the network (Figure 5.8). The instantiation based on
MACs performs significantly better than that based on digital signatures. This is partic-
ularly true for chain topology. Recall that, the communication overhead of beat increases
linearly with the size of the network. However, the increase in computational overhead
is logarithmic for tree topologies and linear for chain and star topologies. Consequently,
the performance gain from using MACs in tree topologies is significantly less than chain
topology. The figure shows that the overall runtime of beat in a network of 1000 devices
1 SMART and TrustLite are only available as FPGA implementations, which tend to consume more energy
than manufactured chips.
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(a) Instantiation based on signatures (b) Instantiation based on MACs
Figure 5.8: protocol beat
(a) Instantiation based on signatures (b) Instantiation based on MACs
Figure 5.9: protocol collect/ attest
is less than 13 s. This runtime is significantly less than the anticipated time tphy required
by A to physically attack the hardware of a device.
The runtime of collect is quadratic in the size of the network for the instantiation based
on digital signature, and the runtime of attest is logarithmic in tree toplogies and linear
in star and chain toplogies for the instantiation based on MACs. This is mainly caused by
the quadratic communication overhead in the signature-based instantiation. Recall that,
in the instantiation based on signatures, devices are expected to send their very large
logs to V, while in the instantiation based on MACs, devices only send one constant
size response containing XORed MACs. Therefore, the very large difference in runtimes
is mainly due to communication overhead. In the instantiation based on MACs, the
runtime of attest converges to the computational overhead on involved devices, which
is logarithmic in tree topologies and linear in star and chain topologies.
A quick comparison between the three topologies shows that the worst topology for
collect is chain topology, where responses are always communicated through all n de-
vices. On the other hand, protocols dominated by communication overhead (e.g., instan-
tiation of collect based on signatures) perform best in star topology, while those domi-
nated by computational overhead (e.g., instantiation of attest based on MACs) perform
worst in such topology.
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5.1.5 Security Analysis
The goal of our solution is to enable the verifier V to check both software and hardware
integrity of all devices in a network N, i.e., V should return b = 1, i.e., accept the attesta-
tion / presence report, if the adversary did not compromise the software or physically
attack the hardware of any device Di in N. This security goal can be formalized as a
security experiment ExpA, where the adversary A can interact with every device in N as
well as V. Recall that, A has full control over the communication channel between every
two devices in N, and between N and V, i.e., it can eavesdrop on, modify, drop, and
inject arbitrary messages to any Di ∈ N and V. A remotely compromises the software
of one device Ds and/or exploits physical proximity to physically attack the hardware
of one device Dh. At the end of the experiment, V outputs the result b of the protocol
indicating whether it has accepted the report or not, following a polynomial number (in
`N, `q, and `mac) of steps performed by A. The output of V represents the result of this
security experiment, i.e., ExpA = b. In the following we provide the definition of secure
collective attestation under the pre-described hybrid adversary model An,n−1:
Definition 5.1 (Secure collective attestation under hybrid adversary). Let f be a polynomial
function in `N, `q, and `mac. We consider a collective attestation scheme to be secure under hybrid
adversary if the probability Pr
[
b = 1|ExpA(1
`) = b
]
is negligible in ` = f(`N, `q, `mac).
Theorem 5.1 (Security of our attestation solution). The solution presented in this section
is a secure collective attestation scheme (Definition 5.1) if the underlying MAC scheme is selec-
tive forgery resistant and the attestation protocol is secure under software attacks according to
Definition 4.1.
Proof sketch of Theorem 7.1. As a response to a request Ch1 = {t, N,µ1} containing a times-
tamp t, a nonce N, and a MAC µ1 over t and N based on the symmetric key k1 shared
between V and D1, the verifier receives from D1 a message {resp1,attest1}. The verifier
accepts and returns b = 1 only if attest1 is a valid collective attestation report of N indi-
cating that all devices inN are not software compromised, and resp1 = xorn1mac(ki; 1‖N).
Consider the two cases where A (1) only compromises the software one or more devices
(including Ds) without physically attacking the hardware of any device, or (2) physi-
cally attacks the hardware of up to n− 1 devices (including Dh). It is easy to see that all
possible attacks by An,n−1 are covered by one of these cases.
We first consider the case where A compromises only the software of devices in N.
According to Definition 4.1, if none of the devices is physically attacked then the proba-
bility that the attestation response indicating that all devices in N are benign when the
software of at least one device Ds is compromised is negligible in `N, `q, `mac.
We now consider the case where A also physically attacks the hardware of devices
in N. Recall that the adversary is capable of physically attacking the hardware of all
but one device. Lets assume that Di is the device that has not been physically attacked.
According to beat, a heartbeat of a device Dj is accepted by Di if it indicates by pi the
current heartbeat interval, and if it was received within the tolerance interval ttol. We
now calculate the lower and upper bound on the time when a received heartbeat would
be accepted by Di. Assume timerhb on Di expires for the current heartbeat interval at
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t1, i.e., Di generates and broadcasts its heartbeat hbi at t1. Di also accepts all valid
heartbeat for the current interval that are received within the tolerance interval ttol =
ttr + δt, i.e., before t1+ ttr + δt. On the other hand, since all benign devices only generate
heartbeats upon the expiry of timerhb, correct heartbeats for current heartbeat interval
are not generated earlier than t1− δt. Therefore, the lower bound on the time a received
heartbeat for the current interval is accepted is t1− δt, and the upper bound is t1+ ttr +
δt. Similarly, the lower bound on the time a received heartbeat for the next heartbeat
interval indicated by pi + 1 is accepted is t2 − δt, and the upper bound is t2 + ttr + δt,
where t2 = t1 + thb is when timerhb of the next heartbeat interval expires. Consequently,
in order not to be detected as absent by Di, a device Dj can be absent for a period of
time which is no longer than:
t2 + ttr + δt − (t1 − δt) = t1 + thb + ttr + δt − t1 + δt = thb + 2 · δt + ttr
Since tphy > thb + 2 · δt + ttr, every device Dh whose hardware is physically attacked
by A will be detected as absent by Di.
Indeed after physically attacking Dh, A will have access to all its secret keys. A may
then try to make up for the absence of Dh by generating the missing heartbeat and
broadcasting it to all device in N including Di. However, it would be too late by then,
as the bit OK is already set to 0 indicating the absence of at least one device (OK =
OK ∧ (∧sipresent[i])). Therefore, A may try to evade detection of the physical attack
on Di by one of the following ways, i.e., A may try to: (1) modify the code for beat or
collect, (2) extract the key ki of a device that it has not physically attacked, (3) modify
the private data, e.g., OK or present[] on Di, (4) tamper with the clock of Di to extend
the time a received heartbeat is accepted. However, A is not capable of executing (1)
since the integrity of the code for beat and collect is protected by ROM and secure boot
on SMART and TrustLite respectively. Moreover, since the private data of the protocol
are only accessible to the protocol code, A cannot execute (2) or (3). Finally, Reliable
Read-Only Clock (RROC) of Di rules out (4).
Therefore, the probability of A convincing V to return b = 1 after compromising the
software of at least one device in N and/or physically attacking the hardware of another
is negligible in `N, `q, `mac.
5.1.6 Conclusion
In this section we introduced a strong adversary model for collective attestation that
is capable of physically attacking the hardware of a large number of devices. We then
devised the first collective attestation solution that allows efficient and scalable detec-
tion of both software and physical attacks on very large networks of embedded devices.
The solution we presented in this section is most suitable for centralized network. It
uses absence detection for identifying devices whose hardware has been physically at-
tacked. And, regardless of its considerable runtime overhead, it provides the grounds
for developing collective attestation solutions that are secure in the presence of a pow-
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erful adversary. In Section 5.2 we present another solution for detecting software and
physical attacks, that is based on the results of this section. The solution presented in Sec-
tion 5.2 is extremely efficient. It is geared towards autonomous decentralized networks.
However, it can be extended to allow reporting to a central verifier.
5.2 unattended scalable attestation of embedded devices
The solution we presented in Section 5.1 provided the ground for designing collective
attestation that is capable of detecting both software and physical attacks. In particular,
Section 5.1 defines the different adversary models with their varying capabilities and
identifies the requirements for mitigating the most powerful adversary. It then devises
a secure collective attestation solution that is capable of mitigating this powerful ad-
versary based on absence detection. Further, in Section 5.1 we analyzed the security of
the proposed solution and derived tight bounds on the time required by an adversary
to physically attack the hardware of a device in order to evade detection. In order to
guarantee security and provide applicability to networks where all but one device can
be physically attacked, this solution required all devices to send global heartbeats to
all other devices in the network. This lead to a runtime overhead that is quadratic in
the size of the network, which hindered scalability to very large networks. Moreover,
this solution is geared towards centralized networks that have restricted mobility, i.e., it
assumes that the topology is static during the execution of the solution.
In this section, we present a second collective attestation solution for detecting soft-
ware and physical attacks on large networks. While this solution imposes more assump-
tions regarding the capabilities of the adversary, it provides a significant performance
gain, and is applicable to both autonomous and centralized networks with dynamic
topology. The solution combines local absence detection and attestation of neighbors
with key management in order to efficiently detect software and physical attacks while
allowing device mobility. Dynamicity also requires that the outcome of protocol exe-
cution can securely flow across the network, to enable verifying the trustworthiness of
mobile devices while roaming throughout the network. This is achieved through a ded-
icated roaming protocol. As mentioned earlier, the solution presented in this section is
based on the results from Section 5.1, which defined the adversary model and identified
the requirements for secure collective attestation under physical attacks.
Contribution. We investigate the security of large autonomous dynamic networks of
heterogeneous embedded devices under physical attacks. We identify a realistic threat
model for these networks that allows devising an efficient collective attestation solution
that is capable of detecting and isolating both software and physical attacks in constant
time. The solution is based on the assumptions, requirements, and time bounds estab-
lished in Section 5.1. It exploits neighbors attestation, local heartbeats, key management,
and a roaming protocol in order to mitigate a powerful adversary in autonomous dy-
namic networks. In order to demonstrate feasibility, we show how to instantiate our
solution on recent security architecture for low-end embedded devices with different
security features and functional capabilities: SMART [52] and TrustLite [84]. Further,
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we show practicality of our solution through implementation and testing on a network
testbed that constitutes six interconnected drones forming an ad hoc network. Finally,
we present extensive performance evaluation based on the two instantiations, in addi-
tion to simulations of the solution in networks of up to 1, 000, 000 devices demonstrating
scalability. The solution allows the detection of software and physical attacks in a net-
work formed of million devices in less than one second. This is achieved by relaying on
peer attestation and presence detection, while exploiting key management and secure
roaming to allow mobility.
Outline. After providing a brief overview of our solution in Section 5.2.1, we present it
details in Section 5.2.2, and describe our implementation in Section 5.2.3. Performance
evaluation is then presented on Section 5.2.4. Security of the solution is examined in Sec-
tion 5.2.5, possible extensions are described in Section 5.2.6, and this section concludes
in Section 5.2.7.
5.2.1 Collective Attestation
5.2.1.1 Problem Description and System Model
We consider a dynamic decentralized network N that is formed a very large number
n of embedded devices. Devices are heterogeneous in term of software and hardware.
Therefore, they may belong to different classes of software C1, . . . ,Cz. The network op-
erator is denoted by O. It is responsible for initializing every device Di in N in a secure
environment. The devices in N are spread over a large area both inside and outside
the physical security perimeter of the network operator. Therefore, some devices can be
within the adversary’s grasp and are subject to physical attacks. We do not assume the
existence of a central entity responsible for assessing the trustworthiness of N. However,
if such an entity exists we denote it by the verifier V. N may not have a routing protocol
in place. However, devices in N should be able to communicate to their direct neighbors.
Device mobility is contiguous, i.e., devices move from one neighborhood to another
gradually changing their sets of neighbors, however, a device may not disappear from a
neighborhood to instantaneously reappear in another. Finally, devices are assumed to be
always reachable. A device may not be switched off for a long period of time. The goal
of a collective attestation solution is to enable the detection and isolation of all devices
whose software has been compromised or hardware has been physically attacked.
5.2.1.2 Requirements Analysis
Objectives. In the system model presented above there exists no central entity that
attests the network and verifies the attestation results. Consequently, a collective attesta-
tion solution should provide the following properties:
• Property #1: Allow collective verification of the network’s integrity.
• Property #2: Detect devices whose software has been compromised and/or hard-
ware has been physically attacked.
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• Property #3: Assure isolation of devices that were detected to be attacked.
• Property #4: Be efficient, ideally provide an overhead which is constant in the size
of the network.
• Property #5: Allow device mobility by capturing the dynamic behavior of N.
The satisfaction of property #1 and property #2 are the main security objective of col-
lective attestation under physical attacks. The solution proposed in Section 5.1 aims at
satisfying these properties in centralized networks with restricted mobility. Property #3
is crucial in autonomous networks where a centralized verifier is not assumed. It is
achieved by combining detection of attacks with key exchange. Property #4 enables scal-
ability to very large networks. It is achieved through peer attestation and absence detec-
tion. And, property #5 allows applicability to dynamic networks. It is enabled through
a secure roaming protocol.
Adversary Model. Similar to Section 5.1, we assume that the operator O is trusted, and
the verifier V, if exists, is also trusted. We assume that the adversary A has complete
control over all communication channels, i.e., it can eavesdrop on, modify, drop, or re-
play any message exchanged between all devices in N and between any device Di and
V. Moreover, we assume that A is capable of executing two types of attacks: remote soft-
ware attacks, whereby A maliciously modifies the unprotected software on any device
Di. We assume that A can compromise the software of all n devices in N; and, physical
attacks, whereby A exploits physical proximity to Di to tamper with its hardware, mod-
ify its software and extract its secrets that are protected by hardware. We assume that A
can physically attack the hardware of up m < n2 − 1 devices. Furthermore, we assume
that A requires a non-negligible amount of time to physically attack the hardware of
one device. We consider physical attacks that do not require turning off the device for a
non-negligible amount of time, e.g., side channel attacks, to be out of scope.
Device Requirements. The design of our solution aims as satisfying all properties #1
to #5. However, in order to satisfy property #1 and property #2 every device Di should
satisfy the requirements for secure collective attestation under hybrid adversary as
discussed in Section 5.1.1. In particular, every device Di in N should be equipped
with a Reliable Read-Only Clocks (RROC) that is not modifiable by software, and a
lightweight security architecture that enables secure remote attestation, e.g., SMART [52]
and TrustLite [84] (see Chapter 3). If the first requirement is not achieved, devices whose
hardware is physically attacked would be able to evade detection. If the second require-
ment is not achieved, devices whose software is compromised and/or hardware is phys-
ically attacked would be able to evade detection.
Assumptions. Devices can have different hardware and/or software. However, all de-
vices should satisfy the requirements for secure collective attestation under hybrid ad-
versary specified in Section 5.1.1, i.e., devices should have synchronized RROC and a
lightweight security architecture that allows secure remote attestation. We denote the
maximum clock skew between any two devices by δt. We assume that all devices can
communicate, i.e., a device can at least communicate to its neighbors. The time required
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to transmit a message between two neighboring devices is upper bounded by ttr. Further,
we assume that all cryptographic primitives and their implementations are secure.
Observations. Let Nhbr(ta,X,Y) denote “devices X and Y are neighbors at time ta”,
Met(ta,X,Y) denote “devices X and Y became neighbors at time ta”, Present(ta,X,Y)
denote “device X believes that device Y is present in the network since deployment
and until time ta (i.e., not absent for longer than tphy), Benign(ta,X,Y) denote “device X
believes that device Y is not software compromised at ta, Secure(ta,X,Y) denote “device
X believes that device Y was not physically attacked since deployment and until time ta,
Equal(ta,X,Y) denote “device X and device Y have the same software state at time ta,
and Short(ta,tb) denote “The difference between ta and tb is less than tphy. We make
the following observation:
• Non-negligible tampering time: Our core assumption is that an adversary re-
quires a non-negligible amount of time to physically attack the hardware of a
device, e.g., to dissemble it components and recover its cryptographic secrets. Con-
sequently, the presence of a device Di in the network implies its physical security.
∀X ∀Y ∀ta Present(ta,X,Y)→ Secure(ta,X,Y)
• Transitivity: Knowledge of presence, software, and physical trustworthiness is
transitive, i.e., if Di believes that Dj has always been present in the network N
until time ta, and Dj believes that Dk is present in N until ta. Then, Di believes
that Dk is present in the N until ta and is consequently not physically attacked.
∀X ∀Y ∀Z ∀ta Present(ta,X,Y)∧ Present(ta,Y,Z)→ Secure(ta,X,Z)
Similarly, if Di believes that Dj has always been present in the network N until
time ta, and Dj believes that the software of Dk is not compromised. Then, Di
believes that the software of Dk is not compromised.
∀X ∀Y ∀Z ∀ta Present(ta,X,Y)∧ Benign(ta,Y,Z)→ Benign(ta,X,Z)
• Contiguous mobility: Devices approach each other gradually i.e., when Di moves
toward Dj it establishes neighborhood with all devices on its path to Dj. Conse-
quently, before Di and Dj come within each others range, they have at least one
common neighbor.
∀X ∀Y ∀ta Met(ta,X,Y)→ ∃Z ∃tb ∃tc Nhbr(tb,X,Z)
∧ Nhbr(tc,Z,Y)∧ Short(ta,tb) ∧ Short(ta,tc)
• Healing: Two similar devices Di and Dj that have the same software configuration
can be either both benign or both compromised.
∀X ∀Y ∀Z ∀ta Equal(ta,Y,Z)∧ Benign(ta,X,Y)→ Benign(ta,X,Z)
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Figure 5.10: Example 8-device network: D1, . . . , D8
Consequently, in dynamic autonomous networks, where devices only interact with their
direct neighbors, securing the network against both software and physical attacks re-
quires only local attestation/heartbeats. However, the protocols’ results must be incor-
porated within the network’s functionality. Note that, a roaming protocol would enable
movement of mobile devices. Moreover, healing of device’s software can be enabled by
letting devices, that belong to the same software class, recover each other.
Protocol Overview. The basic idea of our solution is that devices in N periodically moni-
tor the presence and the software configuration of their neighbors. If a device is detected
by neighbors to be software compromised or physically attacked, this device is discon-
nected and isolated from the network N. The solution also allows new devices to join,
and mobile devices to move throughout N. Finally, the compromised software of a de-
vice can be restored by a similar device using a dedicated protocol. Figure 5.10 shows
an overview of our solution in a network formed of eight devices D1 through D8. The
proposed solution consists of five protocols: initialization init, roaming join, attestation
attest, heartbeat beat, and healing heal.
• init: Before deployment, each device (D8 in Figure 5.10) is initialized by O with the
cryptographic secrets necessary to execute the other protocols (e.g., a signing key
pair).
• join: When a new device (D8 in the figure) joins N, or a mobile device changes
its positions (D6), the device executes join with all its newly established neighbors.
join allows the device to (1) prove its trustworthiness to the new neighbors (e.g.,
through a Proof-of-non-Absence – PonA), and to share symmetric keys that allow
the authentication of messages for other protocols.
• attest: At random times, each device (D1) attests all its neighbors (e.g., D2) through
attest. Devices maintain a list of neighbors that were successfully attested. Further,
each device drops the secure communication to all neighbors that failed attestation
by deleting all keys shared with these neighbors.
• beat: The goal of beat is to allow devices to keep track of neighbors’ presence in
N. Periodically, each device (D5) sends a heartbeat to all its neighbors (e.g., D4)
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demonstrating its presence in N for the specific period of time. Devices maintain
a list of neighbors that were present at the current time period. Further, each de-
vice drops the secure communication to all the neighbors that where not present,
i.e., neighbors from which it did not receive a heartbeat. In response to heartbeats,
devices send their neighbors Proof-of-non-Absence (PonA) tokens, which are later
used by mobile devices to prove their trustworthiness to newly established neigh-
bors.
• heal: When the software of a device (D2) is detected to be compromised, a similar
device (D4), disinfects it through heal and restores its software to its original state.
Through attestation and absence detection, every device is capable of recording the soft-
ware and hardware state of every neighboring device. Consequently, by dropping secure
communication with neighbors that failed to prove their trustworthiness, our solution
facilitates the formation of a securely connected sub-network of benign devices: {D1, D3,
D4, D5, and D7}, i.e., enabling isolation of malicious devices (D2). Note that, autonomous
networks might be occasionally (or periodically) visited by a trusted third party (e.g., the
verifier V) in order to verify overall network trustworthiness. In Section 5.2.6 we describe
an extension to our solution that allows such verification.
5.2.2 Protocol Description
5.2.2.1 Notation
Before describing the details of our solution, we introduce the used notation:
Heartbeat Interval. Time is split into intervals of uniform length denoted by heartbeat
intervals. The length thb of each interval is upper bounded by the minimum time tphy
required by A to physically attack a device. Every heartbeat interval has a unique strictly
increasing ID pi, and its starting time is denoted by Thb.
Device Lists. Every device Di has two lists (1) a benign device list Bi where it stores
the IDs of neighbors that are not software compromised, and (2) a secure device list Si
which stores the IDs of neighbors that are not physically attacked. Recall that Bi and
Si are maintained through continuous attestation and absence detection respectively.
Additionally, Di maintain for the current heartbeat interval pi a present list Pi which
stores the IDs of neighbors that are present during this interval.
Heartbeat. A heartbeat HBij = {{pi, idi},µij} is a periodical authenticated timestamp. It
is generated by every Di with ID idi, at Thb of every heartbeat interval pi, and sent to
each neighboring Dj. HBij is authenticated using a MAC µij based on a heartbeat key
kbeatij shared between Di and Dj. HBij proves to Dj the presence of Di during the current
heartbeat interval pi.
Proof-of-Secure-Enrollment (PoSE). A PoSE pii is an authenticated token obtained by
every device Di at initialization time. pii includes idi, and time Tinit when Di was initial-
ized by O. It is authenticated using a digital signature σi based on O’s private key skO
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(pii = {{idi, Tinit},σi}). pii is used by Di when first joining N to prove to its neighbors that
it was securely enrolled.
Proof-of-non-Absence (PonA). A PonA Πi is a set of authenticated tokens periodically
collected by every Di from all its neighbors after proving its presence to each neighbor.
Each individual token ψjk/i in Πi is authenticated by Dj, using a heartbeat key kbeatjk
shared with every neighbor Dk of Dj, and is valid for the heartbeat interval indicated by
pi. Further,ψjk/i indicates by T
Di
A , the time of the last attestation of Di by Dj (i.e.,ψjk/i =
{{idi, pi, T
Di
A },µjk/i, idk}). Πi is used by mobile device Di to prove its trustworthiness to
newly established neighbors. In particular, every ψjk/i in Πi provides a proof that Di
was successfully attested and continuously present in N.
5.2.2.2 Protocol Details
We now describe the details of the protocols involved in our solution:
Initialization. O initializes each device Di in N with the following:
• A Proof-of-Secure-Enrollment – PoSE pii = {{idi, Tinit},σi}, which allows Di to prove
that its software is not compromised and its hardware is not physically attacked
before deployment.
• A signing key pair (ski, pki) and its corresponding public key certificate cert(pki)
signed by O, in addition to the public key pkO of O.
• A reference software configuration ci, which determines the benign software con-
figuration of Di and a corresponding software configuration certificate cert(ci)
signed by O.
More formally, init is:
init(ci, 1`)→
(
pii, ski, pki, cert(pki), ci, cert(ci), pkO
)
.
Roaming. Figure 5.11 shows join protocol executed when a device Di establishes a new
neighbor Dk. The protocol is formed of four modules that are executed between the two
devices: (1) sharing symmetric keys, (2) verification of PonA or PoSE, (3) attestation, and
(4) derivation of keys for authentication and encryption.
In particular, when a new device Di joins, or a mobile device Di moves within N, Di
exploits a Key Exchange Protocol KEP based on signing key pairs (e.g., authenticated
Diffie-Hellman) to share two symmetric keys with each neighboring device Dk. Namely,
the two devices share (1) an attestation key kattestik that is used by Di to attest Dk and
vice versa, and (2) a heartbeat key kbeatik that is required for authenticating heartbeats and
PonA-s sent between the two devices.
Di and Dk then:
• Exchange reference software configurations ci and ck and software configuration
certificates: cert(ci) and cert(ck). This exchange allows the two devices to later
attest each other when required.
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Πi|pii, idi / Πk|pik, idk
kmasterik ← KEP(sk i, skk, cert(pk i), cert(pkk))
ATTESTATION
Πi|pii = {{idi,Tinit}, σi}, IDi,Bi,Si, ci, sk i, pkO , cert(pk i)
Device Di
append(idk, IDi)
kbeatik ← hash("beat:"‖kmasterik )
kattestik ← hash("attest:"‖kmasterik )
idj ← findNeighbor(Πk)
if vermac(kbeatij ; idk‖qk‖TA, µij/k) then
if qk = qi then
append(idk,Si)
append(idk,Pi)
endif
endif
if versig(pkO ; idk‖Tinit, σk) then
if Thb + δt + ttr − Tinit < thb then
endif
endif
append(idk,Si)
if TA < tmaxA then
append(idk,Bi)
endif
else if attest(Dk)then
append(idk,Bi)
if idk ∈ Si and idk ∈ Bi then
k encryptik ← hash("encrypt:"‖kmasterik )
kauthik ← hash("authenticate:"‖kmasterik )
endif
(1) Share protocol keys
(2a) Find and verify a token in PonA
(2b) Or verify PoSE
(3) Attest new neighbor (if needed)
(4) Create authentication and encryption keys
Device Dk
Πk|pik = {{idk,Tinit}, σk}, IDk,Bk,Sk, ck, skk, pkO , cert(pkk)
append(idi, IDk)
kbeatik ← hash("beat:"‖kmasterik )
kattestik ← hash("attest:"‖kmasterik )
idj ← findNeighbor(Πi)
if vermac(kbeatjk ; idi‖qi‖TA, µjk/i) then
if qi = qk then
append(idi,Sk)
append(idi,Pk)
endif
endif
if versig(pkO ; idi‖Tinit, σi) then
if Thb + δt + ttr − Tinit < thb then
endif
endif
append(idi,Sk)
append(idi,Bk)
endif
append(idi,Bk)
else if attest(Di)then
if TA < tmaxA then
k encryptik ← hash("encrypt:"‖kmasterik )
kauthik ← hash("authenticate:"‖kmasterik )
if idi ∈ Sk and idi ∈ Bk then
endif
(1) Share protocol keys
(2a) Find and verify a token in PonA
(2b) Or verify PoSE
(3) Attest new neighbor (if needed)
(4) Create auth and enc keys
Figure 5.11: Protocol join
• Declare each other as neighbors by adding the ID of one another into their respec-
tive lists IDi and IDk of neighbors.
• Exchange PoSE in case of a new device, or PonA in case of a mobile devices. PoSE
and PonA enable each of the devices to prove its trustworthiness to the other
device.
Upon receiving a PoSE or a PonA token, each device Dk verifies this token by verifying
(1) its authenticity (MAC or digital signature) and (2) freshness (checking Tinit or pi).
Additionally, Dk uses Tinit or T
Di
A to decide whether to attest Di or not. If both token
verification and attestation were successful on both Di and Dk, the two devices then:
• Derive two new keys for authentication kauthik and encryption k
encrypt
ik of messages.
We denote by Ki the set of keys shared between Di and all its neighbors.
• Add the IDs of each other to their respective benign B and secure S lists
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IDi, Ki, cj
Device Di
for each Dj ∈ IDi
Nj ∈R {0, 1}`N
startTimer(timerA, tA)
tA ← random(tmaxA )
TA = time()
if vermac(kattestij ;Nj‖cj , µij) then
endif
T
Dj
A = TA
delete(idj ,Bi)
delete(kauthij , kij)
delete(k encryptij , kij)
else
endfor
endif
if timeOut(timerA) then
(1) Generate nonce for each neighbor
(3) Verify attestation report and store time
Device Dj
kattestij
µij ← mac(kattestij ;Nj‖c′j)
c′j ← getSoftConfig()
(2) Measure software stateNj
µij
Figure 5.12: Protocol attest
As a consequence, neighboring devices that are neither software compromised nor phys-
ically attacked share authentication and encryption keys with each other through join.
More formally, join is:
join
[
Di : pi, ski,pii/Πi, ci; Dk : pk, skk,pik/Πk, ck; ∗ : Thb, cert(pki), cert(pkk),
cert(ci), cert(ck), pkO
]→ [Di : kik, IDi, Si,Bi; Dk : kik, IDk, Sk,Bk; ∗ : ci, ck].
Due to contiguous mobility, join allows benign devices to connect to the network without
causing false positives.
Attestation. Figure 5.12 shows attest protocol executed between two neighboring de-
vices Di and Dj. The protocol is formed of four modules that are executed between the
two devices: (1) generation of a fresh nonce, (2) creation of software configuration, and
(3) verification of an attestation report.
At random attestation times upper bounded by tmaxA , every device Di attests all its
neighbors. Di sends each neighbor Dj a fresh random nonce Nj. Upon receiving Nj, Dj
measures its software state and creates a MAC µij over the generated software configu-
ration and the received nonce. The MAC µij is then sent to Di as the attestation report.
Using the reference software configuration cj and the attestation key kattestij obtained
through join, Di verifies the attestation report µij. If the verification was successful, Di
deduces that the software of Dj is benign. It then stores the attestation time to be in-
cluded in any future PonA it sends to Dj. Otherwise, Di deletes idj from its benign
list Bi of neighbors, and deletes the keys k
encrypt
ij and k
auth
ij from the set kij of all keys it
shares with Dj. As a consequence, devices can continuously check the integrity of their
neighbors’ software through attest and maintain the list B of benign neighbors.
As shown in Figure 5.13, a software configuration is created by Di as the root of
a Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) [99] having segments of the measured code as leaf nodes.
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Figure 5.13: Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) of software configurations
In particular, Di splits the measured software into w segments: s1, . . . , sw of equal
length. It then computes hashes: hi[x2 + 1], . . . , hi[x] for every segment. Next, A MHT is
constructed, having hi[x2 + 1], . . . , hi[x] as leaf nodes and c
′
i as the root, where x denotes
the number of nodes in the tree. As can be seen in the figure, a maliciously modified
software segment (e.g., sw−3), will lead to false hash values along the path to the root.
More formally, attest is:
attest
[
Di : IDi,Ki, cj; Dj : kattestij ; ∗ : −
]→ [Di : TDjA ,Bi; Dj : Nj].
Because of transitivity, attest ensures the software integrity of every device in the net-
work while only requiring each device to attest its direct neighbors.
Heartbeat. Figure 5.14 shows beat protocol executed between two neighboring devices
Di and Dj. The protocol is formed of four modules that are executed between the two
devices: (1) generation of a heartbeat, (2) verification of a heartbeat, (3) generation of
PonA tokens, and (4) verification of MACs on PonA tokens.
Periodically, i.e., at heartbeat time Thb, every device Di generates and sends a heart-
beat HBij = {{pi, idi},µij} to every neighbor Dj. HBij is authenticated using a MAC µij
based on the heartbeat key kbeatij shared with Dj (through join). Moreover, HBij is bound
to the ID idi of the device that generated it, and to the specific heartbeat interval pi,
during which it was generated. The goal of HBij is to prove to Dj the presence of Di
in N during the heartbeat interval pi. When Di receives HBij, it verifies (1) its authen-
ticity by verifying µij; and (2) its freshness according to checkTime algorithm shown in
Figure 5.15. checkTime allows verifying that HBij is generated for the current interval pi,
and is received in the correct time, i.e., within the tolerance interval ttol around Thb. The
goal of ttol is allow tolerating transmission delays and clock drifts between devices.
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HB ij
Ψj/i, µj/i
Device Dj
qj ,Sj , Kj ,TDiA
if vermac(kbeatij ; hbi, µij) then
append(idi,Pj)
if checkTime(qi, time(), qj) then
if idi ∈ Sj then
%i ← {idi, qi,TDiA }
for each kbeatjk ∈ Kj \ {kbeatij } do
µjk/i ← mac(kbeatjk ; %i)
ψjk/i ← {%i, µjk/i, idk}
append(ψjk/i,Ψj/i)
endfor
µj/i ← mac(kbeatij ; Ψj/i‖qi)
endif
endif
endif
(2) Verify heartbeat
(3) Generate tokens for PonA
kij , qi, IDi
Device Di
qi ← qi + 1
for each Dj ∈ IDi
hbi ← {qi, idi}
µij ← mac(kbeatij ; hbi)
HB ij ← {hbi, µij}
if vermac(kbeatij ; Ψj/i‖qi, µj/i) then
append(Ψj/i,Πi)
endif
(1) Generate a heartbeat
(4) Verify MAC on PonA tokens
endfor
Figure 5.14: Protocol beat
Figure 5.15 : checkTime on Dj
if pi = pj ∧ Thb < t < Thb + δt + ttr then
return true
else if pi = pj + 1∧ Thb − δt < t < Thb
then
return true
else
return false
end
If verification is successful, Dj adds the ID idi of Dj to its list Pj of present devices.
Dj then creates a tuple ρi = {idi, pi, T
Di
A }, authenticates it with MACs based on all the
symmetric keys kbeatjk it shares with every neighboring device Dk, i.e., generating the
tokens ψjk/i. Dj sends the set of tokens to Di, which bundles them with all other tokens
received from neighbors forming a PonA Πi.
When ttol ends, every device Dj compares the IDs in its list Sj of secure neighbors to
those in the list Pj of present neighbors. Dj deletes from Sj every ID idi that is not in Pj.
It also deletes the keys kencryptij and k
auth
ij from the set kij of all keys shared with Di.
As a consequence, devices can continuously check the integrity of their neighbors’
hardware through beat and maintain the list S of secure neighbors. Additionally, every
secure device Di acquires a PonA Πi which enables it to roam throughout the network
and establish new neighbors through join.
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begin
Nm, c′m
continue, 0
Hm
continue, i
. . .
Hm
end
L, µkm{Dj , . . . ,Dk}
L, µhj
khj , c
′
h, {hh[0], . . . , hh[x]}
Device Dh
if c′m 6= c′h then
for each hm[i] ∈ Hm do
if isLeaf(hm[i]) then
append(hm[i],Hh)
if hm[i] 6= hh[i] then
else
endif
endif
endfor
for each hh[i] ∈ Hh do
l = {a0 , a, s} ← getCode(hh[i])
append(l ,L)
µhj ← mac(kattesthj ;Nm‖L‖c′h)
endfor
(1) Request and check child nodes (recursively)
(3) Create and authenticate patch
Nm ∈R {0, 1}`N
Hm ← {hm[1], hm[2]}
Hm ← {hm[2 · i+ 1], hm[2 · i+ 2]}
if vermac(kattestkm ;Nm‖L‖cm, µkm) then
install(L)
endif
Device Dm
kkm, cm, c
′
m, {hm[0], . . . , hm[x]}
(2) Get child nodes
(4) Verify and install patch
Figure 5.16: Protocol heal
Let Kj denote the set of symmetric keys shared between Dj and all its neighboring
devices, and let Ψj/i denote the set of all individual tokes ψjk/i created by Dj using
every symmetric key kjk inKj. The protocol is formally:
beat
[
Di : IDi, pi, kij; Dj : pj, Sj,Kj, T
Di
A ; ∗ : Thb
]→ [Di : Ψj/i; Dj : Pj].
Because of transitivity and non-negligible tampering time, beat ensures the hardware
integrity of every device in the network while only requiring each device to monitor the
presence of its direct neighbors.
Healing. When a device Di detects through attest that the software of a neighbor Dm
is compromised, it starts searching for a healer device Dh which is similar to Dm, i.e.,
has the same software configuration. Di sends Dm’s reference software configuration cm
to all neighbors along with a fresh nonce N and a constant Time-to-Live (TTL). When
the tuple is received by a neighbor Dj, It verifies that (1) TTL is not equal to zero and
(2) received cm is not equal to its own reference software configuration cj. If the checks
are successful, Dj decrements TTL and forwards the tuple to its neighbors. As a conse-
quence, cm is flooded across the network until it is received by a healer device Dh or
TTL is exceeded.
On the other hand, when Dh receives a reference software configuration cm which
matches its own reference software configuration ch, it replies to the sending neighbor
Dv with its own ID idh, its software configuration c ′h, and a MAC over both and the
received nonce based on the attestation key shared with that Dv. Dh’s reply propagates
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in reverse path until it is received and verified by Di. Authenticity of the reply is based
on pairwise shared symmetric keys.
heal is then initiated by Dh through sending Dm a protocol message begin. This pro-
tocol is formed of four modules that are executed between Dh and Dm: (1) validation
MHT child nodes, (2) generation of child nodes, (3) creation of a patch, and (4) instal-
lation of the patch. The details of heal are shown in Figure 5.16. Note that, the protocol
messages exchanged between the two devices may be routed through Dv using the
new route established by broadcasting Dm’s configuration. These messages may also be
routed based on an existing routing protocol. Additionally, in order to mitigate Denial
of Service (DoS) attacks on heal, Dh and Dc may authenticate messages in a hop-by-hop
manner.
When Dm receives begin, it replies to Dh with its software configuration c ′m and a
fresh nonce Nm. Dh then checks if c ′c is equal to its own software configuration c ′h. If
the check fails, Dh replies with a protocol message continue requesting from Dm the
child nodes hc[0] and hc[1] of c ′c in the Merkle Hash Tree (MHT). Next, Dh recursively
requests the child nodes of every node that is not equal to its reference value in Dh’s tree.
When leaf nodes are reached, Dh bundles code segments corresponding to modified
nodes into a single patch L. The patch is then authenticated (based on hop-by-hop)
MACs, and sent back to Dm. Dm verifies L and installs it, i.e., replaces malicious code
segments indicated by L with the benign code from L. Formally:
heal
[
Dh : khj, c ′h, {hh[0], . . . ,hh[x]};
Dm : kkm, cm, c ′m, {hm[0], . . . ,hm[x]}; ∗ : −
]→ [Dh : Nm; Dm : L].
Healing allows devices to recover from software compromise by installing patches from
benign devices that have the same software configuration.
5.2.3 Implementation
We present two instantiations of this solution on top of SMART [52] and TrustLite [84]
security architectures (see Chapter 3). Recall that, the two architectures we chose provide
strong security guarantees for remote attestation based on minimal features in hardware,
i.e., a small amount of Read-Only Memory (ROM) and a simple Memory Protection Unit
(MPU).
Implementation on SMART. The instantiation of our solution on SMART [52] requires
the same modifications to SMART’s architecture presented in Section 5.2.3, i.e., extend-
ing MPU to control access to a small amount of rewritable memory. We require secure
rewritable memory to store private data of both attestation, e.g., attestation time, and ab-
sence detection, e.g., present list. For this instantiation we stored in ROM of each device
Di the program code, i.e., the code responsible for the execution of join, attest, beat, and
heal. We also store in ROM of each device Di the signing key ski. The integrity of the
code and the signing key is then ensured through the emutability of ROM. Moreover,
we store the short term STi and long term LTi data of the protocols, e.g., symmetric
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Figure 5.17: Implementation based on SMART [52]
keys kij, · · · , kik shared with neighboring devices, in the rewritable memory of every
device Di since this list could be updated during the lifetime of Di. Our implementa-
tion on SMART is shown in Figure 5.17, where we denote rewritable memory by RAM.
SMART’s MPU ensures that secret data are only accessible to unmodified program code
in ROM that requires access to this data. For example, rule #1 ensures that only join has
read access to the secret key ski and rule #2 ensures that only join, attest, beat, and heal
have read and write access to short term STi and long term LTi protocol data.
Implementation on TrustLite. Our solution is implemented as trustlets on the TrustLite
security architecture [84] (see Chapter 3). More precisely, we implemented each of the
protocols join, attest, beat, and heal as a single independent trustlet on device Di. Our im-
plementation is shown in Figure 5.18. Trustlite ensures the software integrity of each of
these protocols via the secure boot component SecureBoot on Di. Further, as in SMART,
the MPU of TrustLite ensures that secret data of Di is only accessible to appropriate
trustlets. For example rule #1 ensures that SecureBoot has exclusive read access to the
memory housing the program code of join, attest, beat, and heal, rule #2 ensures that
only join have read access to ski, and rule #3 ensure that only join, attest, beat, and heal
have read and write access to short term STi and long term LTi protocol data.
Figure 5.19 : authenticate on Di
if idj ∈ Si and idj ∈ Bi then
return mac(kauthij ;m)
end
Figure 5.20 : verify on Di
if idj ∈ Si and idj ∈ Bi then
return vermac(kauthij ;m,µ)
end
Functionality. In order to bind attestation and absence detection to functionality and al-
low isolation of malicious devices, we added to our instantiation a new module denoted
by Primitives. Primitives provide cryptographic primitives as services to all other soft-
ware on the device, i.e., authentication and encryption, without granting access to secret
keys to untrusted software. An examples for authentication is shown by authenticate and
verify in Figure 5.19 and 5.20 respectively. Before executing authentication or encryption
on Di, the module ensures that the target device Dj is neither software compromised
nor physically attacked by checking its ID idj in Bi and Si respectively.
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Figure 5.18: Implementation based on TrustLite [84]
5.2.4 Performance Evaluation
We assess performance of our solution in terms of computational, communication, mem-
ory, and energy costs. We further present simulations results for networks of up to
1, 000, 000 devices. This performance evaluation is based on our implementation in Sec-
tion 5.2.3.
Computation Cost. Cryptographic operations, such as MAC or digital signature gen-
eration, constitute the major part of the computation cost. Let gi denote the number
of neighbors of every device Di. Every device Di creates 5gi MACs, verifies gi MACs,
executes gi Key Exchange Protocols KEP, and verifies gi additional MACs (for mobile
devices) or gi digital signatures (for new devices) during join. Di creates gi MACs (as
prover) and verifies gi MACs (as verifier) during attest, and creates (gi + 2) · gi MACs
and verifies 2gi MACs during beat. Finally during heal the healer device Dh creates 1
MAC and the malicious device Dm verifies 1 MAC.
Communication Cost. We used HMAC based on SHA-1 as our MAC implementation,
and ECDSA as our digital signature scheme, i.e., `mac = 160 and `sign = 320. We further
used a 64 bit timestamp and chose `N = 160 and `p = 64. As a consequence, nonces
and MACs are 20 Bytes each. The variables Tinit, p, and id are 8 Bytes each. And, digital
signatures are 40 Bytes each. During join, each device Di has a communication overhead,
which is upper bounded by sending and receiving (44g2i + 48) · gi Bytes (for mobile de-
vices), or sending and receiving 112gi Bytes (for new devices). During attest, Di has a
communication overhead, which is upper bounded by receiving 20gi Bytes and send-
ing 20gi Bytes. And during beat, Di has a communication overhead, which is upper
bounded by receiving (44gi + 20) · gi Bytes and sending 36gi Bytes. The communication
overhead of heal depends on different variables including the size of the software, the
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number and size of software segments, and the number of malicious segments. This
overhead will not be discussed here.
Memory Cost. Every device Di in N should store the following: (1) an authentication
key pair (ski, pki) and the corresponding identity certificate cert(pki); (2) a software
configuration ci and the corresponding software configuration certificate cert(ci); (3) a
set of attestation and heartbeat keys that it shares with neighboring devices – Ki; and
(4) the sets Bi, Si, and Pi of IDs of benign, secure, and present neighbors respectively.
The memory cost of Di is 36 · g2+ 56 · g+ 228 Bytes, where an amount of 56 · g+ 80 Bytes
is read- and/or write-protected.
Table 5.1: Runtime of Primitives
Run-time at 48 MHz TrustLite [84] (µs)
for 64 Bytes messages
authenticate verify encrypt decrypt
320 320 460 870
Runtime. We present the runtime of Primitives which allows authentication and en-
cryption of messages exchanged between devices. As shown in Table 5.1 authenticating
and encrypting 64 Bytes of data requires 780 µs on TrustLite. The time required to verify
and decrypt 64 Bytes is 1, 190 µs.
(a) MICAz (b) TelosB
Figure 5.21: Energy consumption per device
Energy Cost. We estimated the energy consumption of our solution based on the energy
costs of communication and cryptographic operations reported for two sensor nodes:
MICAz and TelosB [47], which belong to the same class of low-end embedded systems
that we target.2 For our estimation we excluded the energy required for generating a
2 SMART and TrustLite are only available as FPGA implementations, which tend to consume more energy
than manufactured chips.
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Figure 5.22: Energy consumption of beat
software configuration and for executing KEP, which would vary depending on the
used protocol. Energy consumption estimations are presented in Figure 5.21, and 5.22.
The energy consumption on each device Di increases linearly with the number of
neighbors gi of this device for all protocols except join for a mobile device. For this
protocol the energy consumption is cubic in the number of neighbors. The main reason
for this is the quadratic size of Proofs-of-non-Absence (PonA) in terms of number of
neighbors. Note that, the energy consumed in all of the protocols is constant in network
size. It can be for a MICAz device with 4 neighbors as low as 1, 5, and 20 mJ for attest,
join (for a new device) or beat, and join (for a mobile device) receptively.
Finally, Figure 5.22 shows the energy consumption for both MICAz and TelosB sensor
nodes with 8 neighbors as function of the number of heartbeat intervals that elapsed
within a specific time period. The figure shows that the energy consumption of beat on
Di is linear in the number heartbeat intervals. Note the, heartbeat interval depends on
the minimum amount of time required by the adversary to physically attack a device.
Thus, it presents a trade-off between performance and security. A more accurate detec-
tion of physical attacks is provided by shorter heartbeat intervals which requires more
energy.
(a) SMART [52] (b) TrustLite [84]
Figure 5.23: Performance of all protocols
Simulation Results. We used the OMNeT++ [104] network simulator to assess the per-
formance of our solutions for large networks of embedded devices. Our protocols were
implemented on the application layer, where cryptographic operation were emulated
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(a) SMART [52] (b) TrustLite [84]
Figure 5.24: Performance in terms of network size
(a) vs. SEDA (b) vs. DARPA
Figure 5.25: Comparison to other solutions based on TrustLite [84]
with delays corresponding to real measurments of their execution time on SMART [52]
and TrustLite [84]. For our simulations, the average communication rate between de-
vices was set to 250 Kbps, which corresponds to the defined bandwidth for ZigBee [135].
We simulated various network sizes, which varied from 10 to 1, 000, 000. We also varied
the number of neighbors from 2 to 20. We assume that the size of attested memory on
each device is 100 KB. The execution time for KEP was excluded from our evaluation
since KEP is required regardless of our solution and its overhead depends on the specific
protocol used. Figure 5.23, 5.24, 5.25, and 5.26 show the results of our simulations.
As shown in Figure 5.23 the runtime of beat, attest and join (for a new device) in-
creases linearly with the number of neighbors per device, while the runtime of join (for
a mobile device) is quadratic in this number. This quadratic overhead is mainly caused
by the quadratic size of PonA in terms of number of neighbors. However, as shown in
Figure 5.24 the runtime of all protocols is constant in the network size.
Further, the comparison to the solutions presented in Section 4.1 and 5.1 (Figure 5.23a
and 5.23b respectively), shows that the solution presented in this section performs better
than both. In particular, the attest protocol presented in this section has constant over-
head in the size of the network in comparison to the logarithmic overhead of attest in
Section 4.1 and Section 5.1. Similarly, the beat protocol in this section has a constant
overhead in comparison to the linear overhead of beat in Section 5.1.
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(a) Per hops (b) Per segments
Figure 5.26: Performance of heal on TrustLite [84]
Finally, Figure 5.26 shows that the runtime of heal is linear in the number of hops
between the healer Dh and the malicious device Dm, and logarithmic in the number
software segments (Figure 5.26a and 5.26b respectively). Note that, Figure 5.26a assumes
the code is split into 128 equal segments, and Figure 5.26b assumes that Dh and Dm
are separated by 10 hops. Figure 5.26b also shows that the time required to generate
a software configuration (i.e., getConfig) based on Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) increases
linearly with the number of software segments.
5.2.5 Security Analysis
Recall that goal of a collective attestation solution is to isolate malicious (i.e., devices
whose software is compromised and/or hardware is physically attacked) from benign
devices in the network N. This goal can be formalized as a security experiment ExpA,
where the adversary A can interact with every device in N. A has full control over the
communication channel between every two devices in N, i.e., it can eavesdrop on, mod-
ify, drop, and inject arbitrary messages to any Di ∈ N. A maliciously modifies the soft-
ware configuration and/or physically attacks the hardware of a device Dm. At the end
of the experiment, one benign Db outputs its decision b indicating whether it accepts to
securely communicate to the malicious device Dm, following a polynomial number (in
`mac, `sign, `N, `p, and `t) of steps performed by A. The output of Db represents the result
of this security experiment, i.e., ExpA = b. In the following we provide the definition of
secure collective attestation under the pre-described model:
Definition 5.2 (Secure collective attestation in autonomous systems). Let f be a polynomial
function in `mac, `sign, `N, `p, and `t. We consider a collective attestation scheme for autonomous
systems to be secure under physical attacks if the probability Pr
[
b = 1|ExpA(1
`) = b
]
is negli-
gible in ` = f(`mac, `sign, `N, `p, `t).
Theorem 5.2 (Security of our solution). The attestation solution presented in this section
is a secure collective attestation scheme (Definition 5.2) if the underlying MAC and signature
schemes are selective forgery resistant.
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Proof sketch of Theorem 5.2. Db returns b = 1 , only if (1) one of its existing neighbors
De always sends correct heartbeats at correct times, and is successfully attested; or (2) a
new or a mobile device Dn proves its trustworthiness through correct Proof of Secure
Enrollment (PoSE) or Proof of non Absence (PonA) respectively. Consider the following
four strategies through which A tries to add a malicious device Dm to N by attacking:
beat, attest, join for a mobile device, or join for a new device. It is easy to see that all
possible attacks by A trying to add Dm to N is covered by a combination of these attack
strategies.
We first consider the first strategy where A attacks beat. Physically attacking the hard-
ware of Dm requires a non-negligible amount of time that is greater than the heartbeat
tolerance interval (see Section 5.1.5). Therefore, all neighbors of Dm will be missing at
least one heartbeat of Dm and will hereby record it as physically attacked. In order to
avoid this, A may either try to forge or replay a heartbeat while Dm’s hardware is being
physically attacked. However, these attacks are negligible in `mac, `p, and `t.
We now consider the case where A attacks attest. Since tmaxA is a strict upper bound
on the time interval between two executions of attestation of neighbors, A software
compromised device Dm will be detected and isolated from N within tmaxA . In order to
avoid this, A may try to forge or replay a valid attestation response of Dm. However,
these attacks are negligible in `mac and `N.
Next we consider the case where A attacks join (for a mobile device). Two devices
Dm and Db can become neighbors through join (for a mobile device) after exchanging
PonAs Πm and Πb, only if Πm (resp. Πb) contains a token that proves the presence of
Dm (resp. Db) in N for all previous heartbeat intervals. The tokens should also indicate
a recent successful attestation of each device. Consequently, a mobile device Dm, whose
software has been compromised or hardware has been physically attacked, would not
be able to reconnect to N. In order to overcome this, A may try to forge or replay such a
token generated by one of Dm’s neighbors. However, these attacks are negligible in `mac,
`p, and `t.
Finally, we consider the case where A attacks join (for a new device). Two devices Dm
and Db can become neighbors through join (for a new device) after exchanging PoSE pim
and PonA Πb, only if pim (resp. Πb) proves trustworthiness of Dm’s (resp. Db’s) software
and hardware. Consequently, a new device Dm, whose software has been compromised
or hardware has been physically attacked, would not be able to join N. Similarly, even
if Dm is not malicious, it cannot be added as a bridge between malicious and benign
devices in N. In order to overcome this, A may try to (1) forge or replay a PoSE, or
(2) forge or replay a token in PonA. However, these attacks are negligible in (1) `sign and
`t; and (2) `mac, `p, and `t respectively.
Therefore, the probability of A convincing a benign device Db to accept to securely
communicate to a malicious device Dm and return b = 1 is negligible in `mac, `sign, `N,
`p, and `t.
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5.2.6 Protocol Extensions
In this section we present parameter tuning and extensions to our solution that: (1) re-
duce false positive rates, caused by incorrectly counting an absent node as malicious.
This can occur because of battery depletion, system failure followed by reboot, or tem-
porary unreachability; (2) remove some previous assumptions, that might not be real-
istic (e.g., contiguous mobility, connected network); (3) offers new features required in
some scenarios (i.e., reporting to an external verifier, hereby making the solution pre-
sented in this section a superset of collective attestation solutions presented earlier); and
(4) supports partitioning and allow healing (i.e., re-connection) of partitions by network
operator O.
Proof-of-non-Absence (PonA) Verification. In some network settings, it is reasonable to
assume contiguous mobility (as described in Section 5.2.1). However, in scenarios where
devices are sparsely distributed over a large area, this assumption no longer holds. Since
during join every Di expects to find in Proof-of-non-Absence (PonA) Πj received from
a new direct neighbor Dj, an individual token ψik/j, which it can verify. Applying our
solution in such sparse networks will lead to many benign devices being mistakenly
counted as malicious – false positives.
For this reason, we propose a PonA verification protocol, that allows devices to check
the validity of a PonA even it does not include a token authenticated by a direct neighbor.
When Di fails to find a direct neighbor in Πj, it sends to all its neighbors a request con-
taining a constant (protocol specific) Time-to-Live (TTL), and Πj. The request is flooded
until TTL is exceeded or Dk is found, whose id idk is in Πj. Dk verifies the correspond-
ing individual token ψkl/j as in join. If verification succeeds, Dk creates a new token for
Dj and sends it back to Di. The token is authenticated hop-by-hop, using MACs based
on symmetric keys shared between neighbors. Consequently, the new token is received
and can be verified by Di, thus, enabling secure communication between Di and Dj.
Collection. When N is attended by a trusted party (e.g., the verifier V). V runs collect.
The main goal of collect is to gather the number (or ids) of devices belonging to different
device classes C1, . . . ,Cz in N. V initiates collect by choosing an arbitrary device D1 and
sending it a random nonce N, a session identifier q, and the set of classes Cu, . . . ,Cv it is
interested in. D1 then forwards this to all its neighbors, which in turn forward it to their
neighbors and so forth, until it is received by every device in N. Note that, q is necessary
to avoid overcounting, and is used for the construction of a spanning tree rooted at D1.
Starting at leaf nodes, each Di sends to its parent node Dj a response respi, which
contains the number rt (or ids) of the devices in its subtree that belong to each class Ct in
{Cu, . . . ,Cv}. The response is authenticated using a MAC (µij) based on symmetric key
kattestij . Dj, in turn, verifies authenticity of the received responses, accumulates them, and
sends them to its parent. The final response resp1 is then generated by D1, authenticated
using signature σ1 (based on its secret key sk1), and forwarded to V. After verifying σ1,
V learns the number rt (or ids) of benign devices in each class Ct, i.e., devices whose
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software is not compromised and hardware is not physically attacked. The result is only
accepted by V, if
∑v
t=u rt > m. Formally:
collect
[
V : Ct, . . . ,CuN, q; D1 : K1, sk1, ; ∗ : cert(pk1)
]
→ [V : resp1; D1 : N, q,Ct, . . . ,Cu] .
Similar to collective attestation solutions presented earlier, collect reports the status of the
network to a trusted third party. However, collect has three differences to these solutions:
• Efficient detection of physical attacks: In addition to detecting remote software
attacks, collect also enables V to detect physical attacks. However, unlike Section 5.1
the heartbeat protocol it is based on imposes constant overhead in the size of the
network.
• Lower overhead and mobility: During the execution of collect, devices are not re-
quired to measure their software configuration, which considerably reduces run-
time as well as energy consumption of the protocol. Reducing reporting time is
particularly important since the topology is assumed static during the execution
of collect.
• Resiliency to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks: Since devices do not perform full-
blown attestation during collect, computational DoS on the network is no longer
possible.
Finally, in case of network partitioning, V may run collect with different network par-
titions in order to detect the overall number of benign device in the whole network.
Similar to what is described above, V considers every partition, where the number of
benign devices is greater than m, as a benign partition.
Partition Healing. Having attested the network via collect, V becomes aware of parti-
tions in N. Thus, in order to heal the network’s partitions (i.e., reconnect them), V runs
a partition healing protocol. V simply broadcasts for every Di in each benign partition
(e.g., through the same arbitrary device D1 used for collect) a Proof-of-Secure-Enrollment
(PoSE) (pii = {{idi, Tfresh},σi}). pii including a fresh timestamp Tfresh, which proves that Di
is currently neither software compromised nor physically attacked. Provided these new
proofs, benign devices from different partitions can assess each others trustworthiness
and securely communicate.
Tolerating Absence. In order to tolerate short absence periods caused by benign reasons
(e.g., system failure followed by reboot), the tolerance interval ttol around Thb, during
which a received heartbeat is accepted can be expanded by a short period of time tabsence.
Consequently, the algorithm checkTime that is responsible for checking the freshness of
heartbeats becomes as shown in Figure 5.27.
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Figure 5.27 : checkTime on Dj
if pi = pj ∧ Thb < t < Thb + δt + ttr + tabsence then
return true
else if pi = pj + 1∧ Thb − δt − tabsence < t < Thb
then
return true
else
return false
end
The extension of the tolerance interval tolerates devices being absent for a short period
of time (e.g., enough for reboot after system failure) without being mistakenly counted
as physically attacked. Other reasons for benign absence, such as battery depletion and
hardware failure, require V’s intervention to replace the battery or repair the device.
5.2.7 Conclusion
In this section we presented a second scheme for efficient collective attestation that
allows efficient and scalable detection of both software and physical attack on very
large networks of embedded devices. Our solution mainly targets autonomous networks.
However, it can also be extended to allow reporting to a central verifier as discussed in
Section 5.2.6. The solution is based on the adversary model and requirements identified
in Section 5.1. Unlike the scheme presented in Section 5.1, it has a performance overhead
which is constant in the size of the network. This performance gain came at the cost of
more strict assumptions regarding security and device mobility. This solution combines
local attestation and absence detection with key management in order to enable efficient
detection and isolation of devices that are software compromised or physically attacked.
It also leverages a roaming protocol to allow device mobility.
5.3 related work
In this section we present work from the literature that is directly related to the solu-
tions presented in this chapter. A survey on existing attestation schemes is presented in
Chapter 3.
Physical attacks. We distinguish between three different types of physical attacks: (1) in-
vasive attack [133] that allow the adversary to extract a device’s secrets by directly ac-
cessing its internal components; (2) semi-invasive attacks [134] that only require device
decapsulation, e.g., optical fault injection, laser scanning, thermal imaging; and (3) non-
invasive attacks [160] that enable extraction of cryptographic secrets during normal oper-
ation, e.g., time or power side channel attacks. While invasive and semi-invasive physi-
cal attacks require expensive and sophisticated lab equipment, non-invasive attacks may
only require low cost electrical engineering tools. The solutions presented in this chapter
aim at detecting invasive and semi-invasive physical attacks that require possession of
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the target device for a non-negligible amount (hours to weeks [133, 132]). Non-invasive
attacks are considered an orthogonal problem.
Absence Detection. Absence detection is a popular topic in the field of Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSN). It has been mainly used to detect failure of sensor nodes. In this
context, several solutions have been proposed for static [137] and dynamic topologies
(e.g., [67, 37]). However, all these schemes are not designed for an adversarial settings.
Other WSN solutions utilize absence detection to detect capture of sensor nodes. These
solutions also assume that physical attacks require non-negligible time. However, they
either are designed for static networks, or provide probabilistic results allowing false
negatives.
Attestation & Key Exchange. A lot of prior work investigated combining key exchange
with attestation [122, 116]. SAKE [122] allows neighboring sensor nodes to establish sym-
metric keys with relying on pre-shared secrets, by basing key establishment on the result
of attestation. SAKE relies on a software-based attestation scheme that has unrealistic
and strong assumptions (see Section 3.4). On the other hand, researchers have proposed
extending the key exchange protocol IKEv2 [80] of IPsec [82] with attestation [116]. The
goal of such an extension is ensuring the trustworthiness of the devices involved in
running an IPsec connection. This extension mainly targets high-end computing devices
connected through legacy networks. It is not suitable for autonomous networks of low-
end embedded devices.
5.4 conclusion
In this chapter we investigated the problem of physical attacks and presented two col-
lective attestation solutions that enable the detection of both software and physical at-
tacks in large networks of embedded devices. The two presented solutions are based on
slightly different assumptions, have different cost, and are applicable in different sce-
narios. Section 5.1 provided the basis for detection of physical attacks by defining the
adversary model, identifying the requirements, and proposing an attestation solution
for centralized networks which is secure under the strongest adversary possible. On the
other hand, the solution presented in Section 5.2 enables attestation of both autonomous
and centralized networks under a weaker adversary that can physically attack less de-
vices. However, it provides better efficiency. Together the solutions enable detection of
software and physical attacks in a wide range of applications. In Chapter 6, we investi-
gate the problem of runtime attacks, and provide an attestation solution for autonomous
networks that allow detection of such attacks.

6
D E T E C T I O N O F R U N T I M E AT TA C K S
We are increasingly surrounded by interconnected embedded systems, which collect
sensitive information, and perform safety critical operations. Most embedded systems
perform simple tasks upon reception of a command, in a predefined manner. However,
in recent years, embedded systems have been increasingly designed to carry out au-
tonomous collaborative tasks. Networks of autonomous embedded systems (such as,
vehicular ad hoc networks, robotic factory workers, search/rescue robots, and drones
are already being used for performing urgent, tiresome, and critical tasks with mini-
mal human intervention. For example, drones are (envisioned to be) used for various
non-military tasks, such as search and rescue, construction site management, security
and surveillance, cargo delivery, and natural disasters prediction and warning. The se-
cure and safe operation of autonomous embedded networks depends heavily on the
trustworthiness of the involved devices. Securing such networks requires ensuring the
integrity of data exchanged between device, e.g., commands and sensor readings.
Despite all the benefits of the new emerging applications, the high connectivity and
autonomy pose crucial security and safety challenges on the underlying embedded de-
vices and their interactions. Such embedded devices have been the target of various
attacks from reverse engineering [55, 61] to (large-scale) software attacks [148, 54, 149].
Morever, in addition to malware and physical attacks, embedded devices represent an
attractive target for runtime attacks that exploit software vulnerabilities (such as a buffer
overflow vulnerability) to subvert the normal execution of a benign program and exe-
cute a malicious functionality, e.g., Return Oriented Programming (ROP) attacks [127].
Consequently, it is not always enough to verify the software integrity of embedded net-
works in order to ensure their correct operation.
The collective attestation solutions presented in Chapter 4 and 5 enable the detection
of both malware infestation and physical attacks. However, they are incapable of detect-
ing runtime attacks. Moreover, existing security solutions that target runtime attacks are
either unable to provide protection against data-only attacks, i.e., Control-Flow Integrity
(CFI) [8], or are inapplicable to complex systems and not scalable to large autonomous
networks, i.e., Control-flow Attestation (CFA) [9].
In this chapter, we aim at securing autonomous embedded networks by securing col-
laborations between devices using CFA. We present the first secure collective attestation
solution for large autonomous networks. Our solution is based on reducing the com-
plexity of CFA, hereby enabling it usage to secure interactions in autonomous systems.
Contribution. We investigate the security of large autonomous networks of embedded
devices under runtime attacks. We define the threat model for these networks that allows
runtime attacks. And we devise the first collective attestation solution that is capable of
securing these network. Our solution is based on redesigning CFA in order to allow its
efficient applicability to complex systems. It leverages a novel representation of execu-
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tion path to reduce the complexity and overhead for verifying an attestation response.
In order to demonstrate feasibility, we show how to implement the solution on recent
open source flight controller for drones – Pixhawk PX4.1 Finally, we present extensive
performance evaluation based on our implementation, in addition to simulations of the
collaboration scenarios involving thousands of devices. Our solution allows securing a
collaboration involving 10, 000 devices in order of seconds. It presents a first step to-
wards secure detection of runtime attacks in autonomous embedded networks.
Outline. After providing a brief overview of the solution in Section 6.1, we present our
CFA scheme in Section 6.2, and explain details of our solution in Section 6.3. We describe
our implementation and present our performance evaluation results in Section 6.4. Secu-
rity of this solution is examined in Section 6.5, and this chapter concludes in Section 6.6.
Remark. The results presented in this chapter are due to the author of this work and the
result of many intensive discussions and collaboration with Raad Bahmani (TU Darm-
stadt, Germany), Tigist Abera (TU Darmstadt, Germany), Matthias Schunter (Intel Labs,
Darmstadt), Ferdinand Brasser (TU Darmstadt, Germany), and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
(TU Darmstadt, Germany). Parts of this chapter have been published in [10].
6.1 collective attestation
6.1.1 Problem Description and System Model
We consider a dynamic autonomous network N that is formed of n interconnected ho-
mogeneous devices. The network operator O is responsible for initializing each device
Di in a secure environment as well as for the maintenance of N. We do not assume the
existence of a central entity responsible for controlling and assessing the trustworthi-
ness of N. N may not have a routing protocol in place. However, devices in N should
be able to communicate to their direct neighbors [44, 68, 114, 115] Collaboration be-
tween devices in the network is performed through the exchange of messages such as:
sensor readings, commands, and status information. The mobility of devices can be
involuntary, i.e., guided by ambient factors. Therefore, the topology of the network is
unpredictable. A collective attestation solution for autonomous networks allows devices
in N to securely interact performing complex collaborative tasks.
6.1.2 Requirements Analysis
Objectives. A collective attestation solution for an autonomous network of embedded
devices should at least provide the following three properties:
• Property #1: Allow detection of remote attacks including malware infestation and
runtime attacks.
• Property #2: Be efficient and scalable, i.e., have low overhead on both the verifier
and the prover.
1 https://dev.px4.io/en/concept/flight_stack
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• Property #3: Be applicable to large systems with complex software.
The main objective of collective attestation is satisfying property #1 and property #2 in
large autonomous networks. Property #1 provides security guarantees under a strong
adversary model that is capable of performing runtime attacks. And, property #3 allows
supporting applicability to a wide range of applications including autonomous systems.
Adversary Model. We assume an adversary A capable of modifying the software on
any device Di in N except the components protected by hardware, e.g., A cannot modify
code stored in ROM. A may also exploit a software vulnerability (e.g., a buffer overflow),
to subvert the control flow of a benign program, stitch together a sequence of existing
machine code instruction, and execute an arbitrarily malicious functionality. However,
A is not capable of tampering with the hardware of any device Di, i.e., physical attacks
are ruled out in this context. Therefore, the hardware security architecture of devices in
N is considered to be immune to attacks. A can eavesdrop on, modify, replay, or drop
any message exchanged between devices in N. We assume that the network operator
O is trusted. Further, we assume a stealthy adversary that aims at compromising as
many devices as possible while evading detection by our solution, hence, we do not
consider Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on the attestation protocol which would reveal
A’s presence. By compromising a subset of the devices in N, A aims at manipulating col-
laborative tasks of N, through generating and sending malicious data to benign devices.
Device Requirements. The design of our solution aims at satisfying the properties de-
scribed above. However, satisfying these properties require the ability to remotely attest
each device in N in addition to strong isolation. Consequently, the following require-
ments should be satisfied by every Di in N:
• Integrity measurement: A should not be able to tamper with the measurement mech-
anism responsible for measuring the software integrity of any device Di.
• Integrity reporting: A should not be able to forge the measurement c ′i of Di’s soft-
ware that is sent to V.
• Secure storage: A should not have access to the cryptographic key(s) that are used
in the attestation protocol.
• Secure Isolation: A should not be capable of manipulating one software module
through compromising another software module.
If one of these requirements is not achieved, A can tamper with Di’s interactions without
being detected. Security architectures for low-end embedded devices that satisfy these
requirements include: TrustLite [84] and ARM TrustZone-M.2
Assumptions. Devices in N are homogeneous, i.e., have the same hardware and software
configurations. Homogeneity implies redundancy. A failed or compromised device Di
can be replaced by another device Dj in N. We assume that every device Di in N satisfies
the above requirements that allow secure remote attestation and provide strong isolation.
2 https://community.arm.com/processors/trustzone-for-armv8-m/b/blog
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Figure 6.1: Example 5-device network: D1, . . . , D5
Further, the sensors and actuators of Di are assumed to be trusted, i.e., sensors provide
correct readings, and actuators behave as instructed. Devices in N collaborate and com-
municate with each other, i.e., in order to perform complex tasks every device Di at
least communicates to its neighboring device. Cryptographic primitives are assumed to
be secure along with their implementations.
Protocol Overview. The goal of our solution is to enable secure collaboration between
individual devices in an autonomous system. In particular, when two devices exchange
information, a CFA report, which proves the correct generation and processing of this
information is also exchanged between the devices. The main challenge here is allowing
efficient CFA that provides data integrity. This challenge is tackled through a novel and
efficient execution path representation.
Figure 6.1 shows an overview of our solution in a network formed of five devices
D1 through D5. While collaborating, devices in N exchange information (e.g., D4 and
D5). On each device, a trusted component denoted by DFMonitor, monitors the commu-
nication between modules and determines the modules responsible for the generation
and processing of the exchanged information. A second trusted components, denoted
by CFMonitor, monitors the execution of modules that are identified by DFMonitor to
be influencing the exchanged information. CFMonitor creates a CFA report for each of
these module based on an efficient execution path representation. The correctness of
exchanged information is ensured via a CFA report (generated by CFMonitor) of all
modules that participated in its generation and processing (identified by DFMonitor).
6.2 control-flow attestation
Control-flow Attestation (CFA) allows attesting the exact execution path of an applica-
tion running on an embedded device (the prover) to a remote verifier. It enables the
prover to report the control flow of the program to the verifier, providing assurance on
control-flow integrity and detecting runtime attacks. Existing CFA schemes have multi-
ple limitations (see Chapter 3). First, they require binary instrumentation, i.e., rewriting
of control-flow instructions (e.g., jump, branch, etc.) on the prover. Second, they impose
a high performance overhead on prover which records every control-flow event. Third,
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they impose a significant overhead on the verifier, which is required to store and search a
very large database of expected execution paths. The size of this database explodes expo-
nentially with the number of control-flow events. While the first two limitations can be
overcome by implementing the prover side of CFA in hardware [49], the third limitation
limits the application of CFA to simple software on standalone devices. In fact, apply-
ing CFA to autonomous networks where devices with complex software and limited
resources should act as both provers and verifiers requires a complete redesign. In this
section we present the design of an efficient CFA for autonomous networks that relies on
a novel representation of execution paths based on Multiset Hash (MSH) functions [40].
Our CFA scheme represents the logic behind CFMonitor presented in Section 6.1.
6.2.1 Multiset Hash Function
A Multiset Hash (MSH) function [40] maps multisets of finite number of unordered
members to a fixed length hash value (see Definition 2.8). In the following we present a
multiset-collision resistant (according to Definition 2.9) MSH function denoted by MSet-Add-Hash)
from [40]. Details of MSH and multiset-collision resistance are provided in Chapter 2.
MSet-Add-Hash. Let B = {0, 1}m be the set of all bit strings of length m, and let M be a
multiset of elements of B. The number of times a bit string b ∈ B is in M is called the
multiplicity Mb of b in M. Let HK : {0, 1}m+1 → Zln be randomly selected from a pseudo-
random family of hash functions. Let L ≈ nl ≈ 2m, L 6 nl, and L 6 2m. MSet-Add-Hash
is defined as below.
• Hash: Let r ∈ B be a random nonce. The hash of M is defined as a triple [h; c; r].
H(M) =
[
HK(0, r) +
∑
b∈B
MbHK(1, b) mod n;
∑
b∈B
Mb mod L; r
]∣∣∣∣∣
r∈B
• Extend: The addition +H of two hashes [h; c; r] and [h ′; c ′; r ′] is:[
HK(0, r ′′) + h−HK(0, r) + h ′ −HK(0, r ′) mod n; c+ c ′ mod L; r ′′
]∣∣∣
r ′′∈B
• Compare: Two hashes [h; c; r] and [h ′; c ′; r ′] are equivalent (i.e., [h; c; r] =H [h ′; c ′; r ′])
iff h−HK(0, r) = h ′ −HK(0, r ′) mod n and c = c ′ mod L.
6.2.2 Efficient CFA
Before we present the intuition behind our CFA scheme, we briefly describe the most
prominent Control-Flow Attestation (CFA) scheme in the literature (i.e., C-FLAT [9]),
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Figure 6.2: Control-Flow Graph (CFG) showing C-FLAT and our CFA scheme
shedding light on its limitations that makes it inapplicable to autonomous systems. For
our presentation we utilize the Control-flow Graph (CFG) depicted in Figure 6.2.3
In C-FLAT, the binary code to be attested is instrumented with different labels (n1, n2, . . .
in Figure 6.2) for each basic block (BBL) ending with any branch instructions (i.e., a node
in CFG). When attestation is requested by the verifier, a measurement procedure con-
tinuously measures the control-flow path of the executing program. This is done by
cumulatively hashing the labels of every executed node, i.e., hi = H(hpre, ni). For exam-
ple, consider the execution path of a program to be n1 → n2 → n5 → n4, the attestation
response for this execution is h4 = H(H(H(H(0, n1), n2), n5), n4). Note that, this tech-
nique provides a fixed-size result as is the case in static attestation. After an attestation
response has been generated, it is authenticated along with the nonce received from
the verifier using a MAC or a digital signature, and then sent back. Finally, the verifier
checks the trustworthiness of the response by searching a database of valid attestation
responses (i.e., execution paths).
The number of valid paths, i.e., the size of the verifier’s database, depends on the
size and complexity of the attested program. Moreover, loops and recursive calls may
increase the size of the database indefinitely. The authors propose a solution for the ef-
ficient handling of loops and recursion. However, when their complex solution is used,
the size of the attestation response may increase indeterminately, and the size of the
database can still become very large. Our CFA scheme is based on replacing cumula-
tive hash functions with Multiset Hash (MSH) function that provides a constant-size
database as well as a constant-size attestation response. This procedure is not straight
forward. It requires special care in order to be secure and efficient.
3 Software code can be presented as a CFG, where nodes represent blocks of code and edges are control-flow
transitions (e.g., direct branch).
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Obviously, the order of nodes in an execution path is important. Directly using MSH
functions over node labels is hereby not secure. The core idea of our CFA scheme is to
hash edges in a CFG rather than nodes. An edge can be identified with a label ei, which
is a concatenation of the labels of the two nodes the edge is connecting (e.g., e1 = n1‖n2).
For example, the attestation response of the execution path n1 → n2 → n5 → n4 is
H(M = {e1 = n1‖n2, e3 = n2‖n5, e5 = n5‖n4}). It is clear that the attestation response in
our CFA scheme has less information than the full execution path. However, the verifier
can still (1) detect any added edge to the execution path caused by a Return Oriented
Programming (ROP) attack; and (2) construct the set of possible paths a software execu-
tion has taken based on the constant-size attestation response, thus, allowing detection
of data-only attack that change a program’s control flow. In the following a provide a
brief analysis of our scheme:
(a) Complexity of our CFA scheme (b) Information loss of our CFA scheme
Figure 6.3: Simple explanatory CFGs
Loops and Break Statements. Loops and break statements constitute a major challenge
for C-FLAT as they increase the complexity of the generation and verification of attes-
tation responses. For this reason, C-FLAT is only applicable to very small and simple
applications. Our scheme is applicable to more complex programs as it is not based on
cumulative hashing of all nodes in a CFG, but rather hashing the multiset of edges in
that CFG.
Complexity. Unlike C-FLAT, whose verification complexity is exponential in the number
of edges, the verification complexity of our CFA scheme is linear in that number. Con-
sider the two simple CFGs shown in Figure 6.3a. The increase in the number of edges
from 9 (in A) to 11 in (in B) increases the number of possible execution paths from 4 to
8, thus, the size of the database increases exponentially. In the contrary, in our scheme
only 2 more edges need to be considered on the verifier’s end.
Information Loss. Indeed, the attestation response of our scheme carries less informa-
tion than C-FLAT. However, it provides more information than CFI due to order infor-
mation preserved inherently in the collected edges themselves. The information loss due
to the use of MSH functions depends on the CFG and the executed path. Figure 6.3b
shows an example CFG. If path p1 = n1 → n2 → n4 is executed, then attestation re-
sponse in our scheme would contain the edges e1 and e2. These correspond only to the
path p1. On the other hand, if path p2 = n1 → n2 → n4 → n1 → n3 → n4 is executed,
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N ∈R {0, 1}`N N , req
if versig(pkj ;Ωj‖dataj‖N , σj) then
dataj ← Execute(code)
Ωj ← hx1‖ . . . ‖hxd
σj ← sign(skj ;Ωj‖dataj‖N )
end if
dataj ;Ωj ;σj
if verifyCFP({hx1 , . . . , hxb}, {CFG1, . . . ,CFGz}) then
b← 1
{hx1 , . . . , hxd} ← CFMonitor( )
{x1, . . . , xd} ← DFMonitor( )
CFG1, . . . ,CFGz , pkj
Device Di Device Dj
skj
else b← 0
end if
end if
Figure 6.4: Protocol interact
then the attestation response would contain the edges e1, e2, e3, e4, and e5. These edges
either correspond to p2 or to p3 = n1 → n3 → n4 → n1 → n2 → n4. Consequently, as our
scheme preserves the order in which individual edges are executed, it doesn’t preserve
the order in which different paths inside a loop are executed.
6.3 protocol description
Based on the CFA scheme presented earlier, we present a collective attestation solution
for autonomous networks that is capable of detecting runtime attacks and securing in-
teraction between collaborating autonomous devices. For the sake of clarity, the solution
is first presented as executed between two collaborating devices then later extended for
collaborations involving a large number of devices.
6.3.1 Interaction of Two Devices
As shown in Figure 6.4, an interaction between two devices Di and Dj starts by Di re-
questing sensitive data dataj from a peer device Dj. In particular, Di sends Dj a request
for data containing a fresh nonce N. Upon receiving a data request, Dj executes the pro-
gram code necessary for generating the required data, i.e., dataj ← Execute(code). During
this execution, the communication between software modules is continuously monitored
by DFMonitor, which records the IDs x1, . . . , xd of all modules that are capable of chang-
ing the value of dataj. We denote these modules by critical modules with respect to dataj.
For each critical module identified by DFMonitor, CFMonitor monitors execution and
records the control flow of that module according to our Control-Flow Attestation (CFA)
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scheme in Section 6.2. At the end of execution, CFMonitor returns a set of attestation
responses hx1 , . . . , hxd for executed critical modules, i.e., for each module xi CFMonitor
returns the attestation response hxi = {valxi ,Mxi}, where Mxi = {<e1,2>, <e2,1>} means
that while executing module xi, the edge e1 occurred twice while e2 occurred once.
The attestation responses hx1 , . . . , hxd are sent back to Di along with the requested
data dataj. They are authenticated with a digital signature σj based on Dj’s secret key.
Upon receiving the data, Di verifies its integrity by: (1) verifying σj using Dj’s public
key, and (2) checking the control-flow integrity of all critical modules with respect to
dataj using verifyCFP. In particular, verifyCFP verifies that all the edges in a module’s
attestation response h belong to the CFG of that module. verifyCFP also checks h based
on predefined policies, e.g., upper bounds on the number of times loops should be
executed. If the verification was successful, Di gains assurance regarding the integrity
of dataj (b← 1).
6.3.2 Interaction of Multiple Devices
In an autonomous network more than two devices can be engaged in a collaboration.
The collaboration is secured in this case through the recursive execution of interact
(shown in Figure 6.4) between the involved devices. We refer to this protocol as interact+.
Through interact+, the exchanged sensitive data is accompanied by the attestation re-
sponses of all critical modules on all collaborating devices. The main differences between
interact and interact+ are outlined below:
• Upon receiving a request from a peer device Di, Dj generates and sends a new
data request to other devices that are involved in the collaboration
• Along with its attestation response, Dj sends Di the attestation responses its re-
ceives from other involved devices.
• If the verification of the attestation responses was successful, Di concludes that the
data was processed correctly by all devices involved in the collaboration.
6.4 implementation and evaluation
We implemented and evaluated our solutions on top of a popular flight controller for
drones – Pixhawk. The underlying Real-Time Operating System (RTOS) used is NuttX,
and the adopted autopilot software is PX4. Note that, PX4 is composed of two layers: the
flight stack formed of modules responsible for implementing the device’s control func-
tionalities, and the middleware responsible for providing basic functionalities to flight
stack layer, e.g., communication between modules through an Object Request Broker
(uORB) and to the outside world through a Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink).
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6.4.1 Implementation
We now briefly describe the implementation of the core components of our solution, i.e.,
DFMonitor and CFMonitor and their integration within PX4. Details of this implementa-
tion can be found in [10].
DFMonitor. The goal of DFMonitor is to determine critical modules at runtime and enable
their attestation. This is done by (1) extending the MAVLink protocol packets with the
necessary fields for attestation requests and responses, and (2) modifying uORB to allow
tracking of data exchanged between modules and enable the delivery of fresh data, i.e.,
through flushing data buffers.
CFMonitor. CFMonitor monitors and records the execution path of modules identified by
DFMonitor to be critical. The main components of CFMonitor are a logic that records for
every critical module all control-flow events using a Multiset Hash (MSH) value, and
code instrumentation that enables the execution of this logic on every integrity-relevant
control-flow event.
Integration within PX4. Our solution is integrated within PX4 by modifying the mid-
dleware to implement the functionality of DFMonitor, and instrumenting all integrity-
relevant control-flow events to call our CFMonitor logic. Further, two other component
are implemented that filter unauthorized MAVLink messages (Filter) and authenticate
attestation responses (Quoter).
6.4.2 Evaluation
We assess the performance of our solution in terms of runtime and present simulations
results for collaborations involving up to 10, 000 devices. Our performance evaluation
is based on the implementation from [10]. The energy consumption of computation
on autonomous systems is usually negligible in comparison to other system parts, e.g.,
actuators. Therefore, we do not present an evaluation of the energy consumption of our
solution.
6.4.2.1 Multiset Hash Function
Our solution is based on replacing a hash function with a Multiset Hash (MSH) func-
tion. In order to understand the direct overhead of this replacement, we compare the
runtime of our implementation of the additive MSH function with that of the Blake2
hash function.4
Judging by the runtime of both hash functions in isolation from the overall attesta-
tion protocol, it is clear that using a MSH function adds a considerable performance
overhead. While hashing one block using a conventional Blake2 hash functions requires
31 µs, hashing the same block using a MSH function requires 85 µs. This represents
a runtime increase of almost 175%. However, using a MSH function has multiple ad-
vantages that allow our solution to be better than all existing Control-Flow Attestation
4 https://blake2.net
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Figure 6.5: Simulated collaboration scenarios (OMNeT++ [104])
(CFA) schemes [9, 49]. These advantages include: (1) linear verification overhead which
enables applicability to complex devices in autonomous systems as opposed to existing
schemes that are only applicable to tiny standalone devices, (2) reduction of the commu-
nication overhead compared to the naive approach of sending the entire execution path
to the verifier, and (3) reduction of required secure rewritable memory compared to the
naive approach of calculating the hash of a multiset of edges at the end of program ex-
ecution using a conventional hash function. Note that, the last approach does not allow
performing attestation in parallel to program execution using dedicated hardware [49].
6.4.2.2 Attestation
We measured the time required for the generation and verification of attestation reports
for various data generation processes. For example, when GPS coordinates are gener-
ated on Pixhawk, 13 software modules are typically being executed. Only one of these
modules is critical for the GPS data. This represents an improvement of at least 95% over
existing CFA schemes, which require attesting all executing modules. The case of GPS
data represents one of the extremities of our performance evaluation. Performance gain
may vary depending on the data in concern. For example, for the generation of gyro-
scope sensor data only 2 modules are critical which represents 25% of the 8 executing
modules.
6.4.3 Network Simulation
We used the OMNeT++ [104] network simulator to assess the performance of our so-
lution for collaborations involving a large number of devices. Our solution was imple-
mented on the application layer, where cryptographic operations were emulated with
152 detection of runtime attacks
(a) Serial collaboration scenario (b) Parallel collaboration scenario
Figure 6.6: Performance of our solution in serial and parallel collaboration scenarios
Figure 6.7: Performance of our solution in hybrid collaboration scenario
delays corresponding to real measurements of their execution time on a Pixhawk. For
our simulations, the average communication rate between devices was set to 250 Kbps,
which corresponds to the effective bandwidth provided by NodeMCU – a WiFi mod-
ule that can be used for connecting autonomous drones.5 As shown in Figure 6.5 we
considered three popular scenarios: a serial collaboration scenario, where collaboration
is executed sequentially on devices; a parallel collaboration scenario, where collabora-
tion is executed in parallel on all devices; and a hybrid collaboration scenario, where
collaboration is executed both sequentially and in parallel. While serial and parallel
collaboration scenarios represent two extreme cases, the hybrid collaboration scenario
represents a realistic use case scenario that falls in between. Further, we simulated vari-
ous collaboration sizes, which ranged from 10 to 10, 000 devices.
The simulated collaboration required each device to generate GPS data and send it to a
collaborating peer device. We also considered three different security measures that can
be deployed. In particular, we simulated a control case where GPS data is not secured by
any means; a basic transmission integrity case where messages are authenticated with
a digital signature (ECDSA); and our solution where the integrity of data is ensured by
attesting the execution of critical modules. Figure 6.6, and 6.7 show the results of our
simulations.
In the following, we briefly analyze the results for each collaboration scenario:
5 http://nodemcu.com/index_en.html
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Serial Collaboration Scenario. In this scenario the runtime overhead for collaboration,
under the three security measures, increases linearly with the collaboration size. The
main reason behind this is that involved devices process, authenticate, and exchange
data sequentially.
Parallel Collaboration Scenario. In this scenario the runtime overhead for collaboration
in the control case is constant in the collaboration size. This is due to the parallel pro-
cessing and exchange of data. For the two remaining cases, the runtime overhead for
collaboration increases linearly with the collaboration size. The main reason behind this
is the sequential verification of signatures and attestation responses at the end of the
collaboration.
Hybrid Collaboration Scenario. In this scenario the runtime overhead for collaboration,
under the three security measures, is logarithmic in the collaboration size. The main rea-
son behind this is the even distribution of the processing, authentication, and attestation
burden across all collaborating devices.
Conclusion. Figure 6.7 shows that the overhead of our solution is four times higher
than that of basic authentication for the hybrid collaboration scenario. However, the
security guarantees provided by our solution are much stronger than those provided by
basic integrity protection using authentication. Moreover, unlike existing Control-flow
Attestation (CFA) schemes [9, 49], our solution is applicable to complex autonomous
systems as it allows efficient verification of attestation responses. Note that, the runtime
of our solution can be as low as 1.5 s in a collaboration involving more than 6000 devices.
6.5 security analysis
The goal of our collective attestation solution is to enable every device Di in the network
N to securely interact with every other peer device Dj., i.e., Di should accept the data
coming from Dj and return b = 1 if this data is correctly generated by the software
on Dj. We formalize this goal as a security experiment ExpA, where the adversary A
can interact with every device in N. A has full control over the communication channel
between every two devices in N, i.e., it can eavesdrop on, modify, drop, and inject ar-
bitrary messages to any Di ∈ N. At the end of the experiment, Di outputs the result
b indicating whether it has accepted maliciously generated data from Dj, following a
polynomial number (in `N, `h, and `sign) of steps performed by A. The output of Di rep-
resents the result of this security experiment, i.e., ExpA = b. In the following we provide
the definition of secure collective attestation under the pre-described adversary model:
Definition 6.1 (Secure collective attestation under runtime attacks). Let f be a polynomial
function in `N, `h, and `sign. We consider a collective attestation scheme to be secure under
runtime attacks if the probability Pr
[
b = 1|ExpA(1
`) = b
]
is negligible in ` = f(`N, `h, `sign).
Theorem 6.1 (Security of our attestation solution). The attestation solution presented in
this chapter is a secure collective attestation solution (Definition 6.1) if the underlying signature
scheme is selective forgery resistant, and the Multiset Hash (MSH) function is multiset collision
resistant.
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Proof sketch of Theorem 6.1. Di considers received data from Dj (i.e., dataj) as correct and
returns b = 1 only if the following statements are all correct: (1) The signature σj gener-
ated over dataj, hx1 , . . . , hxd , and N verifies successfully, where hx1 , . . . , hxd represent the
set of attestation responses of the critical modules that were involved in the generation
of dataj, and N is the random nonce sent by Di; and (2) all the edges in every attestation
response hxl belong to the CFG of the module xl, and do not violate any of the verifica-
tion policies. Consider the four cases where the A attacks: (1) the protocol between Di
and Dj, (2) the communication between software modules on Dj, (3) the binary code of
software on Dj, or (4) the control flow of software modules on Dj. It is easy to see that
all possible attacks on our solution are covered by a combination of these cases.
We first consider the case where A attacks the protocol between Di and Dj. A proto-
col adversary A may undermine the security of our solution by: replaying a previously
recorded signature over old data along with dataj or forging a signature σj over mali-
ciously generated output. However, since the response includes the fresh nonce N, the
probability of Di accepting replayed responses and outputting b = 1 is negligible in `N.
Similarly, since the signature scheme is unforgeable, the probability of finding a correct
signature is negligible in `sign.
We now consider the case where A attacks the communication between software mod-
ules on Dj. In order to hide the traces of maliciously generated data, A may try to pre-
vent CFMonitor from recording the execution of one (or more) malicious critical modules,
or use a malicious non-critical module to influence the value of data. However, this is
not possible since all modules on Dj are strongly isolated and their communication is
monitored through DFMonitor which is protected by hardware.
Next we consider the case where A maliciously modifies the software of Dj in order to
undermine the security of our solution. A may try to: extract the authentication key skj
used for authenticating attestation responses or modify the software or instrumentation
of critical modules in order to maliciously modify the data without being detected. How-
ever, these attacks are not possible because the underlying security architecture protects
the secrecy of skj and the integrity of the software binary.
Finally, we consider the case where A exploits runtime attacks to enable Dj to gener-
ate malicious data. A may undermine the security of our solution by: injecting malicious
code and corrupting control-flow information to redirect execution to the injected code
(code injection); exploiting code reuse attacks and maliciously combining code snippets
(Return-Oriented Programming) or functions (function reuse attacks); or manipulating
variables that affect the program’s control flow and execute a non-expected path (non-
control-data attacks). However, these attacks will be detected at verification time since:
code injection is prevented by the Data Execution Prevention (DEP) technology; code-
reuse attacks that induce new edges in the execution path will be detected when check-
ing the attestation response against the CFG, while code-reuse attacks that only incorpo-
rate valid edges in the CFG are detected when checking the attestation response against
verification policies; and non-control-data attacks that involve unexpected control-flow
events will also be detected when they violate one of the verification policies.
Therefore, the probability of A convincing Di to accept maliciously modified data
from Dj and return b = 1 is negligible in `N, `h, and `sign.
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6.6 conclusion
In this chapter we investigated the problem of runtime attacks and presented a collective
attestation solution that enables the detection of runtime attacks in large autonomous
networks. The presented solution allows low-end embedded devices to securely collabo-
rate and exchange data within a large autonomous system. The main component of our
solution is a novel execution path representation which reduces the overhead of Control-
Flow Attestation (CFA) considerably allowing its applicability to complex systems. As
our tests and evaluation results show, the solution presented in this chapter is applicable
to real-time systems with tight time constraints. In Chapter 7 we investigate the problem
of secure and scalable management of large embedded network.

7
S E C U R E A N D S C A L A B L E M A N A G E M E N T
A large number of embedded devices are interconnected providing distributed sensing
and control for a wide range of applications. This increased connectivity and the services
it provides is commonly referred to as the Internet of Things (IoT). Recent forecasts
suggest that the number of such devices will reach 50 billions in 2020 [39]. Examples of
domains utilizing IoT devices range from small ecosystems, e.g., building automation,
to large installations such as industrial control systems. A fundemental requirement in
such systems is the ability to manage IoT device [131]. Device management refers to the
task of distributing software updates and commands on devices, as well as monitoring
of devices’ state.
Unfortuntately, existing management solutions and standards for low-end embedded
devices are geared towards the single device setting [131, 103]. These solutions are not
scalable to large IoT networks. In particular, the overhead of these solutions increases
linearly in the size of the network in the absence of trusted intermediaries. Moreover,
utilizing existing approaches for secure data aggreation to solve this problem introduces
a linear overhead on the entity managing the network [35, 153].
Unlike the rest of this thesis which focuses on securing large networks of embed-
ded devices against malware infestation (Chapter 4), physical attacks (Chapter 5), and
runtime attacks (Chapter 6), In this chapter we aim at providing a secure and scalable
management solution of these networks, which we find as important as securing these
networks against attack. For example, the inability to update the outdated (possibly vul-
nerable) software of devices in a network or monitor the status of that update provides
an attractive attack surface.
A management process involves sending management commands to target devices,
e.g., commands to be executed, and monitoring the state of devices by collecting statis-
tics from the network. The goal of device monitoring is to allow capturing the overall
state of the network after distributing (one or multiple) commands. In particular, the
entity managing the network might be interested in knowing the percentage of devices
that successfully executed a software update command. The management solution we
present in this chapter allows performing these tasks in a secure and scalable manner.
In particular, it ensures low computational, communication, and storage overhead on
both the network devices and the entity managing it. This allows a low-end device, e.g.,
a smart phone, to efficiently manage a network formed of millions of devices.
Contribution. We investigate the problem of management of embedded networks and
design the first secure and scalable management solution for these networks. Our solu-
tion allows a single low-power entity to manage a very large number of low-end em-
bedded devices. This is enabled by leveraging an untrusted network of intermediaries,
such as smart gateways, which are commonly used as a communication infrastructure
for low-end IoT devices. The core of our solution is a finite state machine representation
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of the management process which provides a domain independent abstraction. This
allows expressing complex managements commands with an accurate high-level rep-
resentation. We denote this abstraction by Management Finite State Machine (M-FSM).
Based on M-FSM we construct a secure command distribution protocol which is fully
cacheable. It exploits caching capabilities of intermediate nodes to improve the perfor-
mance of command distribution and provide scalability. This protocol is generic, i.e., it
can be plugged into any pull-based message-response protocol allowing devices in the
network to “manage themselves”. In our solution, devices selectively pull the manage-
ment commands that they require. We further devise a scalable protocol for monitoring
the state of devices in the network. The monitoring protocol is based on a secure data ag-
gregation scheme from [35], which we extend to allow a constant verification overhead.
The monitoring protocol leverages aggregation capabilities of untrusted intermediate
nodes to provide constant computational and logarithmic communication overhead in
the size of the network, thus allowing the management of millions of devices while
keeping communication overhead in the network and computational overhead on the
managing entity manageable. In order to demonstrate feasibility, we implemented our
solution on Riot-OS – an open source operating system for IoT devices. Further, we
present extensive performance evaluation based on our implementation, in addition to
simulations of the protocols in networks of up to 1, 000, 000 devices demonstrating scal-
ability, and showing the low overhead on the entity managing the network.
Outline. In Section 7.1 we introduce our system model and present the Management
Finite State Machine (M-FSM). In Section 7.2 we present our secure data aggregation
scheme. We present the details of our command distribution and monitoring protocols in
Section 7.3, and describe our implementation in Section 7.4. Performance evaluation of
the protocols is then presented in Section 7.5 and their security is examined in Section 7.6.
We overview work related to our solution in Section 7.7, and conclude this chapter in
Section 7.8.
Remark. The results presented in this chapter are due to the author of this work and
the result of many intensive discussions and collaboration with Moreno Ambrosin (Intel
Labs, Oregon), Matthias Schunter (Intel Labs, Darmstadt), Mauro Conti (University of
Padua, Italy), and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi (TU Darmstadt, Germany). Parts of this chapter
have been published in [13].
7.1 scalable management
7.1.1 Problem Description and System Model
As in Section 4.1.1, we consider a centrally managed dynamic network N that is formed
of a large number n of heterogeneous devices. Manager M is the owner/operator of N,
and is the entity responsible for performing the management of every device in N.
An example network is shown in Figure 7.1. We consider four logical entities par-
ticipating in the protocols: Manager (M), managee (vj), aggregator (ak), and cache (cl). A
managee vj is the entity that is managed by M, i.e., its receives commands and reports
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its status to M. An aggregator ak is the entity that is responsible for aggregating sta-
tus reports coming from managees. And, a cache is the entity that caches management
commands coming from M. While managees clearly represent IoT devices, examples of
aggregators and caches include gateway and edge devices. In fact, each physical device
Di in N may act as more than one of these three logical entities. For example, device D1
in Figure 7.1 acts as managee v1, aggregator a1, and cache c1. Note that, he main goal of
aggregators and caches is reducing the communication overhead and speeding up the
command distribution and status monitoring processes respectively.
v1
a1
c1
a2
c2
v2
c3
v2 v4
a3

v1
a1
c1
Aggregator 
Commands distribution overlay link
Cache
Endpoint
Aggregate collection overlay link 
Physical device boundaries 
1
Manager
2
3 4 5
Figure 7.1: System model as a network of devices; each device acts as at least one of the following
entities: endpoint (vj), aggregator (al), and cache (ck)
The three entities form two types of logical trees in N: a distribution tree that is formed
of caches as inner nodes and managees as leaf nodes, and an aggregation tree where
inner nodes are aggregators and leaf nodes are managees. Connection between any two
entities is purely logical, i.e., it may map to a real network communication (e.g., link
between v2 and a1) or present an internal communication within one physical device
(e.g., link between v1 and a1). This generic model allows representing multiple use
cases that range from Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) where every sensor node acts
as the three logical entities, to smart environments where IoT devices are managees and
gateways act as relay entities (i.e., aggregators and/or caches).
In this model, a secure and scalable management solution enables a manager M to
distribute management commands and collect statistics over device status in a secure
and efficient manner. The basic idea is that an adversary is not capable of tampering
with or forging commands issued by manager or statistics collected from devices in the
network.
7.1.2 Requirements Analysis
Objectives. The main goal of our solution is to allow secure and scalable management of
a very large number of embedded device through a low-end manager M. This translates
to reducing computational and communication overhead on the devices in N and on M,
while preserving the authenticity and integrity of distributed commands and collected
statistics. Consequently, a secure and scalable management solution for large networks
of embedded devices should provide the following properties:
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• Property #1: Guarantee that management commands are efficiently delivered to all
managees in N. We refer to this property as the outbound efficiency property.
• Property #2: Allow M to efficiently collect statistics regarding the state of managees,
e.g., the number of managees that successfully performed a software update. This
property is denoted by the inbound efficiency property.
• Property #3: Guarantee that managees only execute legitimate commands issued
by M. We denote this property by the outbound security property
• Property #4: Ensure the integrity of statistics collected from managees. This prop-
erty is referred to as the inbound security property.
While the satisfaction of property #1 and property #3 allow secure and scalable distribu-
tion of management commands, property #2 and property #4 enable secure and scalable
collection of device status. Property #1 is based on the Management Finite State Machine
(M-FSM) abstraction. And, property #2 and property #4 are achieved through our secure
data aggregation scheme.
Adversary Model. As in Section 4.1 we assume A can eavesdrop on, modify, drop, or
replay any message exchanged between all devices in N and between any device Di and
the manager M. We assume that M is trusted in distributing legitimate management
commands. We consider two kinds of attacks: software attacks whereby an adversary
can modify all the software on any device Di in N except what is protected by hardware;
and, physical attacks that allow an adversary to tamper with the hardware of devices,
modify their software and extract their secrets that are protected by hardware. We as-
sume A is capable of mounting both software and physical attacks on all devices that do
not act as managees, i.e., relay entities (aggregators and caches) and not trusted. These
entities are assumed to be under full control of A. However, A is incapable of launching
physical attacks on devices acting as managees. These devices can only be the target of
software attacks. Finally, we assume a stealthy adversary that aims at tampering with
the management protocols while evading detection. Hence, we do not consider Denial
of Service (DoS) attacks on the management protocols which would reveal A’s presence.
Device Requirements. The design of our solution aims as satisfying all properties #1
to #4. However, in order to satisfy these properties, every device acting as a managee
should be equipped with a lightweight security architecture, e.g., SMART [52] and
TrustLite [84]. Managees that do not satisfy these requirements may lie about their status
possibly affecting the outcome of the statistics collection protocol.
Assumptions. Devices can have different hardware and/or software. However, we as-
sume that every managee (i.e., every physical device Di acting as managee) in N is
equipped with a lightweight security architecture. We assume that all devices can com-
municate to the manager M. Finally, we assume that all cryptographic primitives, such
as Message Authentication Code (MAC), and their implementations are secure.
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7.1.3 Management Finite State Machine
The core component of our management solution is a finite state machine representation
of the management process, which allows decoupling the realization of this process from
any domain specific requirements. This representation provides a domain independent
abstraction that allows defining a simple and scalable command distribution process
between managees and the manager M. The advantage of this representation is that it
enables M to provide upon request a number of static contents. The static nature of
these contents allows their efficient delivery to managees through a distribution tree of
caches.
The specification of the management process in our solution is represented by an ex-
tended finite state machine – the Management Finite State Machine (M-FSM). M-FSM
comprises a number of smaller state machines denoted by sub-M-FSM, each correspond-
ing to the execution of a single command. A simple sub-M-FSM is shown in Figure 7.2.
It constitutes of:
• States: Every sub-M-FSM comprises at least three different states that can be as-
sumed by a device: (1) the starting state which is assumed by devices while waiting
for commands; (2) the attempted execution state assumed by devices after executing
a command; and (3) one or more terminal states, e.g., fatal errors. Note that, states
are identified by their unique IDs SID.
• Transitions: Every sub-M-FSM comprises at least two different transition: A tran-
sition between the starting and attempted execution state, that is labeled by the
execute event. This transition specifies by its corresponding COMMAND the command
to be executed. And, one or more transitions to the terminal state. Note that, the
execution of commands is done by the Execute function, which may write values
to global variables. For example, the execution of COMMAND writes its output into
the variable out. Any transition that is starting at the attempted execution state
is labeled by a switch event on the value of out. This transition specifies by its
corresponding OTHER_ACTION the action to be executed. Further, it may end at a
terminal state or a starting state of a different sub-M-FSM.
A graphical representation of a simple sub-M-FSM is shown in Figure 7.2. In this rep-
resentation states are represented by ovals and transitions are represented by arrows.
On top of each arrow we show the events and commands/actions corresponding to
the transition. These are separated by the symbol “|”. Moreover, the boolean guards
which indicate the transition to be chosen are shown in squared bracket. Recall that a
sub-M-FSM represents the execution of one command. The execution of complex man-
agement processes are created by combining multiple sub-M-FSMs. This allows repre-
senting multiple consecutive commands, where executing one command relies on the
successful execution of previous commands. Combining two sub-M-FSMs is achieved
by adding a new transition from the attempted execution state of one sub-M-FSM to the
starting state of the other. This transition is labeled by a switch event on the value of
out.
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Figure 7.2: A simple sub-M-FSM with 3 states and 4 transitions. One of the transitions is to the
starting state of a different sub-M-FSM
Note that, this composability of sub-M-FSMs allows to continuously update an M-FSM
by adding new sub-M-FSMs over time. This is particularly important in management
scenarios, where the management process cannot be fully defined in advance, e.g., soft-
ware update. Consequently, at any period of time ti, the whole management process
can viewed by a managee as the command to execute at ti. This allows providing a
management solution having a constant overhead on the managees.
Figure 7.3: Example: Software update management
Software Update M-FSM. As a use case example, we explain a simplified software up-
date management process. The M-FSM for this process is shown in Figure 7.3. Every
update process comprises two phases: an installation phase and a recovery phase. Fig-
ure 7.3 shows for each phase the corresponding sub-M-FSM.
The starting state of the update process is the “Not Updated” state (S1). From S1 a
transition labeled as execute allows the device to move to “Update Attempted” state
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(S2) when executing the corresponding command UPDATE via the Execute function. The
output of this execution is then written to the global variable out. Based on the value
of the variable out, the device moves to the next state following one of the transitions
labeled as switch while executing the action NULL. In particular, if the value of out is
FATAL_ERROR the device assumes the terminal “System Failure” state (S3). If the update
was successful returning out == SUCCESS, the device is brought to the starting state of
the subsequent sub-M-FSM, i.e., a “Not Updated” state with a different value for SID.
Finally, if update encountered a simple error returning out == SIMPLE_ERROR, the
device moves to the starting state “Erroneous State” (S4) of the second sub-M-FSM
corresponding to the recovery phase. From S4 a transition labeled as execute allows the
device to move to “Recovery Attempted” state (S5) when executing the corresponding
command RECOVERY through Execute, i.e., recovering to old software. Execute writes its
output to the global variable out2. Based on the value of out2, the device either assume
a terminal state “System Failure” (S6) or moves back to the initial “Not Updated” state.
To prevent recovery from being attempted for an infinite number of times. The RECOVERY
action may keep a counter indicating the number of recovery attempts. When this
counter exceeds a certain threshold, the execution of RECOVERY returns a fatal error, i.e.,
out2 == FATAL_ERROR, bringing the device into the terminal state “System Failure” (S7)
. Additionally, the transition from state S2 to state S7 may be replaced by a transition
to the “Not Updated” state (S1) having a new SID. This would allow avoiding state
explosion [146].
7.2 secure data aggregation
Secure data aggregation enables the reduction of communication overhead while pre-
serving the security of aggregated data (see Section 5.3). In this section we present our
integrity preserving data aggregation scheme which we utilize in our monitoring proto-
col [35]. Our scheme is based on a data aggregation scheme from the Wiresless Sensor
Network (WSN) literature [35]. However, unlike the existing scheme, our scheme has a
constant verification overhead. Thus, it satisfies the requirements of a secure and scal-
able management solution. The proposed aggregation scheme enables a querying entity,
e.g., the control station of the WSN, to securely and efficiently collect statistics from de-
vices in a large network, e.g., sensor nodes. It comprises two main phases: a collection
phase, and a checking phase.
Collection Phase. The querying entity initiates the collection phase by sending a query
to all devices in the network. The query indicates the kind of data the querying entity
is interested in. It is disseminated throughout the network across a tree of aggregating
nodes. The devices in the network located at leaf nodes respond to the query with
the required data. Aggregating nodes then recursively aggregate all data coming from
their child nodes and send the aggregation results to their parents. Along with the
aggregation result, each aggregating node sends to its parent a hash of all the responses
it has aggregated, which serves as a commitment to its aggregation. The final aggregated
response of all devices in the network is then sent by the root of the tree to the querying
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entity. Note that, all hashes generated by all aggregators are forwarded across the tree
along with the aggregation results and are also sent back to the querying entity.
Checking Phase. Upon receiving the final response and the commitments, the query-
ing entity initiates the verification phase in order to verify the integrity of the response.
The querying entity broadcasts the commitments and the response to all devices in the
network. Every device is expected to verify that its contribution has been successfully
added to the final response. If the verification was successful, each device replies with a
protocol specific acknowledgment. Acknowledgments are authenticated based on mul-
tisignatures, which are aggregated along the tree en route to the querying entity. Finally,
if the multisignature verifies successfully, the querying entity concludes that the integrity
of the aggregated response was preserved.
7.3 protocol description
Our solution constitutes of two protocols that are executed between the manager M and
the devices Di in the network N: a command distribution protocol, and a monitoring (or
statistics collection) protocol. In this section we describe the details of those protocols.
7.3.1 Command Distribution Protocol
The command distribution protocol represents a scalable protocol that allows the distri-
bution of management commands issued by M to every managee vj in N. The protocol
is based on the specification of the Management Finite State Machine (M-FSM). It lever-
ages the abstraction provided by the M-FSM to enable domain independence, minimal
memory overhead on managees, and efficient caching that is convenient for Content De-
livery Networks (CDNs). For the sake of clarity, we present our command distribution
protocol as executed between M and a single managee vj through a single cache cl.
The intuition behind the protocol is that every managee vj in a specific states of
M-FSM requests from M the transitions that correspond to this state. Based on these
transitions, vj can move throughout the M-FSM executing management commands and
assuming new states. In particular, the transition requested by vj may either be labeled
as execute indicating a command COMMAND to be executed, or as switch indicating a
OTHER_ACTION action to be performed. The managee vj requests the transition by send-
ing M (through cache cl) a management request req. The manager M then replies with a
management response resp. The intermediate caches may cache management responses
before forwarding them to the managees in order to reduce the latency of future requests.
Caching of management responses is of particular importance in the case of large pay-
loads, e.g., software update [11]. Note that, the assumed communication model for our
command distribution protocol is already supported by numerous existing protocols
such as CoAP [27]. It is also compatible with recently proposed data centric protocols,
e.g., Named-Data Networking (NDN) [78].
Protocol Details. The details of the protocol are shown in Figure 7.4. A managee vj in
state SID sends M a management request demanding a transition from its current state.
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SID,[< var1 : val1 >, . . .],∆τ
Managee vi
req ← {SID,[< var1 : val1 >, . . .],∆τ}
Manager M
M-FSM, t,∆t, kτ ,∆τ
resp ← {TID, SIDS , SIDD, COMMAND, t,∆t, µ}
µ← mac(kτ ;TID‖SIDS‖SIDD‖COMMAND‖t‖∆t)
if vermac(kτ ;TID‖SIDS‖SIDD‖COMMAND‖t‖∆t, µ) = 1 then
endif
out← Execute(COMMAND)
MoveToState (SIDD)
req ′ ← {SID,[< out : out >, . . .],∆τ}
req
resp
// Cache resp according to
// caching policy
req
resp
Cache cl
// Caching policy
req ′
req ′
. . . . . .
Figure 7.4: Command distribution protocol based on µTesla
The request req is formed of the ID SID of vj’s current state, and a set [< var1 : val1 >, . . .]
of M-FSM variables with their respective values. Note that, the transport protocol indi-
cates the appropriate way for including these parameters in req. M uses these parameters
to identify the best management response it should send to vj. This response resp is com-
posed of a transition from the current state SID along with its corresponding manage-
ment command. Upon receiving resp, vj executes the command via the function Execute
and assumes the corresponding attempted execution state indicated by the transition.
After executing the command, vj sends M a new management request containing the
output of this execution. As a response, vj receives a new transition to a (terminal or
starting) state – MoveToState.
Note that, if the command has a large payload, e.g., software update, M’s response
would only contain a pointer to the payload, e.g., a hash. This pointer can be then used
to retrieve the payload.
In order to ensure freshness of cached responses, a validity interval ∆t and timestamp
t are added to each resp issued by M. To determine whether a response resp is fresh,
a managee simply checks whether resp’s t is within ∆t. To ensure availability, caches
should allow managees to enforce management requests to be directly served by M.
This can be done in data centric protocols, such as Named-Data Networking (NDN) [78],
through special flags, e.g., Freshness and MustBeFresh. The application level protocol
CoAP [27], on the other hand, provides a Max-Age option which indicates the time in
seconds after which a response is no longer considered fresh.
Protocol Security. Our command distribution protocol can be combined with different
security primitives that allow authenticated broadcast. For example, management re-
sponses may be authenticated by M with either µTesla [110] or digital signatures. Note
that, using µTesla enables applicability to low-end devices, which are not capable of per-
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forming computationally extensive public key operations, while preserving cacheability
and public verifiability of the distributed management commands.
Based on the chosen authentication primitive, M’s responses are either sent to man-
agees with a MAC or a digital signature. Authenticating commands with digital signa-
tures is fairly simple. Each response is signed by M using its secret key skM, and verified
by managees using M’s public key pkM.
Command distribution based on µTesla is shown in Figure 7.4. When µTesla is used,
each response is authenticated with a MAC based on the symmetric key kτ, which is
valid for a short interval of time τ. This key kτ is disclosed at time τ + d allowing
managees to verify the MACs on management responses authenticated with that key. In
other words, at time τ, the managee vj downloads and buffers a management response
that it requires. Then, at time τ+ d, i.e., when kτ is disclosed, vj verifies the response
and executes the corresponding command.
Building a key sequence in µTesla is based on hash chains, i.e., the key kτ for interval
τ is generated as the hash of the key kτ+1 for interval τ + 1. Since different applica-
tions may demand different key disclosure times, M maintains multiple key sequences
that have different key disclosure times. When M receives a management request req, it
authenticates the response resp based on the key from sequence indicated by req.
Note that, management responses authenticated with digital signatures can be cached
permanently. However, responses on µTesla expire when the authentication key is dis-
closed. Managees can freely select, through req, whether the required management re-
sponse should be authenticated with a MAC or a digital signature. This allows managees
to choose between performing extensive computation and waiting for authentication
key to be disclosed. There are various factors that may alter a managee’s choice on this
matter, .e.g., energy source, computational power, or application specific time bounds.
Additionally, a managee may choose between different key sequences, with different
disclosure times, based on multiple factors including its degree of synchronization. This
allows managees to tradeoff security level for a delay in receiving the management re-
sponse. Finally, we consider the number of different key sequences maintained by M
and their key disclosure times to be design parameters that are application specific.
7.3.2 Statistics Collection protocols
The monitoring protocol represents a scalable protocol that allows the manager M to
collect statistics on the status of devices in N, e.g., the number of managees that assume a
specific state in the Management Finite State Machine (M-FSM). The protocol is based on
the secure data aggregation scheme presented in Section 7.2. Thus, it allows an aggregate
value to be generated within the network, while imposing a verification overhead which
constant in networks size. As in Chapter 4 and 5, the entities performing the aggregation
are not trusted. They form an aggregation tree that has M as a root and managees as
leaf nodes.
Protocol Details. The details of the protocol are as follows:
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• M initiates the first phase protocol by broadcasting the ID SID of a state of interest,
e.g., “Not Updated” state (S7) in Figure 7.3. M’s request can be authenticated with
either a digital signature or a MAC based on µTesla.
• Every managee vj replies to its parent aggregator with a bit indicating whether it
currently assumes the state with ID SID, i.e., 1 if vj is in SID and 0 otherwise.
• Every aggregator ak sums all the values coming from its child nodes, and forwards
the result to its parent. Eventually, M receives a final aggregate value indicating
the total number of managees in a state wit h ID SID.
• M initiates the second phase of the protocol by broadcasting the received results.
This broadcast is also authenticated as above, i.e., through digital signatures or
µTesla.
• Upon receiving the second broadcast, every managee vj checks whether its contri-
bution was correctly integrated in the final aggregate value (see Section 7.2). If the
check was successful, vj replies with a multisignature on a protocol specific “ACK”
message. Otherwise, vj sends back a “NACK” message to its parent node.
• Aggregators aggregate the multisignatures en route to M according to the defi-
nition of a multisignature scheme in Chapter 2. Eventually, M receives a single
multisignature for the whole network N.
• Having all public keys of managees in N, M can verify the received multisigna-
ture and determine whether the total number of managees in SID was generated
correctly.
If the verification of the multisignature failed, M concludes that an error has occurred.
This error might be benign, e.g., caused by a connection problem. The error might also
mean that aggregators were trying to maliciously modify the outcome of the protocol.
Device Inspection. In some scenarios, it might be desirable to detect the IDs of devices
in a specific state SID rather than their mere number (as described above). In this case,
M may issue a command requesting the IDs of all managees in that state. As a response,
every managee in SID will report back to M with its ID. Note that, the overhead of this
procedure is linear in the size of the network, and it can easily overwhelm the whole
network unless constrained to a small number of devices.
7.4 implementation
We implemented the two main entities involved in our solution, i.e., the managee vj
and the manager M. Our implementation of the managee targets IETF Class 1 and
2 devices [26]. It was realized as a Client Agent Module for Riot OS [18, 64], which
executed both the command distribution and monitoring protocols.1 On the other hand,
1 Our implementation of the monitoring protocol is based on the multisignature from [24] which uses bilinear
pairings [25].
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Figure 7.5: Client Agent Module of managees for Riot-OS
the implementation of M comprises a simple application with several exposed APIs
for command distribution. M’s application also collects periodic statistics regarding the
status of managees. The implementation of M will not be presented in this section.
Riot OS [18, 64] is an open source operating system for low-end embedded devices. It
constitutes a basic microkernel, in addition to a set of modules that can be included if
necessary for the execution of an application. On Riot OS there is no differentiation be-
tween processes and threads. Every application executes on its own thread. It can create
a large number of other threads, which is limited by the size of available memory. The
Riot module we implemented for managees exposes a number of APIs that can by used
by any application is order to allow the command distribution protocol. This module
utilizes CoAP [27] transfer protocol for the distribution of management commands from
M and for the collection of statistics from vj.
Our implementation is shown in Figure 7.5. The Client Agent Module is formed of
two components: a Client Agent and a simple CoAP Server. These two components
execute on different threads and interact through Inter Process Communication (IPC).
The module receives commands from the network and forwards them through IPC to
applications that are performing management process. The communication between the
managee and the manager exploits a set of minimal CoAP REST APIs. Note that, this im-
plementation can make use of an edge node translating CoAP requests into HTTP [50].
Let SERVER_IP denote the IP address of the aggregator closest to the managee, a com-
mand request through CoAP is:
coap : //[SERVER_IP]/sid?sid = SID& . . .,
Note that sid = SID represents the obligatory part of the request. Similarly, a statistics
collection request through CoAP for the state with ID SID is:
coap : //[BROADCAST_IP]/assess/?nonce = N&sid = SID.
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7.5 performance evaluation
We assess performance of our solution in terms of communication, memory overhead,
and runtime. We further present simulations results for networks of up to 1, 000, 000
devices. Our performance evaluation is based on the implementation in Section 7.4. The
managees in our evaluation constitute low-end embedded devices with specifications
comparable to those of M3 Open Node devices from the SensLAB testbed [2]. They
are equipped with 64 KBytes of RAM, a 32 bits ARM Cortex M3 processor running at
72 MHz, and a 2.4 GHz transceiver [3]. On the other hand, the manager is comparable
to a Raspberry Pi Mod B. It features 512 MBytes of RAM, 2 GBytes of flash memory, and
a 32 bits ARM Cortex A processor running at 700 MHz.
Note that, we utilized the embedded system library in [145] for the implementation
of our multisignature scheme, and the mbedTLS library [1] for implementation of the
remaining cryptographic primitives, i.e., MAC and ECDSA.
Memory Cost. Every managee vj in N should store the following: (1) a key pair (ski, pki)
for the multisignature scheme; (2) one M-FSM state which constitutes of the state ID SID;
and (3) the public key pkM of the manager M (in case the protocol security is based on
digital signatures) or the root of a hash chain (in case the protocol security is based on
µTesla). The memory cost of Di is around 322 Bytes in the case of digital signatures,
and 310 Bytes in the case of µTesla. Low-end embedded devices, which we target in
this solution, have more than 1, 024 Bytes of Flash memory. Our solution uses 31.4%
of this memory when based on digital signatures, and 30.3% based on µTesla. Finally,
aggregators do not store any data, and the storage overhead of a cache is dependent on
the size of cached data and overall capacity of the cache’s memory.
Communication Cost. We used HMAC based on SHA-1 as our MAC implementation,
and ECDSA as our digital signature scheme, i.e., `mac = 160 and `sign = 320. We further
used a 32 bit timestamp and chose `id = 32. As a consequence, MACs are 20 Bytes each.
The variables t, ∆t, SID, and TID are 4 Bytes each. And, digital signatures are 40 Bytes
each. Note that, using µTesla adds an overhead of broadcasting a key every interval τ,
i.e., 30 Bytes, which we do not include in our analysis. For the command distribution
protocol, every managee vj has a communication overhead, which is between 80 and
334 Bytes when digital signatures are used, and 37 and 291 Bytes when µTesla is used.
On the other hand, the statistics collection protocol is formed of two phases. In the first
phase, every managee vj receives 24 Bytes, and sends 26 Bytes. The communication over-
head of the second phases is logarithmic in the network size. It depends on the number
of managees and the depth of the aggregation tree. This overhead is caused by the size of
data required by each device to check whether its contribution was integrated correctly
into the final aggregate value [110]. More precisely, every managee has a communication
overhead which is upper bounded by receiving 26× (d+ s) Bytes and sending 84 Bytes,
where s is the number of managees in N and d is the depth of the aggregation tree.
For example, if N is formed of n = 210 devices, the depth of the aggregation tree is
d = 14, and the number of managees is s = 24 = 16, then every managee would receive
780 Bytes.
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Table 7.1: Performance of cryptographic functions
Function M3 node from SenLab Raspberry Pi Mod B
Run-time (ms) Run-time (ms)
H(m) ∈ G1(1) 360.319 89.168
gx1, g1 ∈ G1 494.619 124.604
g1 × g ′1, g1,g1 ∈ G1 23.615 8.459
e : G1 ×G2 → GT – (2) 1.736
hash(3) 0.102 0.031
hmac(3) 0.408 0.124
verECDSA (3) 1181.140 – (2)
(1) Hash computed on a 20 Bytes nonce
(2) Not performed by the device during the protocol
(3) For 64 Bytes
Runtime. The runtime of the two protocols presented in this chapter is dominated by
communication overhead and the time required to perform cryptographic operations.
We measured the runtime overhead of the cryptographic primitives adopted in our pro-
tocols on both the managees, i.e., M3 device, and the aggregator/manager, i.e., Rasp-
berry Pi Mod B. The results are shown in Table 7.1.
(a) First scanrio (b) Second scenario
Figure 7.6: Performance of command distribution
Simulation Results. We used the OMNeT++ [104] network simulator to assess the per-
formance of our solution in large scale. The protocols were implemented on the appli-
cation layer, where cryptographic operation were emulated with delays corresponding
to real measurements of their execution time on M3 node and Raspberry Pi Mod B. For
our simulations, the average communication rate between managees and aggregators
was set to 75 Kbps, which corresponds to the effective bandwidth for ZigBee [135]. The
communication rate among aggregators/caches and between them and the manager
was set to 10 Mbps. We simulated two different scenarios. In the first scenarios devices
acting as managees are low-end devices, while those acting as aggregators/caches are
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(a) First scenario (b) Second scenario
Figure 7.7: Performance of statistics collection
high-end devices. In the second scenario, devices acting as managees, aggregators, and
caches are all low-end devices.
For the first scenario, we simulated various network sizes, which ranged from 26 to
220 = 1, 048, 5761. The aggregation/caching tree formed a binary tree rooted at M. The
number of devices in this tree was set to be proportional to the number of managees,
where the ratio r between aggregators/caches and managees is constant. In this sce-
nario, the topology of the network is assumed to be static, e.g., infrastructure in smart
environments. For the second scenario, we also varied the size of the network from 26
to 220 = 1, 048, 5761, and we assumed that the managees formed a binary tree rooted
at M. Figure 7.6, and 7.7 show the results of our simulations (in the two scenarios) for
command distributions and statistics collection protocols respectively.
For evaluating the command distribution protocol in the first scenario we set r to
32. Further, we configured the caches to utilize a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) caching policy.
Every managee requests, at a random time from 0 s to 1 s, a command from M. We simu-
lated the two cases where commands are authenticated based on ECDSA and on µTesla.
In the case of µTesla, managees can only verify and execute a command upon the dis-
closure of the authentication key at τ+ d, where ∆τ ∈ {0.5, 1} s and d ∈ {1, 2} s. We com-
pared our command distribution protocol to direct fetching from manager. Figure 7.6
shows the time needed by a managee to fetch a command from M as function of num-
ber of managees for all simulated cases. Our command distribution protocol performs
significantly better than direct fetching. Further, the time needed to fetch a command is
logarithmic in the number of managees. The figure also shows that when d = 1 µTesla
performs better than digital signatures. However, this performance improvement comes
at the cost of stricter assumptions and a more complex key management procedure.
Our experiments highlights the scalability of the command distribution protocol, which
leads to maximum cacheability of commands. The presented results are compatible with
prior evaluation results, e.g., evaluation results of Updaticator [11], which performed a
small scale evaluation over a Named-Data Networking (NDN) network [78].
Finally, for evaluating the command distribution protocol in the first scenario, we
considered the cases where r = 16 and r = 32. We compared our statistics collection
protocol to the data aggregation scheme from [35]. Figure 7.7 shows the time needed by
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the manager to collect statistics regarding a state in M-FSM as function of number of
managees. The runtime of our statistics collection protocol is logarithmic in the number
of managees compared to the linear runtime imposed by the data aggregation scheme
from [35]. Note that, the overhead of both protocols is mainly caused by the verification
of the acknowledgment in the second phase, which is constant in our statistics collec-
tion protocol and linear in [35]. This overhead is also dependent on the height of the
aggregation tree, which in turn depends on the ratio r. Our statistics collection protocol
performs better when r = 32 than r = 16. Recall that, this is caused by the amount of
data that should be exchanged to allow a device to verify its contribution.
When the number of managees is small, e.g., less than 32, 768 entities for r = 16 , the
aggregation scheme from [35] performs better than our statistics collection protocol (e.g.,
4 s compared to 4.4 s). This is due to our adoption of multisignatures which are far more
costly for low-end devices than a simple MAC. However, as the number of managees in-
creases, the runtime overhead of the data aggregation scheme grows rapidly compared
to the slowly growing runtime of our statistics collection protocol. As a consequence,
when the number of managees exceeds a certain threshold, our statistics collection pro-
tocol starts performing better than the data aggregation scheme (e.g., 4.7 s compared
to 5.4 s). This result proposes devising a hybrid approach, where the manager chooses
between MACs and multisignatures based on the number of managees in N.
7.6 security analysis
The goal of our management service is to enable the manager M to securely (1) issue
commands to every managee vj in the network N (command distribution protocol),
i.e., vj should only correctly execute commands that are issued by M; and (2) collect
statistics concerning the status of managees in N (statistics collection protocol), i.e., M
should only accept correct aggregated statistics that reflect that actual state of managees
in N. This security goal can be formalized as a security experiment ExpA, where the
adversary A can interact with every device in N as well as M. A has full control over
the communication channel between every two devices in N, and between N and M, i.e.,
it can eavesdrop on, modify, drop, and inject arbitrary messages to any Di ∈ N and M.
A can maliciously modify the software of any device in N. It may also exploit physical
proximity to tamper with the hardware of any device that does not act as a managee. At
the end of the experiment, vj outputs its decision b1 indicating whether it has accepted
a malicious command and M outputs its decision b2 indicating whether it has accepted
a manipulated aggregate value, following a polynomial number (in `hash, `mac, `N, and
`sign) of steps performed by A. The OR of the two outputs represents the result of this
security experiment, i.e., ExpA = b | b = b1 ∨ b2. In the following we provide the
definition of secure management under the pre-described adversary model:
Definition 7.1 (Secure management service). Let f be a polynomial function in `hash, `mac,
`N, and `sign. A management service is secure if the probability Pr
[
b = 1|ExpA(1
`) = b
]
is
negligible in ` = f(`hash, `mac, `N, `sign).
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Theorem 7.1 (Security of our management solution). The management solution presented
in this chapter is a secure management service (Definition 7.1) if the underlying MAC, digital
signature, and multisignature schemes are selective forgery resistant, and µTesla is secure.
Proof sketch of Theorem 7.1. We consider the two cases where the A either tricks vj to
return its decision b1 = 1 or M to return b2 = 1:
• A attacks command distribution: As a response to a management request contain-
ing ∆t, the managee vj receives from the manager M a management command
{TID, ..., t,∆t} authenticated with either a digital signature or a MAC. vj accepts
and returns b1 = 1 only if the verification of the signature (resp. MAC) was success-
ful. In order to convince vj to return b1 = 1 , A then must forge a digital signature
(resp. MAC). However, since the signature (resp. MAC) scheme is selective forgery
resistant, the probability of A forging it is negligible in `sign (resp. `mac). Moreover,
since the keys used for creating MACs in the command distribution protocol are
based on a hash chain, where kτ−1 ← hash(kτ). A could use an older key kτ−1 in
order to generate the MAC or extract the current key kτ. However, since µTesla is
secure (i.e., the hash used for creating the key sequence is collision resistant and
preimage resistant), the probability of generating a correct MAC or extracting the
current key is negligible in `hash.
• A attacks statistics collection: In order to undermine the security of the statistics
collection protocol and convince manager to accept a manipulated aggregate value
and return b2 = 1, A may try to: (1) modify the query sent by manager (i.e., state
of interest) during the collection phase, or (2) forge or replay a multisignature over
an acknowledgment of a managee vj during the verification phase. Attacking the
collection phase requires A to either forge a digital signature or a MAC based on
µTesla. However, this attack is negligible in `sign, `mac, and `hash. Similarly, since
the multisignature is selective forgery resistant, attacking the verification phase is
negligible in `sign and `N.
Therefore, the probability of A convincing a managee vj to execute a malicious com-
mand, or the manager M to accept manipulated statistics is negligible in `hash, `mac, `N,
and `sign.
7.7 related work
In this section we present work from the literature that is directly related to the solution
presented in this chapter.
Device Management The Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) recently proposed The Lightweight
Machine to Machine protocol (LWM2M) [103], which aims at allowing secure manage-
ment of embedded devices. However, this solution is geared toward the single-device
setting. It allows the management of individual devices only, and is not applicable to
large scale scenarios. In princple, prior work on management of embedded devices ei-
ther focuses on managing the IoT network itself [120], or requires managing each device
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individually [131]. We consider existing work to be complementary to the management
solution that we present in this chapter. In particular, our solution could leverage exist-
ing work to allow inspection of individual devices, performing one time management
operations, or maintaining the network topology when required. Ambrosin et al. pre-
sented a software update protocol that exploits cache-enabled networks to allows secure
and scalable delivery of confidential updates [11]. The solution presented by the authors
is based on a Named-Data Networking (NDN) network. Further, it does not allow the
manager to collect statistics regarding the state of managees in the network. Burke et
al. proposed a security architecture for instrumented environments [29]. Their solution
is also based on NDN networks. It allows the exchange of authentic and confidential
messages (i.e., commands and acknowledgments) between the manager and managees.
However, the proposed security architecture does not allow messages to be multicasted.
Therefore, it is also not applicable for managing devices in large scale scenarios.
Secure data aggregation. Secure data aggregation allows reducing the communication
overhead in WSN, by combining data of different sensor, while maintaining its integrity
and/or secrecy. A lot of prior work has been done on secure aggregation schemes that
preserve data integrity. Proposed schemes rely on witness-based solutions [51], crypto-
graphic techniques [72, 93, 34, 33, 156, 87, 106], or trust relations [105]. Further, they
either have high communication and computational overhead [51, 100, 36], require glob-
ally shared keys [93], or involve asymmetric cryptography [87], which is computation-
ally expensive. Note that, while existing secure aggregation aim at reducing the com-
putational and communication overhead on low-end sensor nodes, they consider the
base station to be a powerful entity capable of performing a large number of operation
in order to verify the aggregate value. In this context, node congestion, i.e., the upper
bound on the communication overhead of one node, is considered as an important met-
ric for evaluating secure data aggregation schemes. Chan et al. presented a secure data
aggregation scheme for WSN, which has an overall node congestion of O(∆ log2 n) [35].
This value is further reduced by Frikken et al. to O(∆ logn) through a new commit-
ment scheme [58]. However, the two schemes require the powerful base station to create
and XOR MACs generated by all sensor nodes. Such schemes are not applicable in our
model, were a low-power entity should be capable of securely collecting statistics from
a very large number of devices.
7.8 conclusion
In this chapter we investigated the problem of secure and scalable management of em-
bedded devices and presented a secure management solution that is applicable in large
scale. The presented solution allows a low-power manager to securely distribute com-
mand and monitor the status of a very large number of devices. Our command distribu-
tion protocol relies on a management process abstraction based on finite state machines.
This abstraction allows to decouple the management process from any domain specific
parameters, thus, enabling efficient retrieval of management commands. On the other
hand, our device monitoring protocol is based on a secure data aggregation scheme
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which has a verification overhead that is logarithmic in the number of managed enti-
ties. As our evaluation results show, the solution presented in this chapter is extremely
scalable and has a manageable runtime overhead.

8
D I S C U S S I O N A N D C O N C L U S I O N
Large networks of embedded systems are becoming increasingly popular. These net-
works represent an attractive target for attack as they are often connected to the legacy
internet, they collect and process sensitive information through increasingly deployed
sensors, and they perform safety-critical physical actions through various types of ac-
tuators. A large number of attacks have been launched on embedded networks, e.g.,
Stuxnet [148] and HVAC [149] attacks.
As presented in this dissertation, remote attestation aims at establishing trust in re-
mote devices by allowing a trusted verifier to check the software integrity of a remote
device. While existing remote attestation protocols enable the detection of malware in-
festation attacks on a standalone device, they fall short in securing emerging networks
of embedded devices. These protocols are not only inefficient in large scale, they are also
insecure under any realistic adversary model for large embedded networks.
In this dissertation we aim at securing large embedded systems against a wide range
of possible attacks. We present the design and implementation of multiple collective
attestation solutions that are capable of detecting malware infestation attacks, physical
attacks, and runtime attacks on devices in embedded networks. Further, since device
management and software update represents an important starting point for an attack
on embedded devices, and since existing secure management schemes are not applica-
ble in large scale, we present the design and implementation of a secure and scalable
management solution for large embedded networks. The main results of this disserta-
tion are summarized in Section 8.1 followed by a brief discussion on future research
directions in Section 8.2.
8.1 dissertation summary
Detection of Malware Infestation. In Chapter 4 we investigate malware infestation prob-
lem in the context of large embedded networks. We further present two collective attesta-
tion solutions that allow the detection of malware infestation attacks on multiple devices
in the network. The two solutions have different properties, they are based on different
assumption and cryptographic primitives, and they provide different security guaran-
tees in different application scenarios. They provide a tradeoff between efficiency and
security. Further, we present a systematic treatment of collective attestation that allows
establishing such a security service on solid ground. Our treatment enables the analy-
sis and comparison among various solutions, as well as the construction of a generic
collective attestation solution that completes the aforementioned tradeoff by providing
stronger security guarantees at the cost of minimal additional requirements and runtime
overhead.
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Detection of Physical Attacks. In Chapter 5 we investigate the problem of physical
attacks in the context of large embedded networks. We again present two collective
attestation solutions that allow the detection of both malware infestation and physical
attacks on multiple devices in the network. The two solutions have different overall
cost, are based on different assumptions, and are applicable in different scenarios. We
start by providing the basis for the detection of physical attacks through defining the
adversary model and identifying the requirements for a secure collective attestation
solution under physical attacks. We then provide solutions that are applicable for both
centralized and autonomous networks under different adversarial capabilities. The two
solutions presented in Chapter 5 allow detection of malware infestation and physical
attacks for a wide range of application scenarios.
Detection of Runtime Attacks. In Chapter 6 we investigated the problem of runtime
attacks in the context of large embedded networks. We present a collective attestation
solution that allows the detection of runtime attacks in large autonomous networks. This
solution enables low-end embedded devices to securely collaborate and exchange data
within the autonomous system. It is based on three major building blocks: data integrity
attestation that allows the integrity of sensitive data to be defined based on the integrity
of the software that process this data; modular attestation that decomposes large soft-
ware into small interacting modules, thus reducing the overhead of attestation; and
execution path representation based on Multiset Hash (MSH) functions which reduces
the overhead of attestation considerably.
Secure and Scalable Management. In Chapter 7 we investigated the problem of secure
device management in the context of large embedded networks. We present a secure
and scalable management solution that is capable of managing and collecting statistics
over large number of devices. This solution allows a resource-constrained manager to
distribute management commands and monitor the status of a large embedded network
in a secure and efficient manner. The command distribution part of our solution is based
on abstracting the management process by means of finite state machines. Abstraction
allows decoupling management from all domain specific parameter, hereby enabling
secure and efficient distribution of management commands. Statistics collection, on the
other hand, relies on a our secure data aggregation scheme that has a logarithmic verifi-
cation overhead in the size of the network.
8.2 future research directions
Privacy Preserving Attestation. All proposed attestation protocols expect the prover to
send the verifier its current software configuration in plaintext. Similarly, in the collec-
tive attestation solutions presented in this dissertation, devices in an embedded network
either send their software configuration to all neighbors when they first join the network,
or to the verifier during the execution of the attestation protocol. Consequently, an ad-
versary could exploit attestation to learn the software configuration of a device, which
can then be used to find and exploit a known software vulnerability for that particu-
lar software configuration. This problem is even more critical for collective attestation
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that allows the adversary to scale its attack for a large number of devices. Naive solu-
tions to this problem, e.g., encryption of the attestation response or randomization of
the measurement process, impose a high verification overhead and do not scale to large
embedded networks. It might also be desirable in certain scenarios to hide the software
configuration of the prover from the authentic verifier while allowing it to verify its
trustworthiness. This is also not possible with the current attestation paradigm, where
the verifier needs to have a priori knowledge of the prover’s software configuration. The
consequences of this open access to a device’s software configuration caused by attesta-
tion should be investigated. This would allow determining the severity of the problem
on both single-device and collective attestation. It would also enable devising privacy
preserving attestation protocols that do not reveal a device’s software configuration to
an external eavesdropper or to an authentic verifier.
Detection of Advanced Runtime Attacks. Control-Flow Attestation (CFA) allows the
detection of some classes of runtime attacks that are not prevented by any other miti-
gation technique, e.g., Control-Flow Integrity (CFI), as it allows the prover to report its
exact execution path to the verifier. However, in order to detect such attacks, the verifier
should be able to inspect the received execution path and determine illegal control-flow
events. It is usually assumed that the verifier has a priori knowledge regarding certain
characteristics of the execution path, which we refer to in this dissertation as the verifica-
tion policy, e.g., an upper bound on the number of iterations of a loop, or privileged vs.
non-privileged paths. Regardless of the validity of such an assumption, it does not allow
the detection of all classes of runtime attacks, e.g., attacks that do not violate any known
verification policy. CFA should devise means for constructing a comprehensive set of
verification policies that allow the verifier to detect a wide range of runtime attacks. The
verification process should be automatically generated from the context of execution.
Possible directions for solving this problem might include leveraging machine learning
techniques to classify execution paths based on the context of execution, or utilizing
static and dynamic analysis for a better understanding of programs’ behavior. Finally,
CFA should also allow the detection of runtime attacks that do not change a program’s
execution path by measuring and reporting the data flow within this program.
Post Quantum Attestation. Current and emerging computing paradigms and architec-
tures, e.g., quantum computing, present a formidable threat to existing security services,
including attestation, as they threaten the security of their underlying cryptographic
primitives. The consequence of quantum computing on the security of attestation should
be investigated. This would enable devising single-device and collective attestation so-
lutions that are secure under a powerful quantum adversary.
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